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IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND:
LEGAL ASPECTS OF CHANGING
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES
John H. Jackson*
Jean-Victor Louis**
Mitsuo Matsushita***

International economic and political interdependence has increased dramatically since the close of World War II. We now
watch foreign wars on our living room television sets, move billions
of dollars worth of funds across national borders daily, 1 and feel the
effects of political violence in the Mideast throughout our domestic
farmlands. A corollary to economic and political interdependence,
however, is the less visible but equally pervasive problem of legal
interdependence. Any attempt, in the contemporary world, to create
new international rules or institutions necessarily depends on the national legal and constitutional systems of a number of countries.
This Article analyzes the Tokyo Round2 negotiations of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade3 as a case study of the legal
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. - ed.
•• Professor of Law, University of Brussels, Belgium (Free University of Brussels). - ed.
••• Professor of Law, Sophia University, Tokyo, Japan. - ed.
This is an advance and summary version of a book, to be published in the near future by
the University of Michigan Press, which reports on the results of a joint research project on
comparative legal aspects of implementing the results of the Tokyo Round of international
trade negotiations. Professor Jackson is responsible for Part IV concerning the United States;
Professor Louis is responsible for Part II, concerning the European Economic Community,
and Professor Matsushita is responsible for Part III, concerning Japan. The authors collaborated on other portions of the manuscript and assisted each other on all the parts. The authors
are indebted to the DANA Foundation for a grant which assisted with some of the expenses of
this study, and to the Cook Endowment of the University of Michigan for support of this
project.
1. N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1981, at D5, col. 1.
2. See generally l DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF GATT, THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1979); 2 DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF GATT, THE TOKYO ROUND
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1980).
3. Articles of Agreement for the International Monetary Fund, openedfor signature Dec.
27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, T:I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, as amended in IMF Survey 97 (1978);
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. The current version of
GATT is contained in 4 GENERAL AGREEMENTS ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969) [hereinafter cited as GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS].
See generally D. CARREAU, T. FLORY & P. JUILLARD, DROIT INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIQUE
(2d ed. 1980); K. DAM & J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1977) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS]; C. COOMBS,
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processes and constraints that influence international economic
negotiations.
The interplay of national and international legal structures has
already demonstrated its influence on global economic policy. At the
end of the Kennedy Round of the GAIT negotiations (1962-1967),
the United States' negotiators agreed to a separate adjunct package
of tariff reductions and the elimination of certain nontariff barriers.
Despite support for the package from the executive branch, congressional approval was never obtained, and the package never came
into force. 4 Similarly, negotiators for the European Economic Community during the Tokyo Round were not always certain if they
could, through their own power, bind Member States of the EEC to
international agreements on certain subjects. As a result, the negotiators chose to omit certain subject areas from the negotiation, to reduce the risk of "constitutional challenge." 5 The Japanese
constitutional structure imposes its own unique restraints on actions
THE ARENA OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (1976); G. CURZON, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL
DIPLOMACY: THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE AND ITS IMPACT ON NA•
TIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICIES (1965); J. HORSEFIELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND, 1945-1965: TWENTY YEARS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION, VOL. I:
CHRONICLE (1969); R. HUDEC, THE GAIT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY
(1975); J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GAIT (1969) [hereinafter cited as
WORLD TRADE]; A. LOWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (1977); 25 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF J.M. KEYNES: SHAPING THE POSTWAR WORLD (D. Moggridge ed.
1980); F. SOUTHARD, The Evolution of the International Monetary Fund in 135 PRINCETON
ESSAYS ON INT'L FINANCE (1979); Carreau, Flory & Juillard, Cronique de Droit International
Economique, 1976 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (Centre National de la
Recherche Scientifique).
4. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S. NONTARIFF BARRIERS in WILLIAMS COMMISSION,
PAPERS I at 712-14 (1971). See also S. REP. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 19; S. CONG. RES.
38, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. l; Amendment to H.R. 17324, 114 CONG. REC. 26,133 (1968); Renegotiations Amendment Act, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (congressional reaction to the International
Anti-Dumping Code).
5. The line between constitutional challenge and strong political challenge is difficult to
draw. Often the constitutional structure is what positions the potential political challenge. For
example, if the Constitution requires Congress to approve an agreement, then the politics of
Congress become all-important. Some of the results of the 1967 Kennedy Round were
strongly challenged in United States congressional and other procedures, and these challenges
and criticisms were in part the influence for developing a new procedure in the United States
for negotiating in the Tokyo Round. See Part IV infra (describing procedure). Since this new
procedure depended heavily on congressional approval of the results under a normal statutory
but "fast track" procedure, the potential for "constitutional" challenge in the courts was
sharply reduced, so the true potential challenge in the Tokyo Round resulted from the politics
of Congress. This clearly limited certain kinds of potential negotiations. For example, the
1974 Act authorizing U.S. participation made it rather clear that certain industrial sectors, such
as textiles, or certain sensitive steel products, would probably not be negotiable. The situation
in the EEC WllS more complex and, in general, during the Kennedy Round the EEC seemed
reluctant to embark on major reformulations of international economic rules. Even with a
certain amount of caution, the EEC negotiators ended the Tokyo Round with a large amount
of ambiguity as to the constitutional distribution of powers for approving the results of the
Tokyo Round. See Part II infra.
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taken by international negotiators, and influences international
rulemaking in the same way. 6
This experience suggests the importance of the relationship between domestic legal rules and international economic negotiations.
Our goal in this study is to identify the legal and constitutional constraints on the development of international trade policy, and to analyze the degree to which those constraints are changeable. This
analysis is conducted by considering how the various Tokyo Round
agreements were implemented in the national legal system of each of
the three key actors in the GATT process. The basic technique of
investigation was for each author to examine the procedure of implementation in his own country. At the end of this process, after
dealing with their separate national legal systems, the authors together formulated some cross-cultural conclusions comparing various legal systems as they affect international economic rules today.
Needless to say, it has not been possible to answer all the questions
which motivated this study. The law in this area is very much in a
state of transition, attempting to cope with the new and alarmingly
difficult situations presented by ever increasing international interdependence and rapidly changing economic conditions. Three general
subject areas, however, are compared and contrasted, using the Tokyo Round experience as the prinicipal basis for empirical evidence.
These three subjects are: (1) the legal requirements in each legal system for approving and accepting the various Multilateral Trade Negotiation (MTN) agreements (as international law obligations);
(2) the questions of "direct effect," that is, the legal status within
each legal system of the MTN agreements; and (3) the question of
"hierarchy of norms," that is, which will prevail among contradictory legal instruments such as the MTN agreements, prior or later
statutes or regulations, or each legal system's "constitution."
These comparisons reveal some important constraints on the negotiations process by identifying the sort of international agreement
which is precluded by domestic legal structures. This, in tum, can
help identify areas where domestic legal systems enable and facilitate new initiatives in international trade negotiations. By properly
recognizing the role of domestic legal institutions in the formulation
of international economic policy, the authors hope to contribute to a
better understanding, and a more fruitful pursuit, of international
trade negotiations.
6. See Part III infra.
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INTRODUCTION

The international rules governing global economic activity today
have been drafted primarily since World War II. Although there
were a number of international congresses to coordinate customs administration dating as far back as 1900, none of these developed a
successful program of international discipline on international economic behavior. This failure was viewed by many as a primary cause
of both the Great Depression and World War IJ.7 As a result, a multinational effort at the close of World War II sought to develop a
viable set of international economic rules.
At the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, charters were drafted for
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development. Although that conference focused primarily on financial matters, the participants publicly noted
the need for a counterpart international institution to govern trade. 8
As soon as the United Nations was organized, its Economic and Social Council adopted a resolution calling for the convening of a
"United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment." In late
1946, a committee was convened to pave the way for such a conference. During 1947, preparatory conferences were held in New York
and Geneva. These conferences resulted in drafts of both a charter
for an International Trade Organization (ITO) and a multilateral reciprocal tariff reduction agreement, the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs (GATT). Although the executive branch in the
United States had been a major supporter of the ITO, Congress refused to approve it, and the ITO failed to come into existence. Absent support from the United States, the major economic power in
the world at the time, the ITO had no chance for success.
The GATT met with a more favorable response. Although the
GATT treaty instrument was itself never officially brought into
force, the GATT was applied as international law by the Protocol of
Provisional Application. Since the GATT was never intended to be
the principal institution to govern international trade activity, it does
not have extensive institutional provisions to carry out this responsibility. Similarly, the Protocol of Provisional Application provides
that Part II of the GATT will be implemented only where it is "not
inconsistent with existing legislation." This is the source of the socalled "grandfather rights," 9 discussed in detail below, which often
7. WORLD TRADE, supra note 3, at 37-39.
8. United Nations International Monetary and Financial Conference, July 1-22, 1944,
U.N. Doc. 1941 (U.S. Dept. of State Pub. No. 2866, 1948).
9. Protocol of Provisional Application of the GATT, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A2051, T.I.A.S.
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limit the effectiveness of the GATT. Despite these limitations, the
GAIT, in conjunction with the other international economic organizations, such as the IMF and the Organization for_fa:onomic Cooperation and Development (OECD), now functions::-a:nlie backbone
of the international economic system.
Under the auspices of the GAIT, there have beeu--s-even major
"rounds" of tariff and trade negotiations. 10 The first five of these
rounds (the 1947 Geneva negotiation of the original GATT; a 1949
round in Annecy, France; 1950 in Torquay, England; 1955 in Geneva; and the 1960-1961 "Dillon Round") were primarily item-byitem negotiations for the reduction of tariffs, with very little attention
paid to nontariff barriers. Because of the growing complexity of this
sort of negotiation, the sixth round of tariff reductions (the ''Kennedy Round") attempted a "linear tariff reduction" approach. It set
a goal of a fifty percent, across-the-board cut in tariffs. The Kennedy Round also attempted to address major nontariff barriers. Although the Round was not entirely successful, it did yield across-theboard tariff reductions that averaged about thirty-five percent, with a
variety of exceptions and adjustments. The only significant agreement on nontariff barriers, however, was the 1967 Anti-Dumping
Code.
After 1967, there was a period of delay and confusion, before
there developed an effort to launch a new round of negotiations. In
the early 1970s, the United States took the initiative in encouraging
a seventh round of trade negotiations. This time, it was decided to
try to focus negotiation on nontariff barriers, because these had become increasingly significant as restraints on international trade. In
light of the successful reduction of tariffs over a period of several
decades, nontariff barriers became major obstacles to further trade
liberalization. The seventh trade round was launched in September
1973 in Tokyo, and thus the name "Tokyo Round."
Although this negotiation contained a significant element of tariff
reduction, a large part of the activity in the Tokyo Round was focused on a variety of nontariff barriers. These proved most difficult
to negotiate, for a number of reasons. For example, it is very hard to
quantify. many of the nontariff barriers. Nations in previous GATT
negotiations habitually insisted on "reciprocity." Each nation's
negotiators wanted to be able to report home that they had obtained
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308; WORLD TRADE, supra note 3, at 60; INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS, supra note 3, at 401.
10. WORLD TRADE,supra note 3, at 218-29; Jackson, The Birth of the GAIT-MTN System:
A Constitutional Appraisal, 12 LAW & POLY. INTL. Bus. 21 (1980).
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from the negotiation at least as much as they had given up. In negotiating tariffs, there were various' quantitative and statistical ways to
support such claims. For example, the percentage reduction in the
tariff would be multiplied by the value of the goods imported in recent periods, and that would be designated as the "value of the tariff
concession" made in the negotiations. When it came to negotiation
of nontariff barriers, such as the rule governing how a country
should apply its anti-dumping duties, it was hard to quantify the
value of such rules.
Despite these difficulties, the Tokyo Round negotiations were
surprisingly successful in formulating a series of agreements
designed to reduce barriers to international trade, both tariff barriers
and nontariff barriers. Ten major agreements and several "understandings" resulted from the negotiations. Because of the difficulty of
amending the GATT, 11 none of the nontariff agreements or understandings were incorporated into the GATT system as a technical
change to the text of GATT. Instead, most of the MTN agreements
are "stand-alone" treaty instruments. The ''understandings" of the
"Group Framework" negotiations were adopted by the GAIT Contracting Parties as "decisions." The relationship of these agreements
and decisions to the GAIT itself is not a simple subject, but it is not
within the scope of this Article. Some of the agreements purport to
be "interpretations" of various GATT articles, and in a number of
cases the agreements create problems of discriminatory treatment
that could violate the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause of GATT.
A few words about each of these MTN results may help the reader to
understand materials in later sections.
(1) Tar!ffreduction agreements: Little needs to be said about the
Geneva (1979) Protocol and the Protocol Supplementary to the Geneva (1979) Protocol. Basically, they are lists of items with the reduction in tariff that has been agreed to by each country. Each
country has its own "tariff schedule" in GATT, and the results of the
Tokyo Round negotiations on tariffs have become incorporated as
amendments to those tariff schedules of GAIT, through the GAIT
processes. The negotiation was carried out on a "linear" basis, with
a target of an overall reduction of sixty percent in tariffs (at least this
was the target of the United States' authorizing legislation for its
negotiators). Nevertheless, the results have generally been estimated
as approximately a thirty-five percent reduction in the industrial tar11. Jackson, 17ze Birth ofthe GAIT-MTN System: A Constitutional Appraisal, supra note
10, at 32.
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iffs of the major industrial participants of the negotiations. 12
(2) The Subsidies-Countervailing .Duty Code: officially entitled
"Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI,
and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade," it is
perhaps the most important of the nontariff barrier codes negotiated
in the Tokyo Round. It certainly was the most difficult to negotiate.
This Code tries to address the increasingly difficult problem of government subsidies to exports and other goods.
It is very difficult to define "subsidy." A myriad of governmental
practices could be called subsidies, including certain income tax exemptions, as well as governmental support for research. Subsidies
tend to be divided into "export subsidies," whereby the subsidy is
obtained only for goods which are exported; and "general subsidies,"
or "production subsidies," whereby the subsidy is received for all
goods produced. The Subsidies-Countervailing Duty Code is basically divided into two subjects: (1) rules that govern the procedures
by which a country is authorized to apply a countervailing duty to
imports which have benefited from a subsidy; and (2) some rules
directly applying to subsidies, along with a complaint procedure that
allows one country to complain about the subsidy practices of another which seem to be harming economic competitors in the importing country. The Code is exceedingly complex, and represents a
number of uneasy compromises between the contending international negotiators.
(3) Anti-Dumping Code: officially entitled "Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade." Dumping is generally the practice of a firm selling its goods
abroad at a lower price than it sells them in its home market. For
most of a century, there has been general international agreement
among nations that dumping is an unfair international trade practice, and that each importing country should have the right to impose anti-dumping duties on goods that are dumped in its market, to
protect its competing domestic industry. An Anti-Dumping Code
was negotiated in the Kennedy Round (1967), but was not very successful. Indeed, United States constitutional problems and congressional antagonism prevented the United States from fully
implementing this Code. At a late day in the Tokyo Round, it was
decided to revise the Anti-Dumping Code, and to enter into a new
code which embodied many of the concepts that had already been
negotiated in the Subsidies-Countervailing Duty Code. The defi.ni12. See note 4 supra.
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tion 9f "injury" to domestic competing industry was copied from the
Subsidies-Countervailing Duty Code into the Anti-Dumping Code.
This may have been an unfortunate step, since the two subjects, although seemingly parallel, differ substantially in their underlying
policy foundations. Dumping involves activity by particular, often
private, firms. Subsidy activity, in contrast, is basically governmental activity, and can stem from legitimate internal social policies being pursued by the government. Nevertheless, the new Code brings
a series of new rules and concepts to the anti-dumping activity of
nations, and must be considered one of the significant results of the
Tokyo Round.
(4) The Government Procurement Code: officially entitled
"Agreement on Government Procurement." For many years, it has
been increasingly obvious that "buy-national" practices of governments are a significant obstacle to further liberalization of international, trade. The GATT has explicit exceptions for governmental
purchases from some of its important trade obligations (the National
Treatment Clause). Consequently, the enactment of government
procurement rules requiring preference for domestically produced
goods was a major loophole in the GATT system. For many years
there have been discussions among nations, mostly in the context of
the OECD, with the view to developing some sort of international
discipline on these government procurement rules. This effort was
moved into the Tokyo Round negotiation of GATT and resulted in
a new international agreement. The agreement, at first reading, appears to go very far in establishing a general nondiscriminatory "national treatment" rule of behavior for governments in their
purchases of goods. However, there are important exceptions, and
governments are bound to follow the Code only as to "entities" explicitly negotiated and placed on their respective "entities lists."
This practice significantly narrows the initial coverage of the Government Procurement Code; however, it does provide a framework
for future negotiation to expand the entities lists.
(5) Standards Code: officially entitled "Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade." A panoply of different kinds of product standards, such as food and drug standards to protect human health,
standards for product operation to prevent pollution, or standards on
goods to enhance their safety, have increasingly burdened the flow of
international trade. Most standards have a legitimate policy basis,
but standards can be written in such a way as to be an effective limitation on imports, or to discriminate in favor of domestic goods over
imports. The Tokyo Round negotiators approached this problem
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primarily as a procedural one, establishing a new agreement which
allows governments and other interested parties to have an opportunity to protest the development of standards which unnecessarily
discriminate against imports.
(6) Customs Valuation Code: officially entitled "Agreement on
Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade." The various methods employed for valuing imported
goods for customs purposes have served as non-tariff barriers. The
variety of complicated valuation methods and the often arbitrary administration of valuation rules have been an impediment to trade.
Prior to the implementation of the Customs Valuation Code, United
States law included nine different valuation methods - including
the American Selling Price method that has been criticized by trading partners of the United States since before the Kennedy Round of
trade negotiations. The Customs Valuation Code is an attempt to
bring some uniformity to national valuation procedures by providing
a series of procedures for valuation, ranked according to preference
of use, i.e. , lower ranked methods of valuation cannot be used unless
a value is not determinable under a higher ranked basis for valuation. "Transaction value" is the preferred basis for valuation. The
agreement will be administered through two committees. Dispute
settlement will be administered by a Committee on Customs Valuation under the auspices of GAIT, while technical issues will be submitted to a Technical Committee on Customs Valuation under the
auspices of the Customs Cooperation Council. A protocol to the
Customs Valuation Code was also negotiated which was designed to
attract more developing countries to accept the Code.
(1) Licensing Code: officially entitled "Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures." This Code expresses a concern that licensing
procedures designed to implement a trade restriction may serve as
additional restrictions in and of themselves. It calls for neutral rules
and fair and equitable application and administration of those rules.
Application forms and procedures for licensing should be as simple
as possible. A concern for transparency of procedures is reflected in
the Code's requirement that rules governing import licensing procedures be published.
(8) Civil Aircraft Code: officially entitled "Agreement on Trade
in Civil Aircraft." One of the goals at the commencement of the
Tokyo Round negotiations was to develop agreements relating to
particular industrial sectors such as steel or chemicals. This goal was
not achieved. The Civil Aircraft Agreement is the one agreement
which embraces a range of trade barriers affecting a specific indus-
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trial sector. The Agreement eliminates duties on civil aircraft, engines and parts of civil aircraft, and repairs on civil aircraft. The
provisions of the agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade and on
Subsidies, as well as the GAIT rules relating to quantitative restrictions, are incorporated into the Civil Aircraft Agreement. The
Agreement also covers government procurement of civil aircraft.
(9) .Dairy Products Code: officially entitled "International Dairy
Agreement." This agreement provides for a consultative arrangement. The International Dairy Products Council established by the
Agreement will serve as a forum for discussions and monitoring of
the international dairy market. In addition, protocols attached to the
Agreement set minimum export prices for various dairy products.
(IO) Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat: Like the International Dairy Agreement, the Bovine Meat "Arrangement" sets up a
consultative group, called the "International Meat Council." The
Arrangement basically establishes procedures for information exchange and market monitoring, and consultation through meetings
of the council, and otherwise.
(11) Framework Arrangements: One of the negotiating committees of the MTN was called the "Group Framework" Committee,
and was responsible for formulating four specific understandings.
These concern differential treatment for developing countries; balance of payments measures; safeguard actions for development purposes; and an understanding regarding notification, consultation,
and settlement of disputes. These arrangements were not established
as separate treaty agreements, but were instead accepted by a decision of the Contracting Parties (on November 28, 1979) of GAIT. 13
As such, they do not stand alone, but are part of the totality of
GAIT jurisprudence. For the most part, these arrangements do not
have precise obligations; however, they do have significant impacts,
at least in two respects: (1) the understanding with respect to differential treatment for developing countries has been deemed to perpetuate t:b.e GAIT 1971 waiver regarding "Generalized System of
Preferences"; (2) the understanding with respect to dispute settlement procedures, with its annex (an "Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of GAIT in the Field of Dispute Settlement"),
established more precisely the framework of the various procedures
regarding dispute settlement under the GAIT Article XXII and XXIII procedures.
13. Action by the Contracting Parties on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Nov. 28,
1979, GATT Doc. L/4905 (1979), reprinted in GAIT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 201 {26th Supp,
1979).
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In addition to these major "codes" and understandings, there
were certain other multilateral agreements, and a large number of
bilateral agreements. All of these faced similar national legal and
constitutional constraints on their implementation. With the general
framework of the GATT in mind, we now tum to a comparison of
three very different legal systems to analyze those constraints in
more detail.
II.

IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND IN THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

Jean- Victor Louis

This section will examine the legal problems of the European
Economic Community (EEC) in connection with the conclusion and
implementation of the agreements resulting from the Tokyo Round
of negotiations. The most significant issues confronting the EEC in
this context are the allocation of authority between the Community
and its Member States, and individuals' ability to challenge the validity of a Community or national act that is alleged to be contrary to
international agreements.
After a short introduction on EEC commercial policy and its importance in the EEC Treaty and practice, we then examine the negotiating process in the Tokyo Round from 1973 to the conclusion in
1979. There follows an analysis of the problems of the coming into
force and the potential direct effect of the agreements which resulted
from these negotiations.
The EEC is a regional organization created by the Treaty of
Rome on March 15, 1957.14 Since its membership was enlarged in
1973 and in 1981, the EEC includes ten West European countries as
members. 15 The EEC serves as a regional customs union for Europe,
developing, inter a!ia, common policies between its members in the
fields of agriculture, transportation, and external trade relations.
A number of difficulties in implementing multilateral trade
agreements in EEC Member States stem from the structure of the
EEC itself. The EEC is divided into two functional elements: the
Commission, which represents the interests of the EEC as a whole,
14. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957. (Belgium Federal Republic of Germany - France - Italy - Luxembourg - Netherlands).
IS. In 1973, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom acceded to the European Communities (EEC, EURATOM, and European Coal and Steel Community) and on January I,
1981, Greece became the tenth member of the Communities. Accession of Portugal and Spain
is also expected.
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and the Council, which is composed of members of the governments
of each of the Member States. 16 There thus exists a constant tension
between the interests of the EEC as a whole and the interests of any
particular Member State.17 Individual nations tend to want to control their own foreign policy, since this is a 'jealously guarded area
of national sovereignty." The Council has been diligent in keeping a
tight rein on the Commission acting as the negotiator of the Commu16. Technically, there are three European Communities, based on three separate treaties:
the Coal & Steel Community, based on the Treaty establishing the European Coal & Steel
Community, signed in Paris, April 18, 1951; EURATOM, based on the Treaty establishing the
European Atomic Energy Community, signed in Rome, March 25, 1957; and the European
Economic Community, based on the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed in
Rome, March 25, 1957.
The four basic institutions of the three European Communities are the Commission, the
Council, the Court of Justice, and the Assembly (or "European Parliament"). Although a
convention annexed to the two Rome treaties provided for a single Court of Justice and a
single European Parliament to apply the three Community treaties, it was not until 1965 that a
single Council and a single Commission were established. After this merger a particular institution plays a role for all three communities, although that role will differ among the communities. The Commission has fourteen members, one from each Member State, plus an
additional member from the four major States. It is analogous to the executive arm of government and administers the largest bureaucracy (about 9,000 professional-level persons). The
Council, composed of a representative from each Member State (a Minister), primarily decides
upon policy and passes upon legislative initiatives presented to it by the Commission.
The third institution is the Court of Justice, which sits in Luxembourg and has eleven
judges and five Advocate Generals. The Court has fairly ample jurisdiction to decide questions of interpretation involving the basic treaties, regulations, directives, and other EEC acts,
international agreements, and other legal matters of the EEC. Finally, there is the European
Parliament, which since 1979 has been elected by direct elections in the Member States, but
has limited powers, except in financial matters.
The EEC can act by adopting various formal instruments, termed "regulations," "directives," "decisions," etc. These are normally adopted by the Council upon a proposal from the
Commission. A "regulation" has immediate and direct applicability in the Community. The
"directive" was designed to provide a means by which the EEC would direct Member States to
take action to carry out the directive. However, this has not prevented the Court of Justice
from ruling that in some cases, portions of a directive have direct effect for individuals or
enterprises. The "decision" designates an act which applies to particular cases and particular
persons.
The Council, or Council of Ministers, meets with different officials of the Member States'
governments according to the specific matter at hand. For example, when the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the Member States meet, the Council is then called the Council of Ministers
of Foreign or General Affairs. The Council also has a secretariat, including a legal service, and
has a number of subordinate committees or bodies, such as the CO REPER (Council of Permanent Representatives), or the 113 Committee, explained at Part II B infra.
In recent years a "European Council" has evolved in which the heads of government from
the Member States meet. Although there is no written "constitutional" status for the "European Council," its decisions generally have great force within the Community, since the prime
ministers or presidents can subsequently instruct their representatives in the EEC Regular
Council to act in accordance with the decisions of the European Council.
Paralleling the procedures established by the treaties is the very important process of political cooperation in the field of foreign policy. Heads of government in the European Council
and Ministers of Foreign Affairs meet to coordinate the foreign policies of the Member States
and to achieve common positions at the level of the Ten.
17. See Weiler, The European Parliament and Foreign Affairs: External Relations of the
European Economic Community, in PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OVER FOREIGN POLICY 151-89
(A. Cassese & A. aan den Rijn eds. 1980).
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nity. 18 The Tokyo Round of the GATT provides a classic example
of the tensions between a regional organization and the member
states that it represents in international negotiations. These tensions
reveal themselves in the form of legal and constitutional constraints
on the implementation of international agreements.
A. The EEC Negotiating Process in the Tokyo Round
1. An Overview of the Ordinary Negotiating Process
of a Trade Agreement

The ordinary negotiating process of a trade agreement - either
bilateral or multilateral - concluded by the EEC generally includes
the following stages:
(1) Preliminary talks between the Commission and the State(s)
concerned.
(2) Report by the Commission to the Council including a recommendation to open formal negotiations with the third State.
(3) Authorization of the Commission by the Council to negotiate
along the directives ("mandate") approved by the Council on
the recommendation formulated by the Commission and, as
usual, carefully examined by the Committee of Permanent
Representatives (COREPER).
(4) Negotiation of the agreement by the Commission with the
assistance of a special committee composed of representatives of the Member States in charge of international economic relations (so-called "Committee of Article 113" or
"113 Committee").
(5) Authentication of the formal result of the negotiation by way
of an exchange of letters or the initialling ("paraphe") of the
agreement by the Commission.
(6) Report by the Commission to the Council which approves by
a regulation or a decision the result of the negotiation and
decides to proceed to the final conclusion of the agreement.
(7) Formal conclusion through a complex procedure (approbation plus conclusion) or by the signature on the part of the
Community by the persons designated by the Council.
If the agreement is deemed to be a "mixed agreement," that is,
for reasons of the allocation of competence between the EEC and its
18. Weiler, note 17 supra, at 156. One could have more accurately written that the Council
has been reluctant to authorize the Commission to open and conduct negotiations since, under
the terms of the treaty, the Commission has the capacity to negotiate.
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Member States the agreement (such as the LOME agreement) requires not only EEC acceptance but also acceptance by Member
States, then certain additional procedures by the Member States will
be required.
This ordinary procedure outlined above, which results partly
from the joint requirements of Articles 113 and 228 of the EEC
Treaty, and partly from the practice followed by the Community,
has to be adapted to the process of multilateral negotiations such as
the MTN.
We shall look at the various stages of the MTN negotiations on
the part of the Community, analyzing the role and influence of each
Community institution and organ involved.
2. The Preliminary Stages of Tokyo Round
On February 11, 1972, the United States and the EEC issued a
joint declaration supporting the opening of multilateral trade
negotiations. 19 This declaration was endorsed by the first Summit of
Heads of State and Government of the enlarged EEC on October 20,
1972.20 The endorsement is notable because it highlights several crucial aspects of the EEC's negotiating posture: first, that reciprocity
would be demanded in all concessions;21 second, that attention
would be paid to the link between commercial and monetary
problems; and third, the desire to seek a reduction in both tariff and
nontariff barriers. It was partially with these ends in mind that the
EEC began preparing for the Tokyo Round of negotiations.
In early April 1973 the Commission sent the Council a communication on the "elaboration of a global conception in view of the next
multilateral negotiation." Although a majority of the members of
the Council approved of the statement, French Minister Michel
Jobert, supported by the Irish and Italian ministers, reproached the
Commission for proposing compromises to be made with the rest of
the world, rather than setting forth the EEC negotiating posture.
Jobert asked for a restatement of the goals of the EEC, emphasizing
that the negotiations would have to be balanced, and that commercial negotiations were meaningless absent consideration of the convertibility of the U.S. dollar. 22 Jobert insisted on the crucial
19. 5 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 3), 57-60 (1972).
20. See the final declaration of the Summit, 5 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. IO), 14-23 (1972),
21. This principle had also been stressed in the declaration of December 12, 1971, and in
the joint declaration of February 11, 1972.
22. Le Monde, May 16, 1973, at 38, col. 2; In the Same Boal, ECONOMIST, June 9, 1973, at
11-12.
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importance of the common tariff and on the need for respect for the
common agricultural policy.
The Commission then prepared a preamble to its communication, and rewrote several sections to conform to the views of the
Council. On May 24, the communication was finally presented to
the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), an internal organ of the Council.23 The final draft was clearly influenced
by Jobert's comments in a number ofrespects.24 First, the discussion
of the link between monetary and commercial negotiations had been
reworded to incorporate the French view. France wanted to insist
on a new monetary order, based on fixed but adjustable parities and
the general convertibility of monies, before agreeing to any international trade proposals. The Commission held a more moderate view,
insisting only on parallel efforts during the trade negotiations to help
create an adequate monetary system. The final text constituted a
compromise between these two positions,25 incorporating the following proviso into its discussion of the Tokyo Round: "The Community shall evaluate the progress of those negotiations in the light of
the progress which will be realized in the monetary field. When it
will consider the result of those negotiations, it will do so taking into
account that progress." Although these sentences do not make clear
exactly what actions the EEC would take if an adequate monetary
agreement was not reached, they do serve to hide the divergent opinions of the Member States.
The second split of opinion between France and the rest of the
EEC revolved around the Common Agricultural Policy (C.A.P.).
The original text affirmed that the principles of the C.A.P. could not
be put into question. The final text declared more categorically that
the C.A.P. principles and their mechanisms were not open to negotiation. The final text also did away with an earlier allusion to the possibility of a declaration of intent by the Community to consider a
more economically oriented structural policy. Such compromises
combined to provide the EEC with a more united common front as
they entered the new round of negotiations.
3. Negotiation from 1975-1979: The Actors for the EEC
The final draft of the communication to the Coll;ncil, together
with the approval that was granted at a meeting of the Council of
23. Le Monde, May 27-28, 1973, at 23, col. 3.
24. Lemaitre, Pour une Reciprocite Effective, Le Monde, May 27-28, 1973, at 23, col. 3.
25. The text was adopted after a marathon session by the Council of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs in Luxembourg on June 26, 1973.
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Ministers, authorized the opening of formal negotiations for the
EEC. Throughout the negotiations that followed, the Commission
played a prominent role. A series of initiatives directed to the Council and the Member States resulted in acceptance of the "Swiss
Formula" for the reduction of tariffs-greater reductions for higher
tariffs - notwithstanding the objections of certain Member States.
The Commission also attempted to convince the Member States of
the desirability of selectivity in the application of the safeguard
clause, although this effort proved unsuccessful.
Another organ that played a surprisingly prominent role in the
GATT negotiations was the "Committee of Article 113." Composed
of representatives of the Member States, this Committee normally
plays the role of a ''watchdog" of the Commission, overseeing its
activities and suggesting interpretations of Council directives.
Throughout the Tokyo Round, the Committee was primarily responsible for a number of compromises reached between the Commission
and the Member States. A number of reasons have been suggested
for the prominent role played by the Committee of Article 113 during the Tokyo Round. These include the following.
First, the Tokyo Round negotiations, although they were initiated in Japan, later tended to be localized in Geneva. This made it
impossible for COREPER, seated in Brussels, to exert its usual political control over the Commission. Second, the technical complexity
of a number of issues raised, including the difficult issues of nontariff barriers, demanded input by experts. Since the Council was
unable to provide specific guidance on a number of these issues, the
Committee's influence expanded. Third, throughout the lengthy period of negotiations, the Commission required an ongoing source of
information as to each Member State's negotiation positions. To
achieve this goal, the Committee was given an expanded role in the
negotiations. The minutes of the Council meeting on January 17,
1978, recognized this increased authority when it spoke of "a rigorous coordination [of the Commission] with this country's [Federal
Republic of Germany] delegation in the Committee of Article 113.''
Finally, the global conception that was set forth in the Commission's
original communication freed the negotiators from the need to refer
back constantly to the Member States for guidance. Thus freed from
some political restraints, the Commission could rely more heavily on
technical advice provided by the Committee.
. Just as these factors tended to increase the Committee's power,
they tended to undercut the role of the usually influential
COREPER. A number of Member States, particularly France, ob-
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jected to this redistribution of power, and often raised questions in
this regard. When these issues proved irresolvable, or when the
Committee itself was unable to agree on policy issues, the disputes
were brought to the attention of the Council as a whole.
The Council devoted many deliberations to the Tokyo Round. It
examined related problems
on February 10, 1975, when it adopted the directives for the negotiations of the MTN in the GAIT following the adoption of
the Trade Act by the American Congress;
on January 17, 1978, before the beginning of the substantial part
of the negotiations. It examined the "working hypothesis" elaborated by the groups or sub-groups of negotiation;
on April 4, 1978, when it analyzed the tariff offers made by the
main participants in the negotiation. It decided to authorize the
Commission to present demands to its partners to improve their
offers and to envisage a list of possible retractions of
concessions;
on June 27, 1978, for the adoption of a schema of global agreement with the hope of soon concluding the negotiations;
on September 19, 1978, after the adoption of the Declaration of
July 13, it expressed its deep concern over the situation which
would be created by the expiration of the powers given to the
Government of the United States by the Trade Act to waive the
application of countervailing duties in the case of export subsidies, in the absence of an injury test. It stated that it would not
be realistic to envisage the conclusion of the negotiations without an assurance of the continuance of the waiver. On this
point, the Council fully endorsed the position of the
Commission;
on October 17, 1978, after the decision of the United States
Congress to adjourn its work until after January 15, 1979, without having taken a decision on the waiver problem. The Council affirmed that an unequivocal confirmation of the application
of the waiver was necessary to conclude the negotiations but, in
the meantime, the Community declared that it was willing to
pursue the negotiations;
on November 21, 1978, after bilateral contacts between the
Commission and Mr. Strauss (the chief U.S. negotiator). The
Council confirmed its October position;
on December 12 and 18, 1978, to examine progress reports
made by the Commission on the negotiations;
in three sessions on February 5 and 6, 1979, March 5 and 6, and
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April 2 and 3, to analyze the results of the negotiations. The
Council took note of the intention of the Commission to authenticate the various texts and agreements which resulted from the
negotiations, upon reservations of a final examination by the
Committee of Article 113;
on November 20, 1979, when it decided to conclude the agreements resulting from the MTN. 26
Many of these deliberations dealt with controversies between
members of the Community. As a result, many of the Council's final
recommendations are compromise solutions to problems. The debate on the maximum percentage of tariff reductions provides a case
in point. The Commission favored a forty percent maximum; and
Germany, as high a maximum as possible. The final position
adopted by the Council contained an apparent contradiction that resulted from these divergent goals.27
Just as the Commission played a prominent role in the Tokyo
Round negotiations, the European Parliament played a surprisingly
very small role. 28 The EEC Treaty does not require that the Council
consult Parliament while negotiating "commercial agreements."
Consultation, however, is required for association agreements under
Article 238. There are important arguments which plead for consultation of the Parliament in respect of trade agreements, such as the
MTN. First, trade agreements often take place in a context similar
to association agreements. Accordingly, parliamentary participation
in these agreements should be uniform. Second, Parliament has extensive power over EEC budgetary matters. Since trade agreements,
through tariff reductions, affect EEC resources, Parliament, as a
budgetary authority, ought to have some input into this decisionmaking process. Finally, national parliaments generally must approve trade agreements. This suggests that the legislative insight of
the European Parliament might properly be considered by the Council during negotiations.
On October 15, 1973, the Council adopted the Luns II procedure
for Trade Agreements to compensate somewhat for the absence of a
26. Problems related to the Tokyo Round were also discussed at other sessions of the
Council, on December 3 and 4, 1973; January 20 and 21, 1974; April 5 and October 18, 1977;
March 7, May 2, and June 6, 1978; May 8, June 12, !uly 24, and October 22 and 29, 1979.
27. See point 7 of the conclusions of the Council of January 17, 1978.
28. See generally, Weiler, supra note 17, at 151, 169; Quintin, Participation de l'Assemb/ee
parlementaire europeenne au deroulement de la procedure de negociation des accords com•
merciaux, ll Rev. trim. dr. eur. 211 (1975); RENGELING, Zu DEN BEFUGNISSEN DES
EUROPAISCHEN PARLAMENTS BEIM ABSCHLUSS VOLKERRECHTLICHER VERTRAGE IM RAHMEN
DER GEMEINSCHAFTSVERFASSUNG, FESTSCHRIFT FUR H.J. SCHLOCHAUER 877-98 (1981),
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formal consultation.29 The procedure provides for three phases:
before the beginning of the negotiations, the Parliament may
debate the orientations forwarded by the Council to the competent parliamentary committees;
at the end of the negotiations, but before signature, the President of the Council or its representative informs confidentially
and unofficially the competent committees30 of the agreement;
after the signature but before the conclusion, the Council informs the Parliament of the content31 of the agreement. Notably, this procedure does not specifically provide for
parliamentary intervention during the negotiations. The Council felt that such debates would hurt the BBC's negotiating position. The procedure, however, does not absolutely bar these
debates. Parliamentary committees retain the right to request
confidential information and debate it publicly if they so
desire. 32
In practice, Parliament made little use of the Luns II procedure
during the Tokyo Round. Only three debates were held from 19731978, and they resulted in little more than expressions of general
support for the BBC's position and a desire to reach a "substantial
and balanced" final result. The reasons for Parliament's inability to
participate actively in the trade negotiations are multifold. First, although external trade relations are governed by the Community, the
Parliament has little influence over the internal policies of the Member States. Second, Parliament feared that extensive consultation
might weaken the position of the Commission in its dealings with the
Council. Third, the secrecy of foreign negotiations that results from
"international etiquette" made public debates of the Tokyo Round
both difficult and improper.33 Finally, the technical complexity of 29. Formally adopted on October 15, 1973, the procedure had been suggested and already
applied at the end of 1972. The first case of application was the conclusion of the first commercial agreement with Egypt (1972). See E. GRABlTZ & T. LAUFER, DAS EUR0PAISCHE
PARLAMENT 165 (1980).
30. In French: "substance."
31. In French: "teneur."
32. See Weiler, supra note 17, at 171 (giving an example of the effectiveness of the procedure in the case of the preferential trade agreement with Egypt in 1972: "The relevant parliamentary committees were informed confidentially prior to the signature on 18 December 1972.
An amendment by way of protocol was inserted as a result of comments made by the Committee of External Economic Relations. It was then debated in Parliament, on 10 May, which
once again called for a better consultation procedure and implementation of all suggestions in
the Giraudo report (which led to the resolution of 17 February 1973). The agreement was
finally concluded in October 1973.").
33. See Weiler, supra note 17, at 154-57. See also Quintin, supra note 28.
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nontariff negotiations placed much of the Tokyo Round beyond the
expertise of the European Parliament.
4.

Terminating the Negotiations: March -April 1979

The final step in EEC negotiations is the initialling that serves to
authenticate relevant documents. The Commission, as the EEC institution responsible for negotiations, is empowered to take this action without formal authorization from the Council. The Tokyo
Round minutes and protocols were initialled on April 12, 1979.
Although it is not legally required to do so, the Commission generally issues a report to the Council before :finalizing negotiations.
The Tokyo Round report was presented to the Council on March 6,
1979. Several Member States requested a supplementary report analyzing the proposed tariff concession.34 When this was provided,
unanimity was quickly reached at the April 2-3, ·1979, session.35
The Commission was asked to issue reports addressing the domestic legislative measures for implementation adopted by the major
developed countries. The Council declared that the EEC would
adopt the Tokyo Round concessions only after its developed negotiating partners had themselves successfully implemented the concessions. Finally, it included a sentence in its minutes reserving the
question of how power would be divided between the Community
and the Member States until the time for definitive conclusion of the
agreements. Since Member States thus retained some discretion
over whether to adopt concessions authenticated by the Commission,
this sentence later caused severe difficulties in the definitive approval
of the Tokyo Round.
5. The Preparation of the Conclusion in 1979: The Legal and
Political Problems
On February 22, 1979, COREPER instructed an ad hoc working
group and the legal services of the Council and the Commission to
analyze three legal issues: the need for Member States to sign the
Tokyo Round agreement; representation of Member States in administrative bodies created by the agreements; and the number of
EEC votes in those administrative bodies. The Commission legal
service advised that the EEC had authority to conclude the Tokyo
Round agreements without consent of the Member States. Article
113 of the EEC Treaty, as well as several decisions by the Court of
34. See Europe, No. 2632 (April 5-6, 1979); Fin. Econ. Tijdy., Mar. 7, 1979.
35. Italy removed its ultimate objections some days after the meeting of the Council.
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Justice,36 conferred exclusive competence over commercial policy to
the EEC as a whole. The ad hoc working group and the Council
legal service agreed with this general principle but concluded that
certain of the GAIT agreements - the "Standards," "Government
Procurement," and "Civil Aircraft" Codes - exceeded the field of
commercial policy. Accordingly, Member State consent would arguably be necessary to adopt these Codes. The so-called "RubberAgreement Opinion" of the Court of Justice resolved this dispute, 37
holding that the Community is competent to conclude all agreements
that involve commercial policy as their primary focus. Thus, the
Commission concluded, on October I, 1979,38 that the Community
had the power to adopt all of the Tokyo Round agreements without
the consent of each individual Member State. The legal issue resolved, there remained a political difficulty - how to avoid embarrassing those Member States that had insisted that their consent was
necessary for adoption of the agreements. It was finally decided, after much debate, that the Community alone would sign the bilateral
and multilateral agreements, but that all of the Member States
would sign and accept the Tariff Protocol and the Codes on "Standards" and "Civil Aircraft." This solution can only be explained as
a purely diplomatic compromise. There is no legal basis for according a different treatment to the Code of Standards than the Code on
Government Procurement.
Although this arrangement was adopted for purely political reasons, it did seem to have a legal impact. International liability is
different for "mixed agreements" - signed by the EEC and the
Member States - than it is for agreements concluded by the EEC
alone. When a third country is injured by violation of a mixed
agreement, that country may seek restitution from the EEC, Member
State, or both.39
The second legal issue addressed by the ad hoc·working group 36. The most important of these cases is Commission of the European Communities v.
Council of the European Communities, 1971 C. J. Comm. Rec. 275.
37. This is important because the delegations had agreed that on the points where an
agreement existed between the two legal services, the decision of the Council should be in
favor of a conclusion by the Community alone; in the absence of such agreement, there should
be a joint conclusion by the Community and its Member States.
38. GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations - Final Report on the GATT Multilateral
Trade Negotiations in Geneva (Tokyo Round) and proposal for Council decision, COM (79)
514 final.
39. On this problem, see Steenbergen, The Status ofGA'IT in Community Law, 15 J.W.T.L.
337, 343-44 (1981), and Bourgeois, The Tokyo Round Agreements on Technical Barriers and on
Government Procurement in International and EEC Perspective, 19 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 5,
24 (1982), on the impossibility of, and the desire to avoid, stating clearly where the dividing
line between the respective powers of the EEC and its Member States lies.
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representation of Member States in administrative bodies established by the Tokyo Round - did not pose such severe difficulties.
These were partially resolved in the "package deal" prepared by the
Council on November 20, 1979. Member States are represented in
the Community delegation while working on the Committee of Signatories.40 Moreover, all Member States are to be fully informed
about any contacts or discussion with the Committee, and the Member States are invited to participate in all nonconfidential meetings.
Where any matter deals explicitly with the imports or exports of an
individual Member State, that state would be permitted to intervene
on its own behalf.41 Since modes of participation are identical for
committees that resulted from mixed agreements and those growing
out of agreements entered by the EEC alone, there appears to be no
practical reason for the Member States' insistence that the Codes of
Standards and Civil Aircraft be subject to Member State approval.
The final legal issue addressed by the ad hoc working group the number of EEC votes in administrative bodies - remains unresolved. EEC officials tend to de-emphasize the importance of this
problem by arguing that consensus is a tacit rule in GATT matters,
so the allocation of votes is irrelevant. Although this is a satisfactory
political solution to the issue, it leaves much to be desired from a
legal standpoint.
6. Parliamentary .Debate, .December 1979: Improving the
Involvement of the Assembly
The European Parliament supported the Commission's opinion
that the EEC had exclusive authority to conclude the Tokyo Round
Agreements.42 It waited until December 14, 1979, however, to express this support - three weeks after the decisive November 20 session of the Council, and only three days before the agreements were
concluded. During the course of the Parliamentary debates, one
overriding concern became evident - in the future, Parliament
wanted a more active role in the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements by the EEC.
Paragraph 21 of the resolution ultimately passed by Parliament
40. The insistence of (some) Member States on a participation in the groups is understandable for the managing of some codes, such as the Code on Standards. Although there are
indeed some two hundred directives in that field, the national standards are multitudinous. It
is perhaps true that Commission officials are not in the best position to defend purely individual national points of view.
41. It seems that the Commission was not very happy with the possibility of unilateral
intervention of a Member State and insisted on the necessity of a previous scenario.
42. See point 19 of the resolutions.
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evinces this concern dramatically: "[Parliament] instructs its appropriate committees to draw up and submit to it proposals for the participation of the European Parliament in future trade negotiations."
Sir Fred Catherwood, president of the Committee for Economic External Relations, explained that the European Parliament "needs to
take the place of national parliaments, which do not have the competence to discuss these things directly with the Commission and the
Council." Many members of Parliament favored a requirement that
would require parliamentary approval (or at least deliberation) of
EEC international agreements before they could enter into force.
The tenor of the debate made clear that Parliament can be expected
to seek more active involvement in EEC international policy-making
in the future.
A later resolution, adopted on July 9, 1981, reconfirmed Parliament's desire for a more active role in EEC foreign policy. This resolution sought a common declaration between Parliament, the
Council, and the Commission urging conciliation in external matters; consultation by the Council before the conclusion of every
agreement, and confidential consultation of the parliamentary committees as provided in the Luns agreement. All of these suggestions
- which were incorporated into a resolution of February, 18, 1982
- are to be implemented without formal amendment of the EEC
Treaties, through agreements between the institutions concerned.
This mechanism raises a question worthy of consideration: what
is the legal value of inter-institutional agreements? 43 These agreements are obviously easier to enact than amendments to the Treaties,
but their legal value is dubious. Some have only political value.
Others will have legal impact, but this will usually be assessed on a
case-by-case basis. Thus, if Parliament arranges an inter-institutional agreement providing a right of approval - which it does not
seek at the moment - for international agreements, it has no legal
guarantee that this right can be enforced against the Council.
B.

The Implementation

of the MTN Results in the Community
Legal Order

1. The Problem of the Implementation of International Agreements
in the Legal Order of the EEC with Special Reference to
the Tokyo Round

Article 228 of the EEC Treaty makes all bilateral and multilateral agreements concluded by the EEC binding upon the Member
43. See Rengeling, supra note 28, at 894.
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States. This does not make the Member States parties to the Tokyo
Round agreements, but it binds them through the separate legal
structure of the Community.44 This structure makes it legally impossible for a Member State to denounce a treaty concluded by the EEC
alone. 45 Mixed agreements can be denounced, but the denunciation
applies only to those parts of the agreement .wherein the EEC exceeded its authority. Since the mixed agreements concluded in the
Tokyo Round were the result of political, rather than legal, necessity,
it is unlikely that Member States would be able to denounce these
agreements.
Agreements concluded by the EEC alone affect the domestic legal order of the Member States. International Fruit Company and
Bresciani make clear that domestic acts of transformation are not
needed to give EEC agreements domestic effect.46 Upon conclusion
by the Council, these international agreements immediately become
part of the Community legal structure, subordinate to the EEC
Treaty but superior to the acts of EEC institutions.47
Although the Tokyo Round agreements had direct effect into domestic legal orders, some of the multilateral agreements required
specific measures of implementation to assure judicial remedies in
the event of noncompliance. Other agreements did not require internal complements either because they corresponded to preexisting
EEC norms or they merely prescribed rules of conduct for Member
States. Thus, for example, there was no need for specific implementation of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures because the
Community rules already conformed to the requirements of this
agreement.
· Other agreements required EEC internal complements. Regulations governing EEC common agricultural policy were amended to
comply with the obligations incurred through the Tokyo Round. 48
Tariff concessions required the adoption of regulations reducing the
44. See Louis & BrUckner, Relations exterieures, 12 LE DROIT DE LA CoMMUNAUTE
EcoNOMIQUE EUROPEENNE 62 (J. Megrett ed. 1980), and Bourgeois, supra note 39, at 24.
45. See Barav, Oral Intervention, in DIVISION OF POWERS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COM•
MUNITY AND THEIR MEMBER STATES IN THE FIELD OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS 90 (1981),
46. See note 54 infra.
41. See Louis & BrUckner, supra note 44, at 182 and the references quoted; Boulouis, La
jurisprudence de la Cour de justice des Communautes europeennes relative aux relations exterieures des Communautes, R.C.A.D.I. 343, 385-86 (1978); Tizzano, Recenti sviluppi in tema di
accordi internazionali de/la CEE, DIR!TTO COMUNITAR!O E DEGLI SCAMBI INTERNAZIONALI 19,
34 (1981).
48. See GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations - Final Report on the GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Geneva (Tokyo Round) and proposal for Council decision, COM
(79) 514 final, at 81.
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tariffs fixed by the External Common tariff. 49 Nontariff barriers required more elaborate domestic implementation:
(1) The Anti-Dumping Code and the Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Code were incorporated into a new regulation "for protection against dumped or subsidized imports from countries which are
not members of the [EEC]."50 This regulation, effective January 1,
1980, assured a strict parallelism between international and intra-community law.
(2) The Customs Valuation Agreement was implemented through
Council Regulation No. 1224/80 which brought a much older regulation (No. 803/68) into conformity with the Tokyo Round results. 51 As
with the Anti-Dumping Code, this Regulation incorporated the Tokyo
Round Agreement into a single community instrument.
(3) The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade posed a much
more difficult implementation problem. Unlike the agreements discussed above, this agreement dealt with matters unrelated to the Customs Union, and thus beyond the exclusive authority of the EEC. As a
result, there were a number of national rules and statutes governing
these areas and the EEC was able only to adopt directives, rather than
regulations. The Decision of the Council of January 15, 1980, explained the advantage of having directives to govern national standards. If a directive preexists, Member States may adopt "provisional
measures" to implement EEC agreements. The Commission, however,
retains the right - after consultation with a Committee composed of
representatives of the Member States - to set forth final "appropriate
measures" for implementation of the agreements, and these measures
become binding on the Member States. In contrast, where there is no
directive, Member States retain full power over the adoption of appropriate measures to implement the MTN agreement.
(4) The Agreement on Government Procurement raised an entirely different set of implementation problems. Article 228 of the EEC
Treaty made this Agreement immediately binding on the Member
States. However, since this Agreement contained provisions more
favorable than existing rules governing intra-community activity, a dispute arose. Some experts felt that the principle of Community preference made the Tokyo Round rules automatically binding on all intraCommunity transactions. The Commission, believing that these coexisting rules created "the possibility of [public contracts] becoming subject to two sets of irreconcilable agreements,"52 chose to adopt an
implementing directive. Existing Directive No. 77 /62/EEC53 differed
from the terms of the Agreement on Government Procurement in two
49. See Regulation No. 3000/79 of Dec. 20, 1979, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 342) (1979).
50. The Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3017/79 of Dec. 20, 1979, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L339/l) (1979).
51. 11 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. Ll48) (1968). See proposal for a Council Regulation on the
valuation of goods for customs purposes, COM (79) 604 final (Oct. 25, 1979).
52. GATT Final Report, supra note 38, at 104.
53. See COM (79) 621 final (Oct. 31, 1979), 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C287/9) (1979).
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important respects. First, it applied to supply contracts under all public authority, rather than only those contracts concluded by central (national or federal) authorities. Second, the Directive required larger
contracts than the Agreement before it became applicable. Ultimately,
the Council chose to adopt Directive No. 80/767, which derogated
from the existing directive (77 /62/EEC), without rewording it, in order
to extend the scope of the preexisting directive. This resulted in two
benefits: it avoided the need to consult with the German Bundesrat,
which would have been necessary to amend directive 77 /6/EEC, due
to a specific requirement of the German legislation, and it made further modifications of the terms of the new Directive simpler.

2.

The Problem of .Direct Effect ofAgreements

International Fruit Company 54 ("the GATT decision") specifically addressed the question of what effect the GATT would have on
internal Community law. The court held that the possibility that the
GATT could be derogated by contracting parties, together with the
nonlegal dispute resolution process in the Agreement, was persuasive
evidence that the GATT could not have direct effect on the EEC
internal legal order. Commentators have disagreed with this interpretation, insisting that the very wording of the GATT requires that
it be given direct effect.55 National courts of Member States provide
little help in resolving the direct effect question, since they split on
this issue. The Italian Supreme Court left unapplied an act of Parliament to the extent that it failed to conform to the GATT rules.
German Courts, on the other hand, have denied the direct effect of
the GATT on domestic law. 56
A second Court of Justice decision, Nederlandse Spoorwegen ,51
stressed the need to be able to substitU;te Community law for the
Member State's law when enforcing international commercial obligations. Thus, an unpublished decision of a tribunal of Milan that
gave effect to a provision of the GATT without reference to EEC
jurisprudence was contrary to both the Treaty of Rome and the
GATT system itself.
The Bresciani58 decision, although it did not deal with the
GATT, gives further insight into the effect of international agree54. Judgment of Dec. 12, 1972, International Fruit Co. v. Produktschap voor Groenten en
Fruit, 1972 C. J. Comm. E. Rec. 1219.
55. Waelbroeck, L'ejfet direct de /'accord re/at[/ aux echanges commerciaux du 22 Jui/let
1972 entre la CEE el la Confederation suisse, A.S.D.I. I 13-32 (1973).
56. See Waelbroeck, Effect of GAJT within the Legal Order of the EEC, 8 J.W.T.L. 614,
619-20 (1974).
57. Nederlandse Spoorwegen v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, 1975 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1439.
58. Bresciani v. Administrazione Italiana Della Finance, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J, Rep. 129.
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ments on Member States' internal legal structures. There, the Court
considered the effect of Article 2, paragraph I of the Yaounde Convention, a provision almost identical to Article 13, paragraph 2 of the
EEC Treaty. The Court held that the wording of the provision was
not decisive. In addition, the absence of reciprocity in association
agreements did not bar direct effect where the purpose of those
agreements was to favor underdeveloped nations in an effort to encourage their development. In contrast, the original text of GATT,
discussed in International Fruit Company, centered around reciprocity in trade agreements. Since the Tokyo Round also involved reciprocal trade agreements, the question of the direct effect of some
dispositions of those agreements in the internal law of Member
States is open to controversy.
In the Po!ydor case - concerning the interpretation of the FreeTrade Agreement between the EEC and Portugal - the Commission argued before the Court of Justice that "the concept of direct
effect, as developed in Community law, must not, as such, be transposed to the field of the Community's international relations, for two
reasons. The first is based on the different nature and aims of international agreements. The second reason is that it is necessary to
maintain in the context of these free-trade agreements a balance of
the advantages and disadvantages which may exist between the parties to an international treaty."59
The Commission noted, inter alia, that the balance is substantially different if private parties can enforce an international agreement within the Community but cannot do so in other contracting
states. The Commission proposed that "the Court should recognize
direct effect only where the provisions are drafted in an entirely clear
way for all the parties or where provisions which leave room for interpretation have been clarified by the contracting parties."60
The Court did not decide on direct effect in its Polydor decision.
It avoided this issue by finding a distinction between the interpretation of restrictions on trade pursuant to the Treaty of Rome and the
Free-Trade Agreement. The Court held that the two Treaties did
not have the same purpose. The purpose of the Free-Trade Agreement is to consolidate and to extend the economic relations existing
between the Community and Portugal while the Treaty of Rome
seeks to unite national markets into a single market having the characteristics of a domestic market.
59. Oral submissions by the Commission at the sitting of the Court, Judgment of Feb. 9,
1982, Polydor, Ltd. v. Harlequin Record Shops, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 329.
60. These arguments have been elaborated by Bourgeois, supra note 39, at 25-26.
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In an October 26, 1982 decision, not yet published, Hauptzo/lamt
of Mainz and C A. Kupferberg & Cie, KG a.A., the Court has ruled
in favor of the direct effect of Article 21, first paragraph, of the same
Free-Trade Agreement (EEC-Portugal). The decision prohibits
fiscal discrimination against the products imported from the other
party of the Agreement.
The Court of Justice stated that the contracting parties to an
agreement could limit the internal effect of its dispositions. But, in
the absence of the expression of such a common will, and especially
of an indication in the agreement about the way it should be implemented, it is up to each party to determine how best to achieve the
ends fixed by the agreement. Accordingly, the fact that courts of one
party would give direct effect to the provisions of an agreement,
while courts of the other Party would not, is not, by itself, conclusive
evidence of an absence of reciprocity in the implementation of the
agreement.
The Court also mentioned that the existence of an institutional
framework for consultations and negotiations concerning the application of the agreement does not prevent the courts from directly
applying the agreement. Furthermore, the existence of specific escape clauses does not by itself affect the direct applicability of some
provisions of the agreement. Thus, the Court concluded that neither
the nature nor the "policy" of the agreement are obstacles to a private party trying to invoke provisions of the agreement before the
Court.
This conclusion has important implications. It suggests that
there is no theoretical obstacle against the direct effect of an agreement resulting from the MTN. The precision and unconditional nature of the provision, which must be examined in the framework of
each agreement, will be the test that the Court will likely apply.
These cases also suggest that the method of approval of an international agreement by the Council - decision or regulation - is
irrelevant to the problem of direct effect. Rather, it is the nature of a
particular provision of Community law which determines its direct
effect. Is the provision clear, precise, and unconditional? To what
extent are any elements of it discretionary, i.e., to be determined by
the final wording of the rule? The simple fact that the norm needs
implementation measures does not deprive it of direct effect. The
existence of a margin of discretion is the determining criterion. The
judge cannot rely on loose standards or best endeavors clauses which
are only rules of conduct for the authorities concerned. If there is no
room for discretion and if the implementation measure does not con-
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form to the result pursued by the international or Community obligation, the judge may check the implementation measure with the
international or Community rule. To show a parallel, a well-established jurisprudence exists now on the direct effect of EEC directives.
The judge can disregard a national measure incompatible with an
EEC directive which the State has not implemented if the obligation
concerned is precise and unconditional. 61 He can also compare the
implementation measure and the result prescribed by the directive. 62
The GATT problem is somewhat more complex. It is possible
that a citizen of a non-EEC state would contest a national measure
of an EEC Member State before a Member State court. He would
argue that this measure is not applicable to him in spite of its conformity to a Community regulation or directive, because the latter is
not compatible with a provision of an international agreement concluded by the Community. This was clearly the problem raised
before the Court in the International Fruit Co. case, where national
measures - the refusal to import - were based on Commission regulations that were allegedly inconsistent with the GATT.
Even if this type of challenge is not possible, because the Court
maintains its International Fruit holding as far as the GATT itself is
concerned, it is not an obstacle to the recognition of direct effect of
provisions of some other Agreement.
On the other hand, there is no possibility of action before a national tribunal for an enterprise which complains of a violation of an
international rule, such as the Anti-Dumping Code, by producers located in other contracting parties, not members of the EEC. The
Community regulation in conformity with the GATT Code provides
a special procedure normally initiated by a request by or on behalf
of the industry affected.63 The national judge cannot interfere with
this procedure and substitute his own judgment for that of the Commission on the existence of dumping or of subsidies, the existence
and extent of injury, the causal link between the dumped or subsidized imports and injury, and the measures which are appropriate to
prevent or remedy the injury.64 Those issues must be decided by,
and applied uniformly to, the EEC as a whole. The authority to
impose anti-dumping or countervailing duties by way of regulations
(article 13) is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Community be61. Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1629, Ground 23.
62. Nederlandse Ondernemingen v. lnspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, 1977 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 113-126.
63. See Article 5 of the Anti-Dumping Code of 1979 and of Regulation No. 3017/78.
64. See Regulation No. 3017/79, Article 6.
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cause it is a measure of common commercial policy under article
113. In the area of anti-dumping, the Community has not satisfied
itself with the adoption of common principles; it has unified the rules
and the procedure of application in such a way that the intervention
of a Member State is purely automatic. For these reasons, the emer•
gency decision of the tribunal of Milan65 to stop the importing of
some fibers originating in the United States to Italy - because
American producers were benefiting from the "artificial advantages"
of abnormal prices of oil and natural gas - seems objectionable.
C.

Conclusion

A number of conclusions emerge from the above analysis. First,
there are important differences between the EEC and American legal
systems for negotiating international trade agreements. 66 The EEC,
unlike the United States, requires close collaboration between the
Council - the organ of conclusion - and the Commission - the
organ of negotiation. There is a rough balance between the Council's right to issue directives for negotiation and the Commission's
right to ask for modifications of those directives during the course of
the negotiations.
In the case of the Tokyo Round, it appears that the Commission
generally received the directives it requested. Typical examples were
the adoption of the Swiss Formula for tariff reductions and the tactical approach for the presentation of tariff concessions. Major disputes between the two institutions occurred primarily when the
Community had to solve highly sensitive political questions such as
the waiver problem at the end of 1978, or the competence of the
Community and the Member States, to conclude the Agreements.
The absence of major difficulties between the two institutions during
the negotiations is due to the close collaboration of the Commission
with the Committee of Article 113. This collaboration was effective
both for the preparation of the Community negotiating positions and
for the actual conduct of the negotiations. For example, during the
aborted attempt to reach a global agreement in July 1978, simultaneous negotiations were conducted with the titular members of the 113
Committee under the chairmanship of an official of the Commission
and by the Commission with the other Contracting Parties.
A second conclusion worth noting is that the technical nature of
65. Europe, Nos. 2885 at 6 (Apr. 9, 1980) and 2886 at 7 (Apr. 10, 1980).
66. See Jackson, United States-EEC Trade Relations: Constitutional Problems ofEconomic
Interdependence, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 453, 475 (1979).
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the negotiations increased the role of experts. An ad hoc committee
of national experts accompanied the Commission's officials to the
Tokyo Round negotiations. These experts, well-acquainted with national industrial needs, looked out for industrial interests during the
negotiations. This explains why it is difficult to find industrial or
other interests trying to apply pressure during the actual
negotiations.
The central position of the Commission during the negotiations
explains why the other contracting parties preferred to address that
institution rather than the Council or each Member State of the
Community. It was very difficult for third states to enter into bilateral contacts in order to influence the position of the Community
when the Community had only six members. With nine (ten) members - or more - it is, and will be, impossible. The mediation
function of the Commission is thus increased.
If the process of negotiation appears to be rather effective, it is
not democratic. In two or three Member States, national parliaments have been asked to approve some agreements resulting from
the MTN. But with the development of the commercial policy of the
Community, their intervention will probably not be required in the
future. If the jurisprudence of the Court is respected, mixed agreements will become exceptional, required only in the case of commercial treaties. The loss of power of the national parliaments is not
balanced by the attribution of like powers to the European Parliament. Consultation with the latter is not compulsory under the
Treaty of Rome for trade agreements. One can expect that the European Parliament will continue to ask for a more effective role in external affairs; particularly for trade agreements which traditionally
are subject to parliamentary approval by the parliaments of the
Member States. It is also likely that the Parliament will increasingly
consider the political implications of future trade agreements.
In principle, Article 113 is the legal basis for both the conclusion
and implementation of international commercial agreements. Since
the Parliament is not consulted on unilateral measures adopted by
the Community to implement such agreements, it is effectively removed from the entire implementation process. This is the reason
why Sir John Steward-Clark, member of the European Parliament,
asked the Commission to ensure that "regular annual reports are
made available to us in the Parliament on the success of the implementation of the GATT Agreements."67
67. 1979-1980 E.

PARL. DEB.

(No. 249) 250 (Dec. 13, 1979).
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The implementation of the Tokyo Round Agreements raises another set of questions. We have noted the EEC's practice of adopting directives or regulations to incorporate the Agreements into
domestic law. The risk exists that the international origin of the
rules will disappear, particularly in the cases where national law and
regulations have to complete Community acts.
The implementation of the Tokyo Round Agreements by the
Community raises the problem of the effectiveness of their provisions in the Community legal order. It is clear from the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice that international law has primacy over
Community secondary legislation, but if the Court denies direct effect to the agreements, it will be impossible to give priority to the
provision of an international agreement. The Court has decided that
it is possible for one contracting party in an agreement based on
"balanced and mutually advantageous arrangements" to recognize a
direct effect and priority in its own legislation, if the other contracting parties do not also recognize this effect. This author concludes that as far as those agreements are part of Community law,
with a position of superiority on secondary legislation, the national
judge should be allowed to take those agreements into consideration
and to give priority to them if there is a real conflict of norms between a provision of an agreement and a provision of Community
law.
The problem of implementation of the Tokyo Round results is
not merely legal. It is also a problem of political will and of practical
means. Problems raised by dumped or subsidized imports in a time
of economic crisis, government procurement, and access to certification are charged with political controversy. The pressures coming
from political, national, or regional authorities and the industries
concerned will be great. These pressures may hinder the Commission in its attempt to implement the Agreements as part of intracommunity law. The Commission does not have the necessary capability to control effectively the application of all the Agreements in
the Member States. However precise the international and Community rules are (and they are not always so precise), there are always
possibilities for fraud and the resurgence of protectionism. Facing
national administrations implementing complex national regulations, the Commission cannot fully exercise its function as a watchdog of the Community. And it is clear that its zeal will be
proportional to the goodwill of the partners of the Ten.
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IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND IN JAPAN

Mitsuo Matsushita

Since Japan is a country poor in natural resources, her traditional
trade policy has been to import raw materials from abroad, process
them into manufactured or semi-manufactured products, and export
these products abroad. Therefore, the international trade environment has had a tremendous impact on the welfare of the country.
Indeed, it is not too much to say that the dramatic economic growth
of Japan in the 1960s and 1970s was made possible by the relatively
free world trade system. In this sense Japan benefited a great deal
from the Kennedy Round in the late 1960s, and probably is one of
the countries in the world that benefited most from the Tokyo
Round Negotiations.
The Japanese government has been actively implementing the results of the Tokyo Round Agreements and, as explained later, the
National Diet has enacted laws for this purpose. Some trade barriers
have been removed or lessened by the implementation of the Tokyo
Round Agreements. In due course, other trade barriers and restrictions in Japan will probably be substantially lessened by the implementation of various agreements resulting from the Tokyo Round.
However, with regard to barriers and measures limiting Japanese
exports to other countries (especially to the industrialized countries
like the United States and the Member States of the European Common Market), and foreign exports to Japan, the Tokyo Round leaves
some questions unanswered. The United States Government has alleged that a number of Japanese practices are trade barriers (such as
customs inspection processes, various safety standards, etc.). In addition, orderly marketing arrangements between Japan and the
United States and European countries have significantly restrained
exports from Japan to those countries. These aspects have not been
sufficiently covered by the Tokyo Round Negotiation and the resulting agreements. This section will analyze the implementation of the
Tokyo Round agreements in Japan, and will note those problems in
international trade that were left unanswered by the negotiations.
A.

The Constitutional and Legal Framework of Japan

Under the Japanese Constitution,68 there are three basic organs
68. NIHONKOKU KENPO (The Constitution of Japan) entered into force May 3, 1947. An
English translation prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, Binder IX (A. Blaustein and G. Flanz ed. 1973). The
following are some of the references on the Japanese Constitution which are available in Eng-
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of the state, namely: (1) the National Diet, (2) the Cabinet, and
(3) the Judiciary. A brief explanation of each will follow.
The legislative branch of the Japanese government, the National
Diet, consists of the House of Representatives and the House of
Councillors. The National Diet is· the highest organ in the exercise
of the state power (article 41), and the members of both houses are
elected by the people. A legislative proposal may be introduced in
the National Diet either by the Cabinet or by an individual member
of the National Diet. A proposal can be introduced in either house
except for the budget which must originate in the House of Representatives. For a proposal to become a law it must be approved by
both Houses. Whenever the decision of the House of Councillors is
different from that of the House of the Representatives with regard
to a treaty, the decision of the House of the Representatives shall be
regarded as the decision of the National Diet as long as unanimity
has not been obtained in a joint conference of both Houses or the
House of Councillors has not acted on the treaty proposal within
thirty days after it received a decision of the House of Representatives approving of the treaty.
Administrative power is vested in the Cabinet, which is composed of the Prime Minister and other ministers. The Prime Minister is appointed from among the members of the National Diet by a
resolution of the National Diet (article 67), all political parties participating. The Prime Minister appoints the other Ministers, a majority of whom must be members of the National Diet. The Cabinet
must resign when a resolution of no-confidence is passed in the
House of Representatives, or when this House rejects a confidence
resolution, unless the House of Representatives is dissolved within
ten days. The Cabinet is charged to execute general administrative
duties including the following: (1) to execute laws; (2) to establish
and maintain diplomatic relationships; (3) to conclude treaties; (4) to
prepare the budget and introduce it in the National Diet; (5) to issue
Cabinet orders; and (6) to declare clemency.
The third branch of the government is the judiciary, which consists of the Supreme Court and lower courts. Courts have the power
of judicial review. Article 98(1) declares that the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land, and laws, orders, imperial decrees, and
other regulations contrary to the provisions of the Constitution are
lish: s. Fujii, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A HISTORICAL SURVEY (1965); D. Henderson,
THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947-1967 (1969). See also the
bibliography in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra, which follows the
text of the Japanese Constitution.
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null and void. Article 98(2) of the Constitution declares that treaties
to which Japan is a party, and the established international law, shall
be faithfully observed. 69
Since the Japanese governmental system is parliamentary-cabinet rather than presidential, the legislative and executive powers are
fused. However, the Judiciary is independent, and it can exercise
judicial review of both legislative and administrative actions.
In addition to these constitutionally mandated processes, extraparliamentary processes are vitally important in the policy-making
process in Japan. Often ideas for policies are conceived in various
ministries or in the Liberal Democratic Party (LOP), which is the
party currently in control. When a policy is formulated within a
ministry, officials in charge discuss the matter with key LOP persons
and, after obtaining their informal approval, draft a legislative proposal which is sent to the Legal Bureau of the Cabinet. After
amendments are made by this Bureau, the proposal is sent back to
the LOP for a more formal examination by the party. After this
process, it is examined at a Cabinet meeting. After Cabinet approval
it is introduced in the National Diet.70 As long as the LOP holds the
majority in both Houses of the National Diet, a legislative proposal
made by the Cabinet, after obtaining extra-parliamentary consent of
the LOP, is almost certain to pass. If the opposition parties strongly
oppose the proposed legislation, they may try to obstruct debate on
the bill. However, in the area of foreign or international economic
policies, there has been relatively little opposition raised by the minority parties to proposed bills, possibly because they were too complex and technical and not very interesting to the opposition. Most
of the international controversies in the Diet revolve around political
issues such as the Security Treaty between the United States and
Japan. By the same token, there was not much opposition to the
signing and implementation of the Tokyo Round Agreements.
The Cabinet can enter into an international agreement with other
nations without Diet approval and this agreement will bind the Japanese Government as a matter of international law. However, until
the Diet grants approval, such an agreement cannot be legally enforced in Japan if there is a conflicting domestic statute or if the
agreement contains provisions which restrict the rights of citizens.
69. Article 98 of the Japanese Constitution states: ''This Constitution shall be the supreme
law 6f the nation and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part
thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity. The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully observed." CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, Binder IX, supra note 68, at 8.
70. I. MURAKAWA, SEISAKU KETTEi KATE! ("The Policy-Making Process") 125-63 (1981).
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Despite the relative lack of opposition in the area of international
economic policies, one cannot say that there are no conflicts in foreign policy-making in Japan. Quite often differences over foreign
economic policies exist among the various agencies and ministries in
charge of formulating and executing the policies. For example, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) may have a policy of maintaining
a friendly relationship with foreign nations and may wish to abolish
import quotas for some agricultural products imported from overseas. However, the Ministry of Agriculture, Foresty and Fisheries
(MAFF), as the advocate and promoter of Japanese agriculture, may
have a different policy and may wish to restrict imports from abroad.
Although, theoretically, the Cabinet is the forum in which such conflicts are to be resolved, it is sometimes unable to reconcile a violent
disagreement. In these cases the LDP may moderate the conflicts or
suggest ,a compromise solution.71
In any event, the bureaucracy plays a vital role in Japanese politics and also in economic policy. In key ministries in the Japanese
government, the best human resources and information about the
industries are pooled together. It is natural then that the real power
struggle takes place there, in the very heart of the power structure in
Japan. In this sense, something comparable to the conflict and tension between the Congress and the Executive in the United States
might be seen in the relationship among the key ministries.72
These ministerial conflicts and rivalries are not openly reported,
however. Even though it may be common knowledge among those
people who know something about the Japanese government, there
are no official reports on these matters. Therefore, we must be satisfied with reports that trickle out through newspaper accounts. Examples of such Ministerial conflicts regarding trade include the
following.
During the late 1970s there was an increase of imports into Japan
of "adjusted butter" (an ingredient used in confectionary) from Europe. In 1975 imports of this item were about 3,000 tons, and they
climbed to a high of 17,000 tons in 1980. MAFF, fearing that this
would have some adverse effect on domestic farmers, planned an import restriction. However, MFA and the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) objected very strongly because these two
ministries feared that such a restrictive measure would touch off a
trade conflict between Japan and the European exporting countries.
71. I. MURAKAWA, supra note 70, at 128-29.
72. See text accompanying notes 166-73 infra.
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Discussions were held among those ministries, and finally a compromise was reached whereby MAFF would withdraw its plan to restrict imports of adjusted butter from Europe, and the Japanese
government would instead request the European producers and/or
their governments to adopt some voluntary measure to restrain exports from those countries to Japan.73 In this instance, there was a
conflict of policies among the agencies, the MAFF basically representing the interests of domestic producers and other ministries emphasizing the importance of a trade relationship among trading
partners.
In the U.S.-Japan negotiations on textiles and autos, there were
also policy differences between MITI and MFA. In the 1974 textile
negotiations, MITI emphasized the importance of protecting domestic producers of the products and opposed concessions on the part of
the Japanese government to the United States government. MFA
emphasized the importance of friendly relations and took a more
flexible attitude toward such concessions. 74
In the auto negotiation,75 MITI took the position that it should
have charge of the negotiations with the United States government,
since whatever agreement was reached between the two governments
must be implemented domestically by way of administrative guidance or legal measure, and MITI has some control and influence
over the auto industry in Japan, whereas MFA does not. MFA, on
the other hand, maintained that it should be commissioned with the
task of negotiating with the United States government, since such
negotiation was part of diplomacy over which it had "exclusive"
control and authority. The Minister of MITI, when asked his view
regarding the negotiating authority in the Committee on Commerce
and Industry of the House of Representatives in the National Diet,
answered: "Properly MITI should be in charge of this negotiation."76 Eventually, a compromise was reached, whereby MFA "conducted" the negotiation but MITI was extensively involved.
73. Asahi Newspaper, Mar. 4, 1981, at 9 (morning ed.).
74. Details on the textile negotiation and its result are available in Nichibei senikyotei ni
kansuru gyosei sosyo kiroku (Record of the Administrative Litigation concerning the Textile
Agreement between the United States and Japan), SEN! SANGYO RENMEI (The Federation of
Textile Industries in Japan) (1974). This report has been translated into English and can be
found in the course materials on Japanese Law at Harvard Law School (1977-1978).
75. See, e.g., INTL. TRADE REPORTER'S U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY, (BNA) Nos. 70-77 (Mar.May 1981) and particularly No. 76, at A-1 (May 6, 1981).
76. Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Feb. 28, 1981, at 3 (morning ed.).
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The Relationship Between the Constitution, Treaties and
.Domestic Laws

Article 73(3) of the Japanese Constitution provides that the Cabinet is empowered to enter into a treaty with other nations. However,
an attached proviso requires the Cabinet to obtain prior or, depending on the circumstances, subsequent approval by the National Diet.
This approval requirement is designed to protect individual rights
that treaties might restrict, by granting the National Diet some control over the treaty-making power of the Cabinet.
Not every international agreement entered into by the Cabinet
requires Diet approval. Only if an international agreement entered
into by the Cabinet amounts to a "treaty" under article 73(3) of the
Constitution, must the Cabinet obtain approval from the National
Diet.
It is generally held that an agreement entered into by the Japanese government is a "treaty" in this sense only if it contains provisions binding or prohibiting the conduct of private individuals. 77
There are international agreements for which no approval by the
National Diet is necessary. Some examples are (1) an international
agreement pertaining to technical details of diplomacy; (2) an international agreement providing for detailed rules for implementation
of a "treaty" which has already been approved by the National Diet;
and (3) an international executive agreement within the framework
of the powers delegated to the Cabinet by legislation.78
Even where theoretically required, the approval requirement is
not strictly observed. Often the government argues that agreements
fall into the category of international agreements that need not to be
submitted to the Diet. The 1974 United States-Japan Textile Agreement is one example. There are also a number of commercial agreements between various nations and Japan providing for rights and
obligations of the governments involved which seem to a.ffect the
rights of individuals, and yet were dealt with as "executive agreements" and not as "treaties." A few examples are (1) the Agreement
between the Japanese Government and the Government of Malta
Concerning Trade,79 (2) the Agreement between the Japanese Gov77. I. SATO, KENPOKAISHAKU NO SHOMONDAI (Problems in Constitutional Interpretations)
217 (1953); Sato, Kokkai no joyakushoninken to kokankobun (Function of the Diet to Approve
the Treaty and the Constitutional Problems of Exchange ofNotes), 19 JocHI HOOAKU RONSHU
(Sophia Law Review) 135-60 (Mar. 1976).
78. Sato, Kokkai no joyakushoninken to kokankobun (Function of the Diet to Approve the
Treaty and the Constitutional Problems of Exchange of Notes), id. at 148 & 154-60.
79. MOFA Notification No. 275 (1968).

December 1982)

Tokyo Round

305

ernment and the Government of the Republic of Ivory Coast Concerning Trade, 80 and (3) the Agreement between the Japanese
Government and the Government of the Republic of Central Africa
Concerning Trade.81
Japanese government officials often take the position that if an
international economic agreement requires domestic legislation to
implement it, then the Cabinet need not obtain approval from the
National Diet. Rather, the implementation of the agreement will
take place either through domestic legislation already enacted by the
National Diet or, if such legislation is lacking, the government will
introduce the necessary legislation for Diet approval. When the
United States-Japan Textile Agreement was entered into between
the two governments, the opposition parties asked why the government had entered into such an agreement - which would have a
serious impact on the freedom of trade in Japan - without submitting it to the National Diet. The Director General of the Cabinet
Legislation Bureau answered as follows:
If. . .. an international agreement is enforced not as such but through a
domestic law, then restrictions of the rights of individuals are governed
by that domestic law. In this situation, we believe that such an agreement need not be submitted to the National Diet. When our government and a foreign government have agreed on a matter under the
Constitution, it is not necessary to put such agreement under the democratic control of the National Diet as long as such agreement is not
enforced directly (that is, such agreement does not impose obligations
and restrictions upon the conduct of citizens in Japan) and is not in
conflict with a treaty which has been approved by the National Diet. It
is to be understood as an executive agreement of which no such approval is necessary.s 2

The GAIT was submitted to and approved by the National Diet.
Accordingly, it is a "treaty" in the sense of Article 73(3) of the Constitution, and the Cabinet probably had broad power to enter into
executive agreements in order to implement provisions of GAIT.
However, some Tokyo Round Codes have been submitted to the National Diet for approval. Also, some amendments to the domestic
legislation were made in order to incorporate these agreements into
Japanese domestic laws on tariffs and trade. The Cabinet could have
chosen not to submit these agreements to the National Diet for its
approval on the theory that they are implementations of GAIT and
80. MOFA Notification No. 118 (1970).
81. MOFA Notification No. 259 (1970).
82. Testimony of the Director of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau in Hearing ofthe Committee ofBudget ofthe House of Councillors, 67th Diet, the Record of the Committee Hearing No.
7, at 15 (Jan. 9, 1971).
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the Cabinet has already been given the power to enter into executive
agreements for its implementation. Approval was probably sought
because, while the provisions of GATT were so general, much of the
language of the Codes was more specific. Consequently the government felt it necessary to submit them to the National Diet to make
sure that the National Diet had no objection to the contents of the
various codes.
On July 27, 1979, the Japanese government signed the Geneva
Protocol incorporating the results of the tariff negotiations in the Tokyo Round. As to most of the other codes, the Japanese government
signed them on December 17, 1979, on the condition that the government would accept them when the National Diet had given its approval. These agreements were formally and officially accepted on
April 25, 1980, after approval by the National Diet. The Tokyo
Round Codes are thus "treaties" in the sense of the Japanese Constitution. In addition, some implementing domestic laws incorporating
the terms agreed upon in the Codes have been enacted.
A problem arises when a treaty conflicts with a provision of the
Constitution. For example, if a provision of one of the Tokyo
Round Codes or implementing legislation conflicts with a constitutional provision, which is given supremacy? The answer is not clear.
One theory maintains that the Constitution prevails over a treaty because of the procedure for amending the Constitution. In order to
amend the Constitution, a referendum is required. However, the
conclusion of a treaty only needs the approval of the National Diet.
Thus, should a treaty be given priority over the Constitution, it
would mean that the Constitution, which normally requires a national referendum to amend it, can instead effectively be amended
by the conclusion of a treaty which conflicts with the Constitution.
This would be contrary to the basic principle of the sovereignty of
the people that is regarded as one of the fundamental principles of
the Constitution. 83
On the other hand, the theory that a treaty prevails over the Constitution maintains that the Japanese Constitution is based on the
principle of internationalism, under which the Constitution - which
is the expression of the national will of one nation, must yield to a
treaty - which is the expression of the will of the international
community. 84
The former theory is more persuasive than the latter, since to
83. Professor Sato takes this position in I. SATO, NJHONKOKU KENPO GAISETSU (A General
Explanation of the Constitution of Japan) 469 (rev. ed. 1980).
84. I. Sato, supra note 83, at 467-68.
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hold that a treaty prevails over the Constitution would mean that the
most fundamental rights provided for in the Constitution (such as
the bill of rights) could be overridden if the Cabinet decided to enter
into a treaty repudiating such rights. On its face, this seems absurd.
In the Sunakawa case, 85 the Supreme Court implied that the
Constitution prevails over a treaty. The case concerned the effect of
the Status of Forces Agreement between the United States and Japan which was based on the Security Treaty between those two
countries. 86 The Supreme Court stated that the Security Treaty had
great political importance, and was not subject to judicial review by
the courts unless some provisions of the Treaty were clearly and obviously unconstitutional. In this particular case the Supreme Court
adopted the doctrine of "political question" and thereby avoided judicial review of the constitutionality of the Security Treaty. It is,
however, noteworthy that, in dicta, the Court recognized the possibility of judicial review of certain treaties, when some provisions of the
treaties seem clearly unconstitutional.
Article 22 of the Japanese Constitution guarantees the freedom
of occupation. Freedom of occupation is interpreted to include the
freedom of trade or business. This freedom, however, can be restricted if such a restriction is necessary for the public welfare. 87
Since the freedom of engaging in export, import, or other types of
international economic transactions is regarded as a part of the freedom of occupation, these transactions are covered by Article 22 of
the Constitution. 88 Under the Tokyo Round Government Procurement Code, for example, the Japanese government is, in principle,
obligated to maintain open tendering procedures in government procurement contracting. Under the domestic rules enacted to implement this code, the government agencies and some government
corporations must use open tendering or selective tendering rather
than an individually negotiated contract in purchasing instruments
from suppliers. For example, a supplier who, under the individually
negotiated contract procedure, has supplied some instruments to the
85. Judgment of Dec. 12, 1959, Supreme Court, Japan, 13 Saiko saibansho keiji hanrei shu
[Sai-han Keishu] 3223.
86. In this case, a person was indicted on the charge of trespassing on a military installation of the U.S. Air Force in Japan. The indictment was made under the Criminal Special
Measures Law (Keiji tokubetsu ho). The defendant's counsel alleged that this law, implemented by the Status of Forces Agreement and the Security Treaty, violated Article 9 of the
Constitution which prohibits Japan from exercising military power for the purpose of solving
international conflicts.
87. See cases cited in note 89 infra.
88. See The COCOM Decision, Judgment of July 8, 1969, District Court, Tokyo, 20 Gyosei saibansho hanketsu roku [Gyo-han] 842.
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government corporation operating telecommunications may be defeated in bidding under the new open tendering system, because of a
higher price which he offers to the government corporation. This
supplier may bring an action against the government alleging that
the new domestic bid system based on the Government Procurement
Code denies the constitutionally protected freedom of contract
which should include a freedom on the part of the government corporation to select a supplier as it sees fit. Moreover, he may argue
that this contract system deprives the corporation of the right to
choose suppliers and deprives him of the right to be chosen as the
supplier. Or the government corporation may raise a claim alleging
that it enjoys the right to select a supplier, which cannot be denied by
the Government Procurement Code. What is the constitutional implication of such allegations?
A number of cases89 address the issue of whether or not domestic
legislation restricting the rights of individuals was justifiable under
the Constitution if the legislation was designed to achieve some socioeconomic goal. The Supreme Court has held that a judgment as
to whether or not a restriction is necessary to achieve a socioeconomic goal is best made by the legislative branch of the government
and should, in principle, be left to the discretion of the National
Diet.90 Under this reasoning, if a law that restricts the rights of individuals is designed to achieve some social or economic policy (for
89. See Shimizu v. Japan, Judgment of Jan. 26, 1955, Supreme Court, Japan, 26 Sai-han
Keishu 586, as translated and reproduced in J. Maki, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN
(1964) (A translation of this decision is included in the course materials on Japanese Law at
Harvard Law School (1977-1978)); K.K. Sumiyoshi v. Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture,
Judgment of Apr. 30, 1975, Supreme Court, Japan, 3 Saiko saibansho minji hanrei shu (Saihan minshu] 665, as translated by M. Kirkpatrick and published in 8 LAW IN JAPAN 194-204
(1975). For a comment on this case in English, see Haley, The Freedom lo Choose an Occupation and the Constitutional Limits ofLegislative .Discretion - K.K. Sumiyoshi v. Governor of
Hiroshima Prefecture, 8 LAW IN JAPAN 188-94 (1975).
90. In Marushin Sangyo K.K., a company was indicted for erecting a building which violated the Retail Business Adjustment Special Measures Law (Kouri shogyo chosei tokubetsu
sochi ho, Law No. 155 of 1959). This law requires a building developer to file a report with the
local government and obtain a license to lease or assign to small shopkeepers. The law delegates to local governments the power to condition licensing on fulfillment of certain terms.
The Ohsaka Prefecture conditioned such licensing on a zoning regulation which required that
new buildings for shops be built at least 700 meters from existing buildings housing small
shops. The requirement was designed to mitigate "excessive competition" among the existing
shops, thereby protecting small "Mom and Pop" stores. The defendant Marushin Sangyo
K.K. erected a building within the 700 meter limit and leased it to storekeepers without obtaining a license. Faced with a criminal indictment, the company argued that the Retail Business Law and zoning regulation thereunder violated Article 22 of the Constitution. The
Supreme Court held the law constitutional on the ground that the judiciary must not question
the wisdom of the National Diet on issues involving protective legislation. Arguably the case
supports the principle that courts should adopt 'judicial passivism" and refrain from exercis•
ingjudicial review over the wisdom oflegislation when it involves socioeconomic or industrial
policies.
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example, the protection of small enterprises), the Court will not
judge the wisdom of such restriction. Under this rule, any legislation
designed to achieve an economic policy (including international economic policy) will be justified as furthering the public interest goal.
Incidental restrictions on the freedom of trade will not invalidate the
law, unless they are flagrantly unreasonable. Domestic regulations
to implement the Government Procurement Code are likely to be
regarded as regulations enacted for the purpose of embodying an
international economic policy. Thus, it is almost certain that any regulation implementing the Tokyo Round Code on Government Procurement will be held constitutional. More generally, since most of
the Tokyo Round Codes and implementing domestic laws are
designed to achieve some economic policy goals, it is unlikely that
they will be subject to any legitimate constitutional challenge.
A second question arises when a Tokyo Round Code conflicts
with a preexisting domestic law. Although there are no cases directly on point, commentators91 agree that a treaty should be given
higher priority than a domestic law or regulation regardless of when
the treaty was approved by the National Diet. Accordingly, if there
is a conflict between a domestic law or regulation and a provision in
the Tokyo Round Codes or implementing laws, the latter will prevail
over the former.
Articles maintaining that a treaty overrides a conflicting domestic
law are based on Article 98(2) of the Constitution which declares
that a treaty and the established international law shall be faithfully
observed. To admit that a law can exist which conflicts with a treaty
would be contrary to the command ofthis constitutional provision.92
Also, the effectiveness of Article 98(2) of the Constitution is guaranteed only by maintaining the supremacy of a treaty over a conflicting
domestic law and that this constitutional provision restrains the National Diet from enacting a law which would deny the effect of a
treaty the National Diet has already approved. 93 It seems likely that
courts will accept this analysis if this issue ever arises.
Governmental inaction can also be a violation of the Tokyo
Round Codes. For example, if the government has not taken a
measure that it should have taken under one of the Codes, this inaction can be regarded as a violation. Legal remedies for such inaction
are discussed below.
91. I. SATO,supra note 83, at 467; Y. TAKANO, KOKUSAIHO GAIRON (A General Theory of
International Law) 84 (1969).
92. I. SATO, supra note 83, at 467. See also note 2 supra.
93. Y. TAKANO, KENPO TO JOYAKU (The Constitution and Treaties) 209 (1960).
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Only treaties approved by the National Diet are covered by Article 98(2) of the Constitution and given supremacy over domestic law.
International agreements entered into by the Japanese government
and a foreign government without approval by the National Diet,
will not be granted supremacy. This necessarily follows from the
fact that only approval of a treaty can guarantee that the Cabinet has
not usurped the National Diet's legislative power.
Of course, in practice, a court will always try to reconcile international agreements with domestic legislation, and will not lightly find
a conflict.
C. Laws in Japan Regulating International Trade

There are various public laws in Japan which regulate and control international transactions. In addition, there are many administrative regulations that implement these basic laws. One salient
feature of these laws and their enforcement is that the enforcement
agencies (!. e. , the various ministries) are given wide powers to enact
rules and regulations. Unless one is familiar with these administrative regulations, it is difficult to understand the realities of enforcement. Moreover, there are some laws that regulate domestic affairs
(such as various safety standard laws for appliances, foods, cars, and
so forth) and yet have a great impact on international trade. Also
there may be de facto barriers to trade, such as the distribution system, business customs and practices, language and so on. Since it is
impossible to describe all of these laws, regulations and customs, we
must be satisfied with a description of the most basic laws on trade.
The basic public laws in Japan regulating international trade are
(I) the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law94 (hereinafter referred to as the Control Law), (2) the Export and Import
Transactions Law95 (hereinafter referred to as the Transactions
Law), (3) the Customs Tariff Law,96 and (4) the Tariff Law. 97 In addition to these, there are a number of laws which affect foreign trade,
including the Anti-Monopoly Law,98 the Export Insurance Law,99
94. Gaikokukawase oyobi gaikokuboeki kanri ho (Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade
Control Law), Law No. 228 of 1949 (as amended).
95. Yushutsunyu torihiki ho (Export and Import Transactions Law), Law No. 299 of 1952
(as amended).
96. Kanzei teiritsu ho (Customs Tariff Law), Law No. 54 of 1910 (as amended).
97. Kanzei ho (Tariff Law), Law No. 61 of 1954 (as amended).
98. Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi koseitorihiki no kakuho nikansuru horitsu (Anti-Monopoly Law), Law No. 54 of 1947 (as amended).
99. Yushutsu hoken ho (Export Insurance Law), Law No. 67 of 1950 (as amended),
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the Export Inspection Law 100 and various other laws providing for
inspection and approval of products (such as the Food Sanitation
Law, the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law, the Industrial Standardization
Law, etc. 101). This section describes export and import controls exercised under these laws.
1. Export Control

The basic laws controlling exports from Japan are the Control
Law and the Transactions Law. The former authorizes MITI to enforce an export approval system on some designated commodities,
and the latter permits private exporters to enter into export agreements between themselves under some government supervision.
Article 47 of the Control Law provides that "[E]xport of goods
from Japan shall be permitted with the minimum restrictions
thereon consistent with the purpose of this Law." As is clear from
this language, the basic principle is to keep export restrictions to a
minimum. It is also clear that export controls must be "consistent
with the purpose of this Law." The purpose of the law, as set forth
in article 1, is to encourage the healthy development of the national
economy and to protect the balance of payments equilibrium. Any
restriction of exports beyond these stated purposes would be held
outside the scope of this law and therefore "ultra vires."
Under Article 48 of the Control Law, MITI is authorized to enforce an export approval system through a cabinet order. In 1949
the Cabinet issued "the Export Trade Control Order'' 102 (hereinafter, the Export Order) authorizing MIT! to put into effect an export
approval system. This export control has been utilized for a variety
of purposes including, among others, to prevent rare materials (such
as tungsten) from being drained from the domestic market, to observe international commitments (such as the embargo enforced visa-vis Rhodesia, COCOM countries, Iran, etc.), to maintain public
order (i.e., to prohibit exporting of narcotics, weapons, obscene literature, etc.), and, above all, to carry out orderly marketing
agreements.
The constitutionality of export controls under the Export Order
has been challenged at least twice. In the COCOM case, 103 the
100. Yushutsu kensa ho (Export Inspection Law), Law No. 97 of 1957 (as amended).
101. On those laws, see Japan's Import System, JETRO EXPORTERS' GUIDE 16 (1979).
102. Yushutsu boeki kanri rei (Export Trade Control Cabinet Order), No. 378 of 1949 (as
amended).
103. The COCOM Decision, Judgment of July 8, 1969, District Court, Tokyo, 20 Gyo-han
842.
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plaintiffs had planned to exhibit some products in a trade show in
Mainland China but their request for export approval had been denied by MITI because those products were contraband under the
COCOM agreement. The plaintiffs maintained that whereas MITI
could only exercise export controls if the purpose of the control was
"within the limit of necessity for the maintenance of the balance of
international payments and the sound development of international
trade or national economy," the export control in question was exercised for international political or strategic goals and thus fell
outside the scope of the Order.
The Tokyo District Court agreed that the controls exerted by
MITI were for the purpose of international politics or strategy and
thus outside the scope of the Control Law. In particular the Court
held that the exercise of controls infringed upon the constitutional
guarantee of the freedom of occupation and was unconstitutional.
But the plaintiffs were denied pecuniary indemnity since there was
no malicious intent or negligence by the government officials who
made this decision.
The Textile case also challenged MITI's export control. 104 This
time the issue was an export control to enforce the 1974 United
States-Japan Textile Agreement in which the Japanese Government
had agreed to restrain export of textile products from Japan to the
United States. The Fe~eration of Textile Industries of Japan, which
represented the Japanese textile producers, brought a suit against the
government alleging that the contemplated control would be unconstitutional in that (1) it would be contrary to the principle of freedom
of occupation embodied in Article 22 of the Constitution; and (2) it
would be contrary to provisions of GATT which in principle prohibit restrictions on exports. This suit was withdrawn after the Multifibre Agreement was completed in 1974 within the framework of
GATT, and the Federation was satisfied with the treatment of Japanese textile exports under that Agreement.
MITI often uses administrative guidance 105 as a means of control
in conjunction with the Export Order. Through informal request,
104. Details on this case can be found in Nichibei senikyotei ni kansum gyosei sosyo kirok11
(Record of the Administrative Litigation concerning the Textile Agreement between the
United States and Japan) (1974), supra note 74.
105. For articles written in English on administrative guidance from a legal standpoint, see
Narita,Administrative Guidance, 2 LAW IN JAPAN 45 (1968); Sanekata,Administrative Guidance
and the Antimonopoly Law, 10 LAW IN JAPAN 65 (1977); Smith, Prices and Petroleum in Japan:
1973-1974-A Study ofAdministrative Guidance, 10 LAW IN JAPAN 81 (1977); Davis,Administrative Guidance in Japan, 41 SOPHIA U. Soc10-EcoN. INST. BULL. (1972); Matsushita, Administrative Guidance and Economic Regulation in Japan, 1 JAPAN Bus. L.J. 209 (Dec. 1980).
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MITI may ask exporters to increase the price, or reduce the quantity,
of exports to a certain country. If this guidance is ignored, MITI will
usually invoke an order. A prominent example of this was the 1981
auto export restraint. 106 Faced with the possibility that the United
States Congress would pass a law establishing limits on the imports
of autos from foreign countries, MITI decided to implement voluntary export restraints on Japanese autos. Accordingly, MITI "directed" that each auto exporter keep the number of autos exported to
the United States within a specified maximum indicated by MITI. If
this maximum number was likely to be exceeded, MITI would invoke the compulsory export approval system under the Export Order. As this example shows, administrative guidance is often ·a
preliminary stage for initiation of export controls.
The second basic law controlling Japanese exports is the Transactions Law. The function of the Transactions Law is to authorize
private exporters to enter into an export agreement which will be
exempted from the Japanese Anti-Monopoly Law. 107 If such an export agreement only contains terms of export trade (i.e., export price,
quantity, etc.), then it need only be filed with MITI. Conversely, if
the agreement contains some business terms restricting domestic
trade (i.e., purchase terms of merchandise to be exported 108), MITI's
approval must be obtained.
Formally the Transactions Law only provides for private export
agreements and does not involve government export control except
for orders issued under article 28. In practice, however, the Government is normally involved. Usually MITI advises exporters to enter
into export agreements whenever it foresees some possible trade conflict with an importing country. In this way, an export agreement
entered into under MITI's advice is used to carry out governmental
trade policy. MIT! sometimes advises exporters to enter into an export agreement fixing a price or setting a quantity to a specified
country with a threat that if such advice is ignored MITI will
promptly invoke compulsory export control as provided for in the
Export Order. 109
106. See, e.g., INTL. TRADE REPORTER'S U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY, supra note 75.
107. Article 33 (1).
108. Articles 5-2 (l) & 11 (4).
109. In connection with In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litigation, 513 F. Supp. 1100
(E.D. Pa. 1981), MITI, in a statement issued to an American court, claimed that it "directed"
Japanese exporters of television sets to the United States to form an export cartel and fixed
export prices. MITI also claimed that if the exporters had failed to comply with this directive,
it would have invoked a compulsory export approval mechanism at once. For details see Matsushita, Export Control and Export Cartels in Japan, 20 HARV. INTL, L.J. 103 (1979).
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Also, under Article 28 of the Transactions Law, MITI is authorized to issue .an order binding export prices, quantity or other terms
of business, when a private export agreement is entered and proves
inadequate. This provision is invoked when an exporter's agreement
is not effective due to activities of outsiders or when the terms of
business set up by the agreement (export price or export quantity,
etc.) are not satisfactory. If this order is issued by MITI, it is binding
on every exporter, including the participants in the agreement.
In the Zenith case, 110 some Japanese TV manufacturer-exporters
were challenged by two American TV manufacturers for alleged
dumping and cartel activities. In connection with this case, MITI
issued a statement, which was submitted to the American court
where the case was pending. MITI alleged that it had advised these
enterprises to enter into the export agreement as to TV sets to be
exported to the United States, and, had this advice not been
honored, MITI would have invoked an order under the Export Order. Such an order would have yielded a result identical to the private export agreement entered into under MITI's device.
Export agreements under the Transactions Law have perhaps
been the most important policy tool for MITI to effectuate "orderly
marketing agreements" with foreign countries, notably the United
States. In 1968, there was an informal discussion between the officials of the U.S. government and Japanese steel industry representatives regarding the voluntary export restraint to be exercised by
Japan. Thist informal restriction was put into effect by means of an
export agreement entered into among the Japanese exporters of steel
to the United States. 111 In 1974, the U.S. International Trade Commission decided that the domestic specialty steel industry had been
injured due to imports from foreign countries, and the U.S. Government took measures to restrict the quantity of imports of specialty
steel into the United States. 112 The Japanese Government advised
the exporters to enter into a voluntary restraint agreement to supplement the United States import control. Also in 1977, the U.S. International Trade Commission issued a determination that the U.S.
television industry had been injured by imports of television sets
110. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litigation, 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
11 I. This arrangement, however, was challenged in the United States by a U.S. consumer
group. See Consumers Union of the United States v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (1974), cerl.
denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
112. United States Intl Trade Commission, Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, Report to
the President on Investigation TA-201-5 Under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, UNITED
STATES INTL. TRADE COMMISSION PUBLICATION 756 (Jan, 1976).
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from abroad. 113 President Carter, instead of accepting the tariff increase recommended by the Commission, chose to negotiate with the
Japanese government to obtain a voluntary restraint of exports. 114
MIT! advised exporters of television sets to enter into an agreement
fixing the maximum number of sets to be exported to the United
States: The agreement between the U.S. government and the Japanese government stated that the Japanese government would utilize
the Transactions Law and the private agreement entered into thereunder to effectuate this governmental agreement.
Even though export cartel agreements are formally private in nature, there is usually a strong government hand involved in such
agreements, and realistically we can say that the Transactions Law is
one of the important policy tools available to MIT! in enforcing export controls.
2. Import Control

There are several major laws designed to control imports: the
Control Law, the Transactions Law and the Customs Tariff Law.
Moreover, the Tariff Law provides for procedures concerning imports and the collection of duties. In addition, there are also a
number of other laws which prohibit or restrict importation of specific products into Japan.
Article 52 of the Control Law provides for an import approval
system. This article states: "In order to ensure healthy development
of foreign trade and national economy, any person desiring to effect
import may be required to obtain approval therefor as provided for
by Cabinet Order." It should be noted that, unlike article 47 and
article 48(2) which concern export control, there is no language in
this article which requires that import controls be kept within the
limits of that necessary minimum in light of "the maintenance of the
balance of international payments and the sound development of international trade or national economy." Although the language in
article 52 authorizing import controls "in order tp ensure healthy development of foreign trade and national economy" may suggest that
an import control exercised for a purpose other than that of ensuring
healthy development of foreign trade and national economy is "ultra
I 13. United Slates Intl Trade Commission, Television Receivers, Color and Monochrome,
Assembled or Nol Assembled, Finished or Nol Finished, and Subassemblies Thereof, Report lo
the President on Investigation TA-201-19 under Section 201(/J) ofthe Trade Act of1974, UNITED
STATES INTL. TRADE COMMISSION PUBLICATION 808 (March 1977).
114. President's Memorandum for the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, 13
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 761 (May 20, 1977).
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vires," the outer limit of the power of the government to control imports is not as clearly defined as in the case of export control. This
provision may be interpreted to mean that the freedom of import is
not emphasized as much as the freedom of export.
It should also be noted that there is no explicit requirement of a
finding of "injury" to a domestic industry before an import control
under the Import Order can be initiated. In view of the fact that
Article XIX of GATT requires a finding of injury to the domestic
industry before invoking import control, and also in view of the fact
that Japan is a signatory of GATT, the Japanese Government
should probably find an injury to a domestic industry before it enforces an import restriction on a particular item.
Under Article 52 of the Control Law, MITI is authorized to establish an import quota (I.Q.) system. If an I.Q. system is established with regard to a specific item, a person desiring to import this
item must obtain MITI's approval before he can apply for an import
license for such a product. In the 1950s and 1960s this I.Q. system
was widely used to restrict imports of many kinds of items. However, since the late 1960s, the number of items under the I.Q. system
has dropped sharply due to the trend toward liberalization. 115 There
are some residual items which are still controlled: (1) meat and
dairy products, (2) marine products, (3) miscellaneous beans and oilstuff seeds, (4) fruits, vegetables and preparations thereof, (5) cereals,
(6) coal, and (7) hides and leather products. 116 Import control under
the Control Law is exercised for various purposes, among which the
most important is the protection of domestic industries.
In addition to the Control Law, there are a number of laws regulating or prohibiting the importation of certain items, as specified in
each statute. In 1982 the number was twenty-seven. 117 Some of
these laws contain a provision which restricts or prohibits the importation of the item covered by the law. Other laws only set up standards of quality of a product to be observed by the seller of such an
item, whether domestically manufactured or imported. Yet other
laws require the sellers of such items to obtain a license from public
authorities. However, they all affect imports in one way or another.
The Transactions Law permits importers of a commodity to enter
into an import agreement fixing a purchase price, limiting the maximum quantity to be purchased, setting a minimum standard for
115. See NIPPON NO HIKANZEI SHOKEKI (NontariffBarriers in Japan) 130 (K. Komiya ed.
1972).
116. Japan's Import System, supra note IOI, at 2.
117. Id. at 16.
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quality, or restricting channels of import. Unlike an export agreement, an import agreement can be entered into among importers of a
commodity only if one of the following requirements is satisfied:
(1) there must be a substantial restraint of competition or a monopoly in the country or place of export to Japan of the commodity in
question; (2) an import agreement is necessary to carry out an agreement between the Japanese Government and the government of the
exporting country; or (3) a pooling of the demand for a raw material
through an import agreement is necessary to insure that there is a
sufficient demand in Japan for the raw material to be exploited in a
foreign country, thereby facilitating the exploitation and development of this raw material in the foreign country. 118
When importers wish to enter into an import agreement they
must file the agreement with MITI and obtain its approval. 119 As in
the case of an export agreement, MITI often advises importers to
enter into an import agreement. Thus, an import agreement under
the Transactions ½aw is also a policy instrument used by MITI to
regulate foreign trade. Import agreements of this type are deemed
exempt from Japanese anti-monopoly laws. If necessary, MITI may
adopt a binding import order under the Transactions Law. 120
Import agreements are used less often than export agreements
under the Transactions Law. However, import agreements under
the administrative guidance of the government will probably become
increasingly important in the future, as many Japanese industries
lose their comparative production advantages vis-a-vis some developing countries.
Two important examples of import agreements should be mentioned. The first is the Scrap-Iron case. In 1974, under the Export
Administration Act, the United States embargoed the export of
scrap-iron as a result of a domestic shortage. MITI initiated a corresponding import control under the Control Law. When the United
States lifted the embargo, MITI dropped its import control and advised the· importers of scrap-iron to establish an impoit agreement to
control purchases of scrap-iron and avoid touching off new export
controls on the American side. 12 1
The second case is that of Chinese silk fiber. Due to a loss of
comparative advantage, the Japanese producers of raw silk had lost
118. Yushutsunyu torihiki ho (Export and Import Transactions Law), Law No. 299 of 1952
(as amended), Article 7-2 (1).
119. Id. at article 7-2 (1).
120. Id. at article 30 (1).
121. Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Jan. 8, 1975, at 4 (morning ed.).
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their market share to Korean and Chinese producers. To cope with
this situation an amendment to the Silk Price Stabilization Law was
adopted whereby a government corporation was given the exclusive
right to import raw silk from abroad. However, foreign producers
could easily avoid this import regulation by processing the silk
slightly and thereby converting it to semi-processed fibre, (which was
very easy to convert back to raw silk.) 122 MITI, concerned that Japanese producers would be damaged by imports of this product, advised importers of semi-processed silk to enter into an import
agreement to establish a price ceiling. At the same time, a binding
order was invoked to ensure that every importer complied with this
maximum price. 123
The Japanese Government entered into an orderly marketing
agreement with the Korean Government to implement a voluntary
restraint on the export of semi-processed fibre to Japan. 124 However,
since the Chinese Government refused to restrain exports of the
products to Japan, MITI utilized the Transactions Law to effectuate
an import agreement to control Chinese imports.
The import control exercised under the Silk Price Stabilization
Law has been challenged by necktie producers in Japan. As noted
above, the Silk Price Stabilization Law gives a government entity the
exclusive right to import raw silk from abroad. The government corporation sells imported raw silk in the domestic market at the price
prevailing in the domestic market, which is higher than the international price. Accordingly, Japanese producers of neckties were
forced to purchase raw silk at prices higher than the prices paid by
foreign tie producers. European producers were able to purchase
raw silk at a lower price, produce ties, and export them to Japan.
Due to these imports of European ties, the Japanese tie producers
lost some of their market. They brought a law suit against the Japanese Government alleging that the Silk Price Stabilization Law was
designed to protect only the domestic producers of raw silk and was
thus unduly discriminatory against tie producers and consumers. In
addition, they argued that the import controls under the Law violated provisions of the Constitution. 125 At the time of this writing
122. See Ikeda, Kiito-kinuseihin no yunyu chosei (Import Adjustment of Raw Silk and Silk
Products), 623 JURISUTO 85 (1976).
123. Tsusho Hakusho (White Paper on Foreign Trade), Kakuron (Itemized Discussion),
MINISTRY OF INTL TRADE AND INDUS. (1981) 209-10 (1981).
124. Ikeda, supra note 122, at 91.
125. In January 1979 eleven private individuals and companies engaged in the tie business
filed suit against the Government. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the amendment
of the Silk Price Stabilization Law (which gives the government corporation exclusive right to
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(February 1983), the suit is still pending in the Kyoto District Court.
Another important statute regulating import trade is the Customs
Tariff Law. This law provides for customs valuation, anti-dumping
and countervailing duties, and tariff quotas. Some of the most important provisions of this law are highlighted below.
Article 4 of the law provides for customs valuation. According to
this provision, the government shall use the "transaction value" as
the basis for the tariff. "Transaction value" is defined to be the
amount actually paid by the importer to the exporter at the time
when the import transaction took place.
Article 7 of the law provides for a retaliatory tariff. The government is given the right to impose a special surcharge on a product
imported from a country that unfavorably discriminates against Japanese ships, airlines, or commodities. Articles 8 and 9 are, respectively, the provisions for countervailing duty and anti-dumping duty.
These provisions and the amendments which were made to them as
a result of the Tokyo Round Negotiation will be explained in detail
below.
Under article 9-2 an "emergency tariff' is authorized. When, due
to a sharp decline in the price or other unforeseeable changes in the
exporting country, there is a sudden increase of imports to Japan,
causing material injury to a domestic industry that competes with the
imported commodity, or when a threat thereof exists, the government may levy a special tariff in addition to the regular tariff. In
addition, article 9-3 provides for tariff quotas, which permit the government to control the quantity of imports of a product to which a
certain level of tariff is applied. When the quantity of import of this
product exceeds this maximum level, a higher tariff is levied on the
product imported in excess of that maximum.
Except for tariff quotas, these special tariffs are rarely used. The
major reasons for the nonuse of these tariffs is because until the late
1960s the Japanese market was guarded by an import quota system.
Accordingly, there was little need for protective tariffs. Moreover,
since liberalization took place; Japanese commodities (especially industrial products) have been quite competitive internationally.
However, these protective tariffs may be used in the future as Japanese industries lose international competitiveness due to high labor,
overhead, and energy costs.
import raw silk) violated Article 22 of the Constitution's guarantee of freedom of trade and
Article 25 of the Constitution's guarantee of right to livelihood.
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D. Implementing the Tokyo Round Agreements in Japan

The ministries were assigned the task of actually negotiating the
Tokyo Round Agreements for Japan. Representatives from a
number of ministries composed the Japanese delegation to the negotiations, and inter-ministerial conferences were used to settle internal
disputes. The ministries also met with representatives of Japanese
industries to aid in formulating Japan's negotiating posture. 126
Generally speaking, the Tokyo Round Codes which required
some changes of domestic laws or regulations for implementation
were submitted to the National Diet for approval. One exception
was the code on import licensing, which did not require a change in
domestic law for implementation, but was submitted for approval
because it dealt-,with a fundamental principle of the GATT. Ultimately, the codes on tariff reduction, subsidies and countervailing
duties, anti-dumping, import licensing, customs valuation, technical
barriers to trade, government procurement, and civil aviation were
introduced in the National Diet for approval, and they were all approved and promulgated on April 25, 1980. 127 The agreements on
dairy products and bovine meat were not introduced in the National
Diet for approval, but were signed as executive agreements.
1. Tariff Reduction

The Japanese government actively proposed tariff reductions
during the Tokyo Round. On March 4, 1978, it made an advance
reduction of tariffs on 125 items to facilitate the negotiations. Japan
signed the Geneva Protocol on July 27, 1979, as soon as the Cabinet
had decided to accept it. In total, the Japanese government made
tariff concessions with regard to 2,600 industrial products and 200
agricultural products. 128 The imbalance between industrial and agricultural items is probably due to Japan's emphasis on industrial
products in international trade.
The Tokyo Round tariff reductions did not require changes in
126. There are a number of books written in Japanese on the Tokyo Round Negotiations,
among which the following are the most comprehensive: HACHIJUNENDAI NO BOEKI RURU
(The Trade Rules for the 1980s) (N. Shinbunsha ed. 1980); TOKYO ROUND NO ZENBO (The
Total Picture of the Tokyo Round) (Kenkyukai ed. 1980).
127. Agreement on Anti-Dumping, KAMPO GOGAI (Official Gazette - Special Issue) 5-10,
May 23, 1980; Agreement on Countervailing .Duty, id. at 18-25; Agreement on Customs J/aluation, id. at 41-50;Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, id. at 11-77;Agreement on Import
Licensing, id. at 89-91; Agreement on Civil Aviation, id. at 95-100; Agreement on Government
Procurement, id. at 110-29.
128. For details on tariff concessions, see Tokyo Round kosyo no jishitsuteki dakelsu nitsuite
(The Substantive Conclusion of the Tokyo Round Negotiation), 705 JURISUTO 39, 40-42
(1979).
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Japanese internal law. Article 3 of the Tariff Law 129 provides that
(1) tariffs shall be imposed as provided for in the Tariff Law or in the
Customs Tariff Law; and (2) if there is a special provision for a tariff
in a treaty to which the Japanese government is a party, a tariff shall
be imposed in accordance with the provision of such treaty. The
Cabinet submitted the Geneva Protocol to the National Diet for approval. When this approval was granted, the Geneva Protocol became a treaty and article 3 enacted its tariff provisions automatically.
Due to advance reduction of tariffs on many items, the effective
Japanese tariff rate on a number of items was lower than the rate
agreed upon in the Tokyo Round. If the Japanese government were
to carry out reductions according to the Tokyo Round provisions,
initial rates would have been higher than the current effective rate,
and there would have been no tariff reductions as required by the
Geneva Protocol. This situation did not seem desirable since the
Japanese government had actively proposed tariff reductions. Accordingly, it was decided to reduce tariffs from the effective rate of
the Protocol. The Tariff Special Measures Law was amended to effectuate this policy.130
2. Customs Valuation

Japan is a member of the Brussels Convention on Customs Valuation and has enforced her valuation system in accordance with the
principles set forth in that Convention. There was, however, some
difference between the language used in Article 4 of the Customs
Tariff Law, which provided for customs valuation, and the language
contained in the Customs Valuation Code. Article 4 was amended to
conform its language to the language in the Code. This amendment
became effective January 1, 1981.l3 1
Originally, article 4 had valued customs based on the price of an
imported product at the port of importation, if this price was the
result of perfect competition. Based on this general principle, detailed methods for calculating customs value were provided. Under
the amended article 4, customs valuation is based on the "transaction value" of an imported commodity, which means the price actually paid or payable by the purchaser to the seller for the imported
129. Kanzei ho (Tariff Law), Law No. 61 of 1954 (as amended). See note 6 supra.
130. See Amano, Tokyo Round kosho no daketsu nitomonau wagakuni kanzeikankeihorei no
seibi nitsuite, (On Adjustment and Administration of Laws relating to Tariff following the
Conclusion of the Tokyo Round Negotiation) 721 JURISUTO 84 (1980).
131. Kanzei teiritsu ho no kaisei nikansuru horitsu (Law to Amend the Customs Tariff
Law), Law No. 5 of 1981.
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goods, plus the cost of transport and some other costs to the extent
that they are not included in the price actually paid for the goods. If
the "transaction value" cannot be determined, then customs valuation is based on the transaction value of such or similar commodity
which was exported on the day on which the imported commodity
was exported or some other day close in time. If neither of these
values can be determined, customs valuation is based on a price arrived at by calculating backward from the domestic sales price or a
price arrived at by adding manufacturing costs and other costs. If
this method is also'ineffective, then customs valuation will be based
on a price as determined by procedures provided for in a Cabinet
decree. It seems that under the new valuation system the value of an
imported commodity is not necessarily lower than the value under
the old valuation system, since the new system is based on the price
actually paid by an importer of an imported commodity, whereas the
old system was based on a hypothetical price which would have prevailed under perfect competition. If the actual price is not lower
than the perfectly competitive price, the new system results in a
higher tariff value than the old system.
The new system has the advantage of stability in evaluating the
value of commodities, and thus encourages imports. Under the old
system, government valuation officials had more discretion to choose
the value on which the tariff would be based, since the perfectly
competitive price was easily manipulable. Under the new system,
the actual price paid by an importer is the basis for tariff valuation,
leaving less discretion to government officials.
There had been some complaints about the older customs valuation practices in Japan. The Trade Study Group Report 132 states
that there had been a feeling among foreign exporters that "customs
uplifts" had taken place which had caused uncertainty about customs and commodity tax obligations. A U.S. congressional report
also mentioned arbitrariness in evaluating the value of the imported
commodity. 133 The new valuation system should contribute toward
a more "transparent" valuation process.
3.

Countervailing and Anti-.Dumping .Duties

To date, the Japanese government has never issued either a coun132. A Special Progress Report, U.S.-JAPAN TRADE STUDY GROUP 17 (April 1980) [hereinafter cited as Special Progress Report].
133. United States-Japan Economic Relations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Asian and
Pac!ftc Affairs, and International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1980).
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tervailing duty or an anti-dumping duty order. There are a number
of reasons for this. First, until 1960, the Japanese economy was
shielded from foreign imports by the quota system and other import
controls. Accordingly, countervailing or anti-dumping duty orders
were unnecessary. Second, by the time of liberalization of imports
most Japanese industries were already sufficiently competitive that
protection by those special tariffs was not necessary. Third, alternative regulatory means for import control - the Control Law, and the
Transactions Law, for example - made countervailing and antidumping duties unnecessary. As some sectors of the Japanese economy lose international competitiveness, however, it becomes increasingly likely that some industries (especially the petro-chemical
industry) may petition the government to initiate proceedings under
the countervailing or anti-dumping duty laws.
The countervailing and anti-dumping duty laws are relatively
easy for private industries to utilize. Unlike the Control Law, the
Cabinet decrees on countervailing and anti-dumping duties explicitly provide for petition by private parties. 134 In this sense, private
enterprises or labor unions which feel that their interests are adversely affected by imports may petition the government for relief
even though these laws do not grant private parties the right to require that the government start a formal proceeding.
On the whole, it may be said that the attitude of the Japanese
government in the Tokyo Round Negotiation with regard to countervailing and anti-dumping duty matters was passive. Since the late
1960s, there have been many instances in which Japanese products
were challenged in foreign countries as being dumped or subsidized.
Those claims were most frequent in the United States, but there were
similar claims in Europe, Canada, and Australia. Major areas of
concern were steel, electronics, and more recently, automobiles. Accordingly, the Japanese government intended to use the Tokyo
Round Negotiations to propose codes which would narrowly limit
the powers of national governments to enforce anti-dumping and
countervailing duty statutes. The Japanese government was generally handicapped by a lack of experience in enforcing anti-dumping
or countervailing duty statutes.
Article 8 of the Customs Tariff Law provides for the imposition
of countervailing duties. To implement the Countervailing Duty
Code, article 8 and the Cabinet Order Concerning Countervailing
Duty were amended. As amended, article 8 provides that when the
134. See section III.D.4 infra •
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importation of a commodity which has been directly or indirectly
subsidized by a foreign government has caused, or is threatening to
cause, a material injury to an industry in Japan producing a similar
commodity, the Japanese Government may, pursuant to cabinet decree, impose a countervailing duty up to the amount of the net subsidy. The only change required by the Tokyo Round was to include
the term "material injury" to the Customs Tariff Law.
Before the Tokyo Round, there was no specific provision in Japanese law providing for petition by an interested party. Accordingly,
an amendment was necessary to implement the Countervailing Duty
Code. Under Article 2(1) of the Cabinet Order, a person requesting
the initiation of a countervailing duty investigation shall file with the
Minister of Finance a petition in writing together with sufficient evidence. The Minister then transmits a copy of this to the Minister of
MITI. The government may then initiate an investigation.
Under both Article 8(6) of the Customs Tariff Law and the Code,
the investigation period is (in principle) limited to one year. This is
due to the consideration that prolonged investigation may cause unreasonable uncertainty in the terms of trade. Under article 8(7) the
government in the exporting country or the exporter can propose an
undertaking, and the Japanese government can accept such an undertaking and terminate the investigation. Under article 8(9) the
Japanese government may effectuate a provisional measure before
an investigation has come to a conclusion, whenever (1) a subsidized
commodity has been imported; and (2) it is possible to draw the inference that an industry in Japan has been materially injured
thereby; and (3) a provisional measure is necessary to protect the
industry in Japan.
Whenever MOF, the Ministry in charge of the industry in question, or MIT! begin an investigation, all three of these Ministries
must be notified. These Ministries also make important policy
choices during the investigation. When an investigation reveals that
a final measure or a provisional measure is necessary, the Minister of
MOF, after consulting the Tariff Council, may impose a countervailing duty.
4. Anti-Dumping Duties

Japan has ratified as "treaties" both the GATT and the International Anti-Dumping Code of 1967. To implement the 1967 Code
and Article 9 of the Customs Tariff Law, a Cabinet Order Concerning Dumping was issued. Article 9 was amended, and a new Cabinet
Order issued, to implement the Tokyo Round results.
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As amended, article 9 provides that when the importation of a
dumped product causes or threatens to cause material injury to an
industry in Japan or materially retard the establishment of an industry in Japan, an anti-dumping duty may be imposed to protect that
industry. Such an anti-dumping duty must be imposed pursuant to a
Cabinet Order. An anti-dumping duty is a duty in addition to the
regular customs duty, and is to be equal to or less than the difference
between the "normal value" and the dumped price of the product.
E. Technical Barriers to Trade
Technical barriers to trade in Japan have been a major area of
controversy. Some of the barriers to trade seem real while others are
imaginary. Moreover, some of the technical standards, such as emission controls and labels for consumer protection, reflect special circumstances in Japan and cannot easily be removed even if they
create trade problems.
It is useful to have a general understanding of the alleged Japanese trade barriers. 135 Typically, commentators believe that the Japanese standards for product safety, health requirements, and
inspection practices are more stringent than those in foreign countries. These standards and requirements are not designed to discriminate against foreign products but simply to meet domestic needs.
However, due to implementation and enforcement differences between Japan and foreign countries these requirements sometimes
make it difficult for foreign products to penetrate the Japanese
market. 136
According to a survey conducted by the Japan Economic Journal, 137 there are five categories of complaints raised by foreign and
domestic enterprises engaged in importing products to Japan: (1) inspection procedures are too cumbersome and too detailed; (2) foreign test results are not well accepted in Japan; (3) standards are too
stringent compared to standards accepted by most countries; (4) the
enforcement of standards is arbitrary and capricious; and (5) sometimes foreign manufacturers cannot apply for an import license. Another common complaint is that foreign enterprises have insufficient
input into the formulation of technical standards.
135. Some of the difficulties encountered by foreign exporters with regard to technical
standards and inspections are described in Weil & Glick, Japan - Is the Market Open? A
View of the Japanese Market, Drawn from U.S. Corporate Experience, 11 LAW & POLY. INTL.
Bus. 845, 865-79 (1979). See also Special Progress Report, supra note 132, at 13, which contains
comments on experience of foreign exporters in this regard.
136. See Special Progress Report, supra note 132, at 4-5.
137. Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Jan. 4, 1982, at 7 (morning ed.).
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While some of these complaints are well grounded, others are
rather frivolous. Japan understands that some improvements in these
areas are essential to opening the Japanese market and has taken
several steps to remedy the situation. Most of these measures do not
require amendments to laws, but can be accomplished by changing
some internal regulations of the enforcement agencies or simply by
changing administrative practices.
To give foreign enterprises greater input into the formulation of
standards, a cabinet decision passed on May 22, 1979, contained the
following procedural principles:
When adopting or modifying standards, public notification of intention will be made, to the extent possible, sufficiently in advance.
After such notifications are made, opportunity for interested parties, whether domestic or foreign, to submit their views will be provided as much as possible, and views submitted will be given due
consideration. For this purpose, improvement in procedures shall be
facilitated where necessary.

Following this decision, MITI has started to announce changes in
standards in advance, in JETRO's Daily Bulletin.
A common complaint was that import license approvals of sale
were given only to importers that had been established in accordance
with Japanese laws. The complainants alleged that once the amicable relationship between a foreign exporter and a Japanese importer
is broken up, the foreign exporter faces difficulty in obtaining import
licensing and approval for sales in Japan, since such license and approval were given only to domestic enterprises. On April 1, 1979,
MITI took the remedial step of creating the "commissioned testing
system for Category A electrical appliances and materials," under
which a foreign applicant is able to submit his products for testing by
a "designated testing authority." After completion of a successful
test, he receives a certificate of test results. He then sends this certificate to his importer, who forwards it to the "designated testing A
authority" to obtain a "type test." After completion of the "type
test," the importer receives a successful test certificate, which he
sends to MIT!, who then issues the "type authorization." 138 In short,
under this system a foreign manufacturer or exporter can apply for
testing and license of his product while he is .located in a foreign
country.
To comply with the requirements of the Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the Industrial Standardization
138. Special Progress Report, Sllpra note 132, at 13.
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Law was amended 139 to permit foreign manufacturers or importers
to affix a "JIS" mark (Japan Industrial Standard) on goods manufactured in foreign countries. The JIS mark is voluntary, and it has no
legal effect in Japan. However, because this mark is greatly
respected, its presence often improves consumer acceptance of products. Moreover, some laws require that the products or parts used for
certain purposes meet the requirements for JIS standards. In such a
case, this mark becomes essential for sales.
There have been complaints that Japan refuses to accept the results of product tests conducted overseas. Retesting in Japan often
results in undue delay in getting foreign products ready for sale in
Japan. This problem was allegedly compounded by foreign exporters' limited knowledge about Japanese testing requirements which
increased the expense of testing in Japan. 140 Althou~h this problem
has not been solved completely, MITI has made provisions to accept
foreign test results under some circumstances.
A Cabinet decision of May 22, 1979 set forth guidelines to encourage acceptance of foreign test results. As a result, some progress
has been made in accepting foreign test results for electrical appliances, pharmaceuticals, and agricultural chemicals. 141
5. Government Procurement
a. Opening government procurement to foreign companies. Government procurement was probably the most controversial issue during the Tokyo Round. The central issue, however, was not whether
government agencies in Japan should use an open tendering system
to enable foreign enterprises to participate in bidding. The Japanese
government was quite willing to do this. Rather, the real problem
was whether or not some government-affiliated organization (!.e.,
some public corporations) should open their purchases to foreign
bidders. The purchase of instruments by Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone Corporation (NIT) is the major case on point. There
was a strong feeling in Japan that NTT purchases should not be
opened to foreign bidding.
The arguments against opening NTT purchases were cogently
presented by a leader of a labor union in the National Diet. 142 First,
139. The most comprehensive work on the Industrial Standardization Law is Kogyog{iutsuin Hyojunbu Hyojunka, Kaisei kogyo hoyjunkaho - chikujo kaisetsu (The Industrial Standardization Law, As Amended - Article by Article Comments) in NIHONKIKAKU KYOKAI
(1980).
140. See Special Progress Report, supra note 132, at 13.
141. Id.
142. The remarks were made by Komori Masao on March 14, 1980. See generally
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since the communication system of a country is unified, it requires
machines and instruments of uniform quality. If foreign-made
goods were introduced, this could disrupt efficient functioning of the
Japanese communication system. Second, many of the countries
that participated in the Tokyo Round Negotiation, notably some European countries, excluded electric comml!nication instruments from
the reach of the Government Procurement Code. Third, and probably most important, is the issue of unemployment. If foreign producers were free to sell instruments to NIT, this would decrease
national employment and opportunities for small business. According to this testimony, there were many small enterprises in Japan
that manufactured electric communication instruments or parts, and
most of them were subcontractors oflarge entities such as NTT. The
testimony alleged that there were 180 small companies, employing
70,000 workers subcontracting to NIT. If twenty percent of NIT
purchases were shifted to foreign producers, 14,000 workers would
have to be laid off.
A MITI official testified in the National Diet that the Japanese
government would try to favor purchases from small enterprises
rather than large companies under the Government Procurement
Law. This law requires that government agencies, including government-affiliated corporations, exert reasonable efforts to increase
purchases from small business. This measure may minimize the
hardships caused by the Tokyo Round concession. 143
Throughout the negotiations on government procurement, the
basic position of the Japanese Government was that a code should
apply only to government agencies which composed the central government. For this reason, the Japanese offer included only those
government agencies in Japan to which the "Accounts Law" applied.
However, the United States Government strongly requested that
some other government affiliated organizations (especially the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, the Japan Tobacco and
Salt Corporation, and the Japan National Railway) be included.
The Japanese Government agreed to include these corporations, and
several others during the Strauss-Ushiba Conference held in Washington, D.C., in March 1979. The United States insisted that this
offer was still not satisfactory, since some important instruments
Tokushukanzeito nikansuru kokkai gijiroku (The Records of the National Diet on Special Tariff System and Related Matters), MINISTRY OF INTL. TRADE AND INDUS., TRADE AND TARIFF
SECTION (1981). This is a compilation of the National Diet debates on tariff and trade matters
collected by the Tariff and Trade Section of MITI [hereinafter cited as The Record].
143. Id.
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purchased by the NTT were excluded from the coverage of the offer.
The Japanese Government reached an agreement with participating
governments other than the United States, and continued to negotiate with the United States Government.
In December 1980, an agreement was reached between the two
governments that NTT would open up some more areas for open
tendering with some reservations. The Minister of Posts and Telecommunications was to issue administrative guidance to NTT to implement this agreement.
NTT initiated the new system of purchases on January 1, 1981.
At first, there was a strong suspicion in the United States that this
new system would be as closed as it had previously been, despite the
change. In fact, the first year of the Agreement showed a poor performance due to NTT's demand for extremely detailed information
from firms seeking to qualify as bidders. 144 However, the Gibbons
Report, published in December 1980 by the U.S. Congress, commented favorably on NTT's effort to purchase foreign instruments.145 According to a press report of December 28, 1981, 146 the
President of NTT sent a letter to the U.S. Department of Commerce
and requested the Department to advise U.S. firms to utilize this new
bid system adopted by NTT. This report stated that despite the
opening of the NTT market, there has been insufficient participation
by U.S. firms in supplying telecommunication instruments.
b. The legal system ofgovernment procurement in Japan. 147 Until 1972, there was a provision in Imperial Edict No. 556 (1964)
which provided that: "In order to promote use of domestically produced articles, the Minister of each Ministry may use a single tendering in purchasing commodities as designated by the Minister of
Finance." In 1972, to establish a more open system of government
purchasing, this provision was abolished.
At present, there is one law and several orders concerning government procurement in Japan. These are (1) the Accounts Law,
(2) the Cabinet Order concerning the Budget, Auditing and Accounting (Imperial Edict No. 165 of 1947, hereinafter referred to as
the "Order of 1947"), (3) Special Provisions for the Cabinet Order
concerning the Budget, Auditing, and Accounting (Imperial Edict
No. 558 of 1946, hereinafter referred to as "the Special Provisions of
144. SUBCOMM. ON TRADE, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESs.,
REPORT ON TRADE MISSION TO FAR EAST 11-12 (Co=. Print 1981).
145. Id. at 12.
146. Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Dec. 28, 1981, at 7 (morning ed.).
147. Special Progress Report, supra note 132.
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1946"), (4) the Cabinet Order stipulating special procedures for government procurement of goods (Cabinet Order No. 300 of 1980,
hereinafter referred to as "the Special Cabinet Order"), and (5) Ministerial Ordinance stipulating special procedures for government
procurement of goods (Ministry of Finance Ordinance No. 45 of
1980, hereinafter referred to as "the Ordinance of 1980").
Since some provisions of the Order of 1947, the Special Provisions of 1946, and the Accounts Law were inconsistent with the Tokyo Round Code, some adjustments were required to implement the
Agreement. The Special Cabinet Order and the Ordinance of 1980
have thus been issued to provide for special procedures and stipulations to assure full compliance with the requirements of the Agreement. In this way, the Agreement has been incorporated into
domestic law.
c. Single tendering. Currently, government procurement in Japan revolves around open tendering. If it is impossible to rely on
open tendering, selective tendering, which is open to both domestic
and foreign persons, is permitted. The use of a single tendering procedure is limited to some exceptional cases. Article 29-3 of the Accounts Law provides that single tendering shall be adopted where
the circumstances do not allow the governmental entity concerned to
adopt open or selective tendering procedures because of the nature
or purpose of the contract concerned, the need for extreme urgency,
or where it is deemed that adopting open or selective tendering procedures would be disadvantageous for the agency concerned. Article
29-3 (5) of the Accounts Law provides that, notwithstanding the
other provisions, a single tendering procedure may be adopted in the
cases specified by Cabinet Order.
Article 99 of the Order of 1947 provides that a single tendering
procedure may be used where a government agency purchases products directly from cooperatives composed primarily of small and medium sized enterprises in order to protect them. Utilizing this
provision, it is possible for the Japanese government to purchase
products exclusively from small domestic enterprises. This is a potential mechanism for the government agencies in Japan to avoid
purchasing foreign products.
The implementation of the Government Procurement Code has
primarily been effected through amendments to various regulations
under the Accounts Law governing purchases by the government
agencies. The Accounts Law is applicable to purchases by agencies
composing the National Government, which include both Houses of
the National Diet, the Supreme Court, the Prime Minister's Office,

December 1982]

Tokyo Round

331

and various Ministries. In addition, some government affiliated organizations are covered by the Government Procurement Code.
These include, among others, the Japan National Railway, the Japan
Tobacco and Salt Corporation, the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, and twelve other government affiliated financial
organizations.
Since the Japan National Railway, the Japan Tobacco and Salt
Corporation, the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation,
and other government-affiliated financial organizations are not subject to the Accounts Law and regulations issued thereunder, the implementation has been effected through administrative guidance of
the appropriate Ministries and by amendments to the internal rules
and regulations which govern the purchases made by those
organizations.
E. Legal Remedies for Violations of the MTN Codes by the
Government Agencies
1. An Overview

This Section addresses the domestic legal remedies available to
private enterprises and citizens, domestic and foreign, when a Japanese governmental agency violates one or more of the Tokyo Round
Codes. Before discussing legal remedies, it should be mentioned that
there are several organizations which are designed to handle complaints by foreign enterprises operating in Japan. Three of these organizations will be briefly described.
In 1977, the U.S.-Japan Trade Study Group (TSG) 148 was organized. The work of the TSG is concentrated on two related issues.
The first is to identify, analyze, and make recommendations regarding laws, regulations, procedures, or practices that inhibit sales of
American goods and services in Japan. The second is to encourage
U.S. companies to gain a position in the Japanese market through
participation in specific trade promotion programs and to inform
American businessmen about the work of the TSG. 149
The TSG is a purely private organization composed of governmental and nongovernmental members, all participating as private
148. The TSG was a bilateral group of Japanese and American volunteers from the U.S.
business community in Tokyo, the U.S. Embassy, MIT!, the Japanese External Trade Organization, the Federation of Economic Organizations, the Japan-U.S. Economic Council, the Foreign Trade Council of Japan, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and others from
the Japanese business and government communities, all acting in an individual capacity.
149. See Special Progress Report, supra note 132, at 1-3.
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individuals on a voluntary basis. However, recommendations made
by the TSG have had some impact on changing governmental practices in regulating trade. Moreover, the activities of the TSG have
been carefully evaluated by a U.S. congressional committee.
Faced with a huge trade deficit with Japan, the U.S. Government
wanted to create a common entity to encourage entry of U.S.-made
products into the Japanese market. Accordingly, a bilateral sub-cabinet meeting was held in early 1977. This meeting resulted in the
establishment of the Joint U.S.-Japan Trade Facilitation Committee
(TFC). The TFC is jointly composed of members of the U.S. Department of Commerce and of the Japanese MITI. The TFC discusses allegations of Japanese trade barriers raised by American
exporters. Whenever there is a mutually agreeable solution to the
difficulty, the Japanese Government takes the necessary measure to
remedy the situation. In this sense, the TFC is an informal organization without any legal power. However, many complaints have been
successfully handled by this Committee, and it has substantially
eased the entry of U.S. products into the Japanese market. 150
In 1982, the Japanese government established the Office of Trade
Ombudsman (O.T.O.) to deal with complaints about trade barriers
asserted by foreign exporters. O.T.O. is composed of certain ViceMinisters (EPA, MFA, MOF, MITI, Ministry of Education, MHW,
MAFF, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, Ministry of Home Affairs, Agency of Science and
Technology) and is chaired by the Vice-Minister of the Cabinet-Secretariat. Also, an executive board has been established, which consists of high ranking officials of important government ministries and
agencies. Under this system, complaints may be filed with the relevant sections of these ministries and agencies and with Japanese Embassies and Consulates in foreign countries. When a proper
complaint is filed, the relevant ministry or agency shall report to the
complainant how the complaint is being considered within ten days
and, as promptly as possible, inform him of the final result of the
investigation and the remedy.
In formulating remedies, ministries and agencies are required to
take into consideration the following factors:
1. When formulating technical standards under domestic laws,
efforts shall be made to make them conform to standards that are
150. For details of the TFC activities, see Weil & Glick,Japan-Is the Markel Open? A
View ofthe Japanese Market .Drawn from U.S. Corporate Experience, 11 LAW & POLY. INTL.
Bus. 845 (1979).
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internationally recognized while giving due considerations to circumstances unique to Japan.
2. Efforts shall be made to accept the results of reliable tests
made in foreign countries.
3. Standards shall be made clear, and quantitative representation shall be made as much as possible.
4. Transparency in domestic institutions shall be established as
much as possible.
By March 1, 1982, eleven complaints had been filed with the relevant sections of the Japanese government. Among those, seven
complaints had been filed by Japanese importers, three by U.S. exporters, one by an Irish exporter, and one by a state in the United
States.1 51
Under this system, there are four types of actions which can be
taken: (1) To take an affirmative measure to remedy the situation, (2)
To answer to the complainant that his complaint is based on a misunderstanding, (3) To continue consideration of the problem, and (4)
To decide that nothing shall be changed.
It is premature to judge whether or not this system will be the
answer to trade barrier problems. However, if utilized properly, it
may be an effective tool to mitigate trade barrier problems in Japan.
2. Legal Actions for Indemnification of Damages
Article 17 of the Constitution provides that "Every person may
sue for redress as provided by law from the state or public entity in
case he has suffered damage through an illegal act of any public official." 152 This constitutional provision recognizes the individual's
right to recover for damage resulting from wrongful conduct of a
government official. There is little doubt that Japanese citizens can
exercise this constitutional right to recover damages for violations of
the Tokyo Round Codes.
There is some question as to whether or not a foreign citizen or
enterprise is entitled to this same protection. The answer depends on
whether "every person" in Article 17 of the Constitution includes a
foreign citizen or enterprise. Generally speaking, the term "every
person" includes not only Japanese citizens but also foreign individuals. Thus there are some cases 153 in which the Supreme Court has
IS I. Announcement of the Economic Planning Agency (Mar. 29, 1982).
152. CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, Binder IX, supra note 68, at 2.
153. Judgment of Dec. 25, 1957, Supreme Court, Japan, 11 Sal-han keishu 3377; Judgment
of Oct. 4, 1978, Supreme Court, Japan, 903 Hanrei Jiho 3.
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held that foreigners are protected by the constitutional guarantee of
human rights.
However, as quoted above, Article 17 of the Constitution permits
the recovery of damage caused by tortious conduct of a government
official in accordance with a provision of a law. The relevant law in
this regard is the State Redress Law. 154 Article 6 provides that when
a foreign person has sustained damage due to the tortious conduct of
a government official, he is allowed to recover the damage as long as
there is a guarantee of reciprocity. 155 Thus, the State Redress Law
allows recovery for damages sustained by a foreign person if his
country likewise allows a Japanese citizen to recover for tortious acts
committed by government officials of that country. In this sense, the
application of state indemnification for a foreign person is limited by
the rule of reciprocity, and there are some court cases 156 to this effect.
However, some commentators argue that the reciprocity provision of
Article 6 violates Article 17 of the Constitution which, on its face,
extends a remedy to "every person" damaged by the tortious conduct
of a government official.1s1
In any event, it is clear that a foreign person can recover damages
caused by a tortious act of the government when his home country
grants such a recovery to a Japanese citizen. Accordingly, a foreign
citizen or enterprise can bring an Article 6 suit when his business
interest has been adve!sely affected by an action of the government
which violates one of the Tokyo Round Codes. Since most of the
Codes have been approved by the National Diet as ''treaties" in the
sense of Article 98 of the Constitution, they override conflicting administrative actions of the government. To recover, the plaintiff
must prove either a malicious intent or negligence on the part of the
government official who engaged in the tortious conduct. However,
such proof should not be difficult as long as the official's conduct was
contrary to the provisions of one of the Codes, since government officials should know the contents of the treaties to which Japan is a
party. Nevertheless, the plaintiff must prove the amount of damage
sustained by him, as well as the causation between the illegal conduct of the government official and his damage.
154. Kokka baisho ho (State Redress Law), Law No. 125 of 1947.
155. A detailed account of the applicability of the State Redress Law to foreign persons is
made in SHIMOYAMA, KOKKA BAISHO HO (fhe State Redress Law) (1972).
156. Judgment of May 14, 1957, District Court, Tokyo, 8 Kakyu minshu 931; Judgment of
Mar. 24, 1965, High Court, Tokyo, 18 Kosai minshu 188; Judgment of Sept. 4, 1969, District
Court, Tokyo, 582 Hanrei Jiho 81.
157. T. MIYAZAWA, KENPO II 456 (new ed. 1974); TAKADA, KlHONHO KOMMENTAR KENPO
75 (Arikura ed. 1970); HAsHIMOTO, NIHONKOKU KENPO 374 (1980).
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The next question is whether a foreign citizen can base his claim
for damages on the failure of the National Diet to enact or abolish a
law necessary to assure conformity with the obligations of the Tokyo
Round Codes. For example, a foreign enterprise may argue that it
has suffered a loss of profit by a discriminatory regulation which violates the Code on Technical Barriers to Trade. In a court decision 158
addressing abolition by the National Diet of the home voting system
for physically disabled persons, the Sapporo District Court held that
the failure of the National Diet to replace an unconstitutional law
with a proper law could be regarded as a tortious act by government
and could subject the government to liability. Thus, under some circumstances, legislation or failure to enact legislation may be used as
a basis for seeking a pecuniary recovery for damage sustained by an
individual. 159 The question here is whether the right of compensation under the State Redress Law can be equated with the fundamental right of the people to vote which is regarded as the most
fundamental among the political rights of the people.
Generally speaking, the government is not liable for damage to
individuals caused by a failure of government economic policies,
since these policies are discretionary on the part of the administrative branch of the government. In one case, 160 a plaintiff maintained
that unusual consumer price rises were the result of mistaken governmental economic policies and should result in government liability. The Osaka High Court dismissed the claim on the ground that
economic policies are entrusted to the administrative branch of government which has wide discretion in selecting policies.
A claim for the recovery of pecuniary loss due to the failure of
the National Diet to amend a domestic regulation to conform with
the Tokyo Round Codes falls somewhere in between a claim based
on voting rights and a claim based on a failure of the government's
economic policies. This claim, however, should be regarded as having more substance than a claim based on a purely economic policy
matter, since most of the Codes are "treaties" in the sense of the
Constitution. Therefore, they are given a higher status than domes158. Judgment of Dec. 9, 1974, District Court, Sapporo, 762 Hanrei Jiho 9. In this case,
the plaintiff argued that the abolition of the home voting system for physically disabled persons and the failure of the government to enact a law restoring this system was unconstitutional, and the government was liable to compensate for any damages. The court held for the
plaintiff.
159. For similar cases, see Judgment of Dec. 18, 1974, District Court, Tokyo, 766 Hanrei
Jiho 76; Judgment of Oct. 19, 1979, District Court, Tokyo, 914 Hanrei Jiho 29; Judgment of
Jan. 17, 1980, District Court, Sapporo, 953 Hanrei Jiho 18; Judgment of May 14, 1980, District
Court, Ohsaka, 972 Hanrei Jiho 79.
160. Judgment of Feb. 26, 1979, High Court, Osaka, 924 Hanrei Jiho 34.
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tic legislation and regulations. In cases where the domestic regulation or legislation is unequivocally contrary to the requirements of
one of the Codes, the failure on the part of the National Diet to
remedy the situation may constitute actionable tortious conduct on
the part of the government.
3. Legal Action for Cancellation of Governmental .Determinations

The Administrative Cases Litigation Law 161 ("the Litigation
Law") provides for legal actions against the government for cancellation of governmental determinations which are wrongfully made.
We shall examine here the conditions under which a foreign enterprise may challenge a governmental determination that results in a
business disadvantage, and the process involved in seeking a court
decision to nullify such a determination. The situation arises when,
for example, a foreign exporter is placed at a disadvantage as a result
of the valuation of products for customs purposes. As explained in
the Section above, the Customs Tariff Law has been amended to
base the customs valuation on "transaction value" of the imported
product. . Therefore, if a determination of customs value has been
made on the basis of some criteria other than the transaction value,
such a valuation is contrary to both the Customs Tariff Law and the
Code of Customs Valuation. What are the legal remedies in this
situation?
Article 7 of the Litigation Law provides that the Civil Procedure
Code will govern all matters not addressed by the Litigation Law.
Since the Litigation Law contains no provision for a suit against the
government brought by a foreigner, Article 51 of the Civil Procedure
Code comes into force. Article 51 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that "[a]n alien is deemed to possess the power to be a party in
a litigation whenever he shall possess the power to be a party in a
litigation according to the Japanese law, even though he has no such
power according to the law of his home country." Accordingly, a
foreigner has the power to bring a suit against the government as
long as he has the power to be a party to litigation under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code.
Under Article 3(2) of the Litigation Law, a person whose legal
interest has been adversely affected by a government action may
bring a suit against the government to nullify that action. In our situation a government decision such as refusal to grant a license to import is amenable to this suit as long as the action is contrary to the
161. Gyoseijiken sosyo ho, (Administrative Procedure Act) Law No. 139 of 1962.
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obligations imposed on the Japanese government by the Tokyo
Round Codes. This type of action is available to a foreign party as
long as he has been specifically addressed by a government decision.
For example, if a foreign enterprise has applied for a license to sell a
product in Japan, and the Japanese government has issued a determination addressed to this party denying such a license, then the
foreign enterprise is entitled to bring suit under Article 3(2) of the
Litigation Law. The plaintiff in such a litigation usually seeks a
court decision which would cancel the determination. If a governmental determination is contrary to a provision of a treaty as approved' by the National Diet, then the court handling the case must
declare that such a governmental action is illegal and is subject to
cancellation.
However, to qualify as a plaintiff in a suit against the government
under Article 3(2) of the Litigation Law, the party must have some
legal interest in the issue. This is the question of standing and must
be decided before the court addresses the issue of the illegality of the
governmental determination. Article 9 of the Litigation Law provides that a person who brings a suit under the Litigation Law must
have a legal interest with respect to the cancellation of the determination in question. If a foreign enterprise has been denied a license
or approval of sale or import, there is little doubt that it has a legal
interest in requesting a court to cancel this administrative
determination.
Article 3(5) of the Litigation Law provides for a legal action to
nullify governmental inaction. For example, if an administrative
agency is required to decide within a reasonable period of time
whether or not to grant an application for a license to sell, the agency
would be liable for failure to decide within that period of time.
However, whether or not a court will require the government
agency to act under Article 3(5) of the Litigation Law depends upon
the nature of the administrative action sought by the plaintiff. There
are some types of administrative actions which are discretionary. 162
If an administrative action falls within this category it is usually impossible to force the government agency to make a decision. However, there are some government actions that are regarded as
ministerial, such as approvals or disapprovals of licenses given
to products under the safety standards and laws. If an administra162. For example, a decision as to whether the government should effectuate a price control, raise or lower tariffs, or tighten import control of some commodities would be regarded as
discretionary, and the failure of those measures_ would not be amenable to a lawsuit by a
private individual.
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tive action is ministerial, it is usually possible to force the government agency to act.163
4.

Violation

of the MTN Codes as a Defense

When a foreign enterprise is accused of a violation of a law or
regulation in Japan which is contrary to the provisions of the Codes,
the accused party can assert the nullity of the law as a defense. This
defense can be utilized when an enterprise is accused of a criminal
offense for a violation of, for example, safety standards or some
other standards incorporated in law. The party making use of this
defense must of course prove that the law or regulation under which
he is being accused is contrary to a provision of a treaty. However,
once this proof is established, the legal consequence is rather clear;
that is, the court handling the case must decide that the treaty
prevails over the conflicting domestic law or regulation. After the
criminal action has been dropped for this reason, the party may
bring an action against the government for indemnification of all
damages that he can prove.
5. Standing of Foreign Governments
Since standing to sue for nullification of an administrative action
is only granted to those persons whose legal interests have been adversely affected, there appears to be no way in which a foreign government can bring a court action in Japan for cancellation of an
action of the Japanese government in contravention of the MTN
Codes. On the other hand, under the State Redress Law there is no
strict standing requirement. Therefore, it is possible for any person
to sue the government for tortious acts. However, the plaintiff must
prove both damages and the causation between the damages and the
illegal conduct. Foreign governments rarely suffer a property loss
due to an action of a Japanese government official that violates the
MTN Codes. Thus, there is little chance that a foreign government
can assert a claim based on the State Redress Law.
Generally, in litigation addressing the issue of a violation of the
MTN Codes on the part of the Japanese government, foreign governments play the limited role of filing opinions stating a position as
to the legality of the Japanese governmental action. It is up to the
court to decide whether or not to accept such an opinion of a foreign
government. 164
163. Judgment of July 14, 1978, District Court, Fukuoka, 909 Hanrei Jiho 27; Judgment of
July 30, 1979, High Court, Ohsaka, 948 Hanrei Jiho 44.
164. Article 310 of the Civil Procedure Code states: "If the court deems it necessary, the
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Article 42 of the Litigation Law provides for a lawsuit against the
Japanese government by a person or a body not having any legal
interest in the court action. According to this provision, such an action by a party without a legal interest is allowed only if there is a
provision in a law to that effect. Therefore, if the MTN Codes contained a provision permitting a foreign government to bring an action in a Japanese court, foreign governments would be given
standing to challenge an action of the Japanese government which is
contrary to the Codes.

F. Conclusions
It is probably fair to state that the Tokyo Round Agreements and
their implementation have contributed somewhat to the liberalization of international trade in Japan. Especially in such areas as technical standards and government procurement, considerable progress
has been made in opening up some areas to foreign imports. There
is, however, still some dissatisfaction with the remaining trade barriers in Japan. Some of those allegations are real, while others are
based on a lack of understanding as to what has happened in Japan
in the past several years. Closure and exclusivity in such areas as
services, banking, the distribution system and cartels have been
pointed out by a 1981 U.S. congressional document.I 65 The Japanese government is to see if such allegations are justified, and,
whenever it finds undue restrictions and exclusions in those areas, it
should proceed to remedy the situation. At the same time, major
efforts are required by the Japanese government to proclaim to the
world that the Japanese market is not as closed as is perceived in
foreign countries.
Even though the MTN Agreements have accomplished much,
there are some problems in trade between Japan and other countries
which are left unresolved.
On the export side, most of the important trade problems becourt may request ••. a foreign government or a foreign public body to render an expert
opinion. • • ." MINJI SOSHO Ho Art. 3 IO.
165. SUBCOMM. ON TRADE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 97TH CONG.,
1ST SESs., REPORT ON TRADE MISSION TO FAR EAST 11 (Comm. Print 1981). About Japanese
trade barriers see generally SUBCOMM. ON TRADE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON wAYS AND
MEANS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., TASK FORCE REPORT ON UNITED STATES-JAPAN TRADE
(Comm. Print 1979); SUBCOMM. ON TRADE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
96TH CONG., 2D SESS., UNITED STATES-JAPAN TRADE REPORT (Comm. Print 1980); United
States-Japan Trade Economic Relations: Hearings Before the Subcomm on Asian and Pac!ftc
Affairs, and International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1980); Weil & Glick, Japan - Is the Market Open? A View of the
Japanese Market .Drawn from U.S. Corporate Experience, ll LAW & POLY. INTL. Bus. 845
(1979).
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tween Japan and the United States or European countries have been
solved by way of orderly marketing agreements whereby the Japanese government and industries undertook to restrain exports of the
products in question. Prominent examples are textiles, steel, specialty steel, television and automobiles. The wisdom of solving trade
problems by utilizing this technique should be closely reexamined,
and, even if this technique is found desirable, it should be subject to
international rules to guarantee fairness to everyone concerned.
Some of the alleged trade barriers in Japan have not been covered by the Tokyo Round Agreements. For example, administrative
guidance exercised by the Japanese government, the exclusivity in
the Japanese distribution system, and the exclusivity in Japanese
business groups, are some of the subjects which were not addressed
during the negotiations. Some of these alleged restraints are private,
rather than legal barriers to trade. This raises an interesting question
as to whether non-governmental arrangements initiated by private
enterprises, trade-related cultural barriers, or business and social
customs may be made the subject of trade negotiation and, if so, how
the government should go about changing those non-governmental
arrangements. In the future, it will become necessary to give some
thought to this question.
As has already been explained, there are some legal remedies
available to domestic and foreign enterprises if the Japanese government infringes upon their rights so long as they can show that the
government action is contrary to an obligation imposed by one of the
MTN provisions. It is recommended that foreign enterprises bring
such legal claims to the Japanese government whenever they feel
that their rights have been injured by its action. It is less likely that
Japanese domestic companies will raise such claims since Japanese
companies are less inclined to use legal actions to resolve disputes
with the government. Although excess litigation may result in inefficiency and unnecessary waste of time and energy, even in Japan,
lawsuits can be an effective means to persuade governmental agencies that the MTN Agreements should be strictly observed. It is
worthwhile to give some thought to the possibility of utilizing those
legal remedies more fully, not only to secure the rights of foreign
enterprises in Japan, but also to better Japanese society as a whole.
IV.

IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND IN THE UNITED STATES

John H. Jackson

United States law imposes considerable complexity on MTN im-
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plementation, and constrains policy makers and diplomats in a
number of ways. The United States legal system, however, has some
important differences from the other two systems explored in this
Article. Some of these differences can be mentioned at the outset.
First, the parliamentary branch in the United States (i.e., Congress) appears to be considerably more powerful than its counterparts elsewhere. This limits executive branch officials, and in some
cases makes it nearly impossible to implement - or even negotiate
- certain changes in international rules. Second, the U.S. legal system provides a number of mechanisms for individuals to challenge
official actions. These procedures limit the power of the executive
branch. Third, although not so prominent as in the first century of
the republic, there still remains some slight ambiguity about the distribution of powers between the states and the federal government.
Even where the legal issues are clear (generally meaning the central
government power prevails), there are sometimes practical political
constraints preventing the federal government from acting in an area
traditionally subject to state government control.
This section will explore these and other themes as they relate to
the implementation of the Tokyo Round.
A.

The Constitutional and Legal Framework of U.S. International
Trade Relations.

The draftsmen of the United States Constitution distrusted centralized government. Consequently, they built into the Constitution
the principle of separation of powers, explicitly distributing powers
among three branches of the federal government (the Presidency,
Congress, and the Courts) and reserving certain powers to the state
governments. 166 Thus, implementation of international agreements
is constantly affected by the tension between these various government powers.
For practical reasons, the Presidency has developed a preeminent
role in the conduct of foreign affairs. The President has authority to
negotiate international agreements and to carry on international diplomacy. Over the years, Congress has delegated to the President a
wide variety of additional powers relating to international affairs.
Although, in the post-Watergate era, Congress has imposed some restraints on the President's authority over foreign affairs, the President remains the central figure in U.S. diplomacy. One significant
166. See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972); L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 15-412 (1978); THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 47-51 (J.

Madison); No. 75 (A. Hamilton).
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limit on Presidential foreign affairs power is Article I, Section 8 of
the Constitution, under which the Congress claims preeminence as to
"Commerce with foreign Nations."
Another major restraint on the President's foreign affairs power
is the constitutional requirement that "[t]reaties" be submitted to the
United States Senate for "advice and consent" (requiring a twothirds affirmative vote) before the President can enter into them on
behalf of the United States.1 67 Nevertheless, over two centuries of
constitutional history, there have developed alternative forms for approval of international agreements. United States practice divides
international treaty agreements into "treaties" in the U.S. constitutional sense (which must be submitted to the Senate), and "executive
agreements." 168 There are several ways in which "executive agreements" can be approved under United States Constitutional practice:169 (1) They can be submitted to the Congress, for approval by
the passage of a statute which grants the authority to the President to
accept the international agreement; (2) The Congress can pass a statute which authorizes the President, in advance, to negotiate, enter
into, and accept for the United States an international agreement
(and to implement it) (This is the approach of the Trade Agreements
Acts, as to tariff agreements. 170); (3) A treaty may give the President
advance delegated authority within limits to accept an executive
agreement designed to implement the treaty; 171 and (4) There are
some executive agreements which the President can enter into on the
basis of his own "inherent" authority under the Constitution, without any participation by the Congress or the Senate either before or
after the negotiation. 172 These latter must be agreements which are
authorized by explicit constitutional grants of authority to the President (such as his authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces), or which can be implied as part of Presidential authorities
167. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2.
168. U.S. Dept of State, CIRCULAR No. 175 (1955), reprinted in 50 AM. J. INTL, L. 784
(1956); Stevenson, Constitutional Aspects of the Executive Agreement Procedure, 66 DEPT. ST.
BULL. 840, (1972); L. HENKIN, supra note 166, at 173; McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Con•
gressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments

of National Pol-

icy, 54 YALE LJ. 181, 234 (1945).
169. Id.
170. Trade Act of 1974, § 101, 19 U.S.C. § 2111 (Supp. IV 1980).
171. See, e.g., North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. 1964, 34
U.N.T.S. 243, and accompanying executive agreements which are listed following the NATO
treaty in U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1980 277 (1980),
172. These are the most controversial. See, e.g., L. Henkin,supra note 16<>, at 48; J. JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 78 (1977); W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 10104 (1971); U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,supra note 168, reprinted in 50 AM. J. INTL. L. 784, 785 (1956).
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under the Constitution (such as his "executive power"). 173
In addition to legislative-executive tensions, U.S. foreign policy is
affected by the state-federal power struggle. 174 As to domestic affairs, the evolution of U.S. constitutional law has generally been in
the direction of concentrating power in the federal government. It is
reasonably well established today that the U.S. federal government
has supremacy over almost all issues, leaving aside some subject
matters which have not really been tested in the Supreme Court.
With respect to foreign affairs, there is virtually no Supreme Court
opinion which rules against the exercise of federal power on the
ground that such federal power is in conflict with state power, as
long as the exercise· of federal power was itself constitutional. 175
Thus, although the Supreme Court has held that state powers sometimes prevail over international treaties (such as in the off-shore oil
cases), the basis for this decision was itself an exercise of federal
power, namely, an Act of Congress. 176
Apparently only the government procurement negotiations raised
a states' rights issue during the Tokyo Round. Arguably, purchases
by state governments are so intimately connected with normal sovereign and administrative authority reserved to the states, that the federal government can not enter into an international agreement that
interferes with those activities. Indeed, some states have exercised
their authority in this field by enacting statutes that call for preference to be given to the purchase of domestically produced, rather
than foreign, goods. Such rules have been challenged both politically and judicially. 177 The litigation has been generally inconclusive. A California court held that a California Buy-American statute
was unconstitutional, because the general subject of governmental
procurement was precluded by extensive federal regulation of the
matter, including a large number of international treaties. 178 The
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES ch. 3, §1 (5th ed. 1981); A. MASON &
BEANEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW chs. IV, V (2d ed. 1959).

w.

175. There are very few Supreme Court cases concerning the exercise of federal government power in the area of foreign affairs. Of those cases, those which have ruled that the U.S.
government's action exceeded its authority under the Constitution, in cases other than those
affecting civil liberties, are even fewer.
176. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. I (1960).
177. Note, State .Buy-American Laws -Invalidity ofState Al/empts to Favor American Producers, 64 MINN. L. REV. 389 (1980).
178. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commrs. of Dept. of Water & Power, 276 Cal.
App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969). See discussion at J. JACKSON, LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 174-80 (1977).
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GATT, for example, touches on the question of government procurement, but generally exempts government procurement from the
various trade rules of GATT. (It was for this reason that it was felt
necessary to negotiate a government procurement code in the MTN.)
A New Jersey Supreme Court case 179 held that state rules regarding procurement that related to a water supply did not violate the
GATT (and implied that such rules were not preempted by federal
government action). Both of these cases, however, recognized that if
the federal government had acted in a way that was explicitly inconsistent with state regulations or rules, the federal action would
prevail.
During the Tokyo Round, extensive negotiation was held on government procurement. In this portion of the negotiation, the negotiators considered whether international government procurement
rules should apply to governmental subdivisions of a federal state.
This author has been told that the U.S. government was prepared to
accept some such rule, and that the negotiators believed that the federal government had the authority to do so. Apparently,foreign objections defeated this proposal. Certain other governments faced
considerably more difficult constitutional problems on this issue than
did the United States. (For example, the German Lander have
much autonomy, and the constitutions of Canada and Australia raise
important questions in this connection.)
In short, in the area of foreign affairs, particularly economic affairs, it is hard to conceive of an action taken by the federal government that would not be upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
event of direct conflict with state actions. This would be true whether
the action was administrative or legislative, and whether it was accomplished by international agreement or by other properly authorized means.
B. The GA TT in the United States' Law

Originally, the United States accepted the 1947 Protocol of Provisional Application implementing the GATT as an "executive agreement" authorized by the 1945 extension of the Trade Agreement
Act. Consequently, the President accepted GATT without reference
to Congress. Some members of Congress, angered by this procedure,
insisted that the GATT was not a valid international agreement of
179. K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Commn., 75 N.J.
272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), appeal dismissed, 43S U.S. 983 (1978).
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the United States. 18° For several decades Congress officially refused
to recognize the GATT. 181 Although the Trade Act of 1974 seems to
recognize the GATT as a valid legal commitment, 182 this congressional hostility to the GATT has affected U.S. international trade
relations over the years.
The original concept for GATT was that it would merely be a
multilateral agreement appended to the new International Trade Organization when the latter came into being. The GATT itself was
not designed to be an international organization, and presidential
authority probably would not have extended to entry of the United
States into an "organization." When the ITO draft charter was completed at Havana in 1948, it was submitted to governments for acceptance. However, by 1950 it was clear that Congress would not
approve the ITO and consequently the President withdrew 183 it from
congressional consideration. The ITO Charter was then dead, and
GATT had to fill the gap.
Within the United States government, the GATT developments
described above effectively resulted in a substantial shift of power to
the President. With the de facto development of the GATT as the
central international organization regarding trade, more and more
trade issues tended to find their way into the GATT fora for discussion and resolution. The GATT provided the only overall systematic code of conduct governing the way many nations regulated their
international trade. Additionally, because the GATT agreements
provide the authority for the application of a lower tariff on most
goods, the GATT became an essential pillar of U.S. international
trade policy. If the GATT were somehow to be extinguished, tariffs
in the United States could bounce back to the 1930 statutory rates an action which would be a devastating blow to international trade
relations. 184
180. See Jackson, The General Agreement on Tar!!Js and Trade in U.S. Domestic Law, 66
MICH. L. REV. 249, 268 (1967).
181. See id. at 265-69, and note statutory formulae used prior to 1974.
182. See Trade Act of 1974, § 12l(d), 19 U.S.C. § 213l(d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), and
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 2(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2503(c) (Supp. IV 1980), which approve a
number of the MTN agreements.
183. U.S. State Dept., Press Release (Dec. 6, 1950), reprinted in 23 DEPT. ST. BULL. 977
(1950).
184. See Trade Act of 1974, § 125(e), 19 U.S.C. §2135(e) (1976), which provides, however,
that the Trade Agreement tariff rates can remain in effect for one year, pending petition to
Congress to set the tariff levels, in the event of termination of an International Trade Agreement on which the rates rely.
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C. Events Leading Up to the Trade Act of 1974
After the completion of the Kennedy Round negotiations in June
1967, there was a backlash in the United States political attitudes
toward international trade. Congress refused to authorize acceptance of those portions of the Kennedy Round that required its consent. Likewise, the Anti-Dumping Code, negotiated in the Kennedy
Round and accepted by the President, was criticized by members of
Congress who felt the President did not have authority to agree to
that Code. 185 The U.S. balance-of-payments problems, and the surge
of imports into the United States toward the end of the 1960's, led
both labor unions and industrial interests to lobby for restrictions on
imports. 186 The President's authority, under the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, to negotiate for reductions in tariffs, had expired at the end
of June 1967. 187 There was no renewal of that authority until the
1974 Trade Act.
In 1970, the President appointed a commission to make recommendations for United States trade policy. The "Williams Commission" report became the intellectual basis for much of the policy of
new legislation to permit United States participation in international
trade negotiations.
In 1972, preparations began in earnest for the formulation of a
new trade bill to be submitted to Congress. This bill was finally sent
to Congress in April 1973. 188 The new bill was the most comprehensive international trade bill yet submitted to the Congress. It addressed not only the renewal of Presidential trade agreements
authority, but also contained provisions on the Generalized System
of Preferences for developing countries (GSP), extending the Most
Favored Nation treatment (MFN) to certain Communist countries,
185. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, GAIT, BISD 24 (15th Supp. 1968). See Barcelo, Anti-Dumping Laws as Barriers to
Trade - The United States and the International .Dumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 491
(1972); Long, United States Law and the International Anti-Dumping Code, 3 INTL, LAW, 464
(1964). See also S. REP. No. 1385, Part 2, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4539.
186. For a history of these bills, see F. ROOT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT
183-85 (4th ed. 1978). See also Tar!lf and Trade Proposals: Hearings Before t/1e House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
TRADE Acr OF 1970, H.R. REP. No. 1435, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Trade Act of 1970,
Amendments 925 and 1009 to R.R. 17550 Social Security Amendments of1970: Hearings Before
the Senate Committee on Finance, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); SENATE COMM, ON FINANCE,
SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1970, s. REP. No. 1431, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
187. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (1962).
188. H.R. 6767, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93D CONG.,
1ST SESS., PRESS RELEASE AND OTHER MATERIAL RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION PRO·
POSAL ENTITLED THE "TRADE REFORM Acr OF 1973" (Comm. Print 1973).
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amendments to the anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws of
the United States, and a number of other matters.
In the fall of 1973, the House of Representatives approved a remarkably liberal trade bill. 189 As a result of the intervening oil crisis,
however, the Senate was not nearly as receptive to the idea of freer
trade. Furthermore, as the Watergate Crisis deepened, 19° Congress
became increasingly reluctant to enact trade legislation that would
delegate powers to a President whom the Congress distrusted. Many
Congressmen also viewed the Vietnam War as an abuse of presidential powers. 191 Consequently, Congress began to reassert its own authority in matters of international affairs, particularly on trade. It
was only after President Nixon resigned and President Ford came
into office and strongly supported the Trade Act that the Senate began in earnest to finish the work. The bill was finally passed on December 19, 1974, after a number of compromises. On January 3,
1975, the Act was signed by the President and came into force. 192
In 1972 and 1973, many analysts recognized that the next round
of GATT negotiations must address the increasingly troublesome
"non-tariff barriers" (NTB's). However, under the U.S. constitutional system, it is considerably more difficult for the President to
negotiate non-tariff rather than tariff agreements. Because of their
complexity and because of the difficulty of establishing limitations
on delegated authority, Congress was unwilling to grant the President advance authority to negotiate, accept, and implement international NTB agreements. On the other hand, because of Congress'
failure to implement parts of the Kennedy Round, other nations
were unwilling to negotiate with the United States if the results of all
negotiations had to be approved by Congress. 193
189. H.R. 10710, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
190. See, e.g., C. BERNSTEIN & B. WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974); L.
JAWORSKI, THE RIGHT AND THE POWER (1976).
191. See War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2346; S. REP. No.
220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
192. Trade Act of 1974, 19 u.s.c. §§ 2101-2487 (1976); see 119 CONG. REC. 40,769 (1973)
(House debate and action); 120 CONG. REC. 41,796 (1974) (same); 120 CONG. REc. 39,497,
41,629 (1974) (Senate debate and action); H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S.
REP, No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS
7186; HOUSE CONF. COMM. TRADE ACT OF 1974 CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 1644,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 7367.
193. In his testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee, Ambassador William
R. Pearce, Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, said:
our trading partners are reluctant to negotiate with us until they have some assurance that
agreements can be implemented, and implemented rather promptly. After all, when you
put an offer on the table, you spend some political capital. You are offering to expose
some part of the domestic economy to competition it hasn't had before, whether it is a
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One proposed solution to this dilemma was the "legislative veto."
Under this approach, the President would negotiate and complete a
tentative international agreement, consult extensively with the Congress, and then submit a final agreement and implementing legislation to the Congress. If the Congress did not "veto" the action, the
President's submissions would become law. The House of Representatives accepted this approach, but the Senate refused, arguing
that the approach unconstitutionally extended too much power to
the Presidency. 194
The ensuing search for a compromise position resulted in sections 102 and 151 of the Trade Act of 1974, sometimes called the
"fast track" NTB authority. Under these provisions, the President
would negotiate on various NTB matters and, ninety days before entering into international agreements on these matters, would notify
the Congress and consult with key congressional committees about
the proposed agreements. After consultation, the President would
complete the international agreements, and submit them to Congress
along with proposed legislation to implement them into United
States law. The submission would be in the form of a normal bill,
requiring approval by both Houses of the Congress as well as the
President. However, the 1974 Trade Act fast track procedure estabtariff negotiation or NTB negotiation. No country is willing to do that - ourselves included - unless when we make an offer we have reasonable chance that, if accepted, it
will result in agreement - and fairly soon.
Trade Reform: Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and Means on R.R. 6767, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 394 (1973) (testimony of William R. Pearce).
194. There is an extensive debate in the United States, still continuing, about the constitutionality of the legislative veto. Such a veto procedure is embodied in a number of statutes,
including several such procedures elsewhere in the 1974 Trade Act itself. Recent writing on
the legislative veto includes: Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to
Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogative, 52 IND. L.J. 323 (1977); Bruff & Gellhorn,
Congressional Control ofAdministrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetos, 90 HARV, L.
REV. 1369 (1977); Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation ofPowers: The Executive on a
Leash, 56 N.C. L. REV. 423 (1978); Henry II, The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional
Limits, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGlS. 735 (1979); Miller & Bowman, Presidential Allacks on the Constitutionality of Federal Statutes: A New Separation of Powers Problem, 40 Omo ST. L.J. 51
(1979); Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52
IND. L.J. 367 (1977); Stewart, Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto, 13 HARV. J. ON LEOJS.
593 (1976); Volz, Legislative Veto in the Arms Export Control Act of1976, 9 LAW & POLY. INTL,
Bus. 1029 (1977); Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look al Congressional Control ofthe Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 983 (l915);seealso S. REP. No. 1298,supra note 192, at 75. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled, in Chadha v. I.N.S., 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. granted, 454 U.S. 812 (Oct. 12, 1981), that the one-house veto provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act permitting an override of the Attorney General's decision to suspend
deportation of an alien was unconstitutional. A similar legislative veto provision which allowed use of a one-house veto to disapprove a gas-pricing regulation by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission was struck down in Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC,
673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), appealfiled, No. 81-2171, 51 U.S.L.W. 3025 (U.S. Aug. 3, 1982).
Both cases have been appealed to the Supreme Court which, as of February 1983, had not
rendered a decision.
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lished three important procedural modifications: (1) a procedure requiring automatic "discharge" from committee consideration, so that
the bill would necessarily have to be considered by the full House
and Senate within a certain period of time; (2) a procedure that prohibited any amendments to the bill; and (3) a limitation on the debate on the floor of the House and the Senate. Thus, within a
reasonable period of time, normally about sixty days of legislative
session, the Congress would act on the negotiation results. 195
It was under this new procedure that most of the MTN results
were approved and implemented during 1979.
D.

United States Participation in the Tokyo Round
1. Authority to Negotiate

The President's authority in areas of international trade and
other economic relations is very circumscribed and often depends on
particular statutory delegations of authority. Executive participation
in the Tokyo Round, therefore, relied heavily on the authority
granted by the Trade Act of 1974. Without this Act, it is doubtful
that the United States could have participated in a meaningful
way. 196 There are at least five categories of sources of negotiating
authority for U.S. representatives at the MTN (three of which are
contained in the Trade Act of 1974):
First, section 101 of the Act granted the President "advance" authority to negotiate and to implement certain specified tariff reductions.197 This section basically followed the statutory pattern and
language of the series of U.S. trade acts beginning with the 1934 Act
known as the "Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act." This was the
most complete grant of authority given to the President in the 1974
Act. No congressional approval was needed under this provision.
The President's authority under section 101, however, expired after
five years.
Second, section 102 of the Act set forth explicit authority to negotiate international agreements on "non-tariff barriers and other distortions of trade," and provided the "fast track" NTB authority. 198
195. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2112, 2191 (1976). See S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 192, at 74-77, 1071I; H.R. REP. No. 1644, supra note 192, at 31.
196. See Trade Agreements Act ef 1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International
Trade ef the Senate Commillee on Finance, United States Senate on S. 1376, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 393 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Senate Finance Comm. Hearings (1979)) (statement of
Robert S. Strauss, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations).
197. 19 U.S.C. § 2lll (1976).
198. See text at note 195 supra.
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This section is carefully worded to apply the procedure only when
"the President enters into a trade agreement under this Section." 199
It does not purport to require this procedure as to all international
NTB or "trade distortion" agreements, because to do so would have
raised constitutional issues. In some cases, the President could claim
that his own authority (whether originating in the Constitution or
stemming from prior statutes) allowed his negotiation and perhaps
even implementation of NTB or agreements on trade distortions; i.e.,
that 102 was unnecessary in certain cases. Additionally, the President always retained his general constitutional authority to negotiate
an international agreement and submit it to Congress for approval
without the benefit of the fast track.
Third, the Trade Act of 1974 implicitly recognized the authority
of the President to negotiate on some matters. For example, section
121 includes a list of reforms that Congress desired relating to
GATT and international trade rules. A clause of that section specifically stated, however, that approval and implementation of any
agreements designed to achieve the desired reforms must be carried
out pursuant to authorities granted elsewhere, i.e., that" section 121
did not itself grant any such authority. In addition to the fast track
procedure, this section and the legislative history200 recognized a
number of other authorities for presidential action such as authority
contained in some other statutes to promulgate procedural regulations. For example, tlie congressional committee noted existing authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to establish regulations
regarding "country of origin" marks. 201 Likewise, the President has
diplomatic authority to agree to various procedures for the settlement of disputes. 202
Fourth, the President could always negotiate agreements that
were not within the delegations of authority of the Trade Act of
1974, and then, if necessary, he could submit them for approval to
Congress under normal constitutional procedures. For example, although the 1974 Trade Act Section 101 tariff agreement authority
limited tariff cuts to sixty percent from the tariff existing just prior to
the Act, a deeper tariff cut could be agreed upon subject to later
approval by Congress. (A few such agreements did occur.)203
199. 19 u.s.c. § 2112 (1976).
200. S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 192, at 87; Trade Act of 1974, § 102(a), 19 U.S,C. § 2112
(1976).
201. 19 u.s.c. § 1304 (1976).
202. H.R. Doc. No. 153, pt. 2, 526-27 (1979) (Statement of Administrative Action); H.R.
REP. No. 571, supra note 192, at 65; S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 232-35, 238.
203. See notes 241-42 infra and accompanying text.
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Finally, there was the possibility of previously delegated or inherent presidential authority to negotiate, accept, and implement
agreements. This was to some extent recognized in the 1974 Trade
Act. 204 But even some authority not recognized by the 1974 Trade
Act could supply a residuum of additional authority for the President and his officials for their MTN participation.205
2. The Structure of the United States Government for Participation
in the MTN
In the legislation which established the authority for U.S. participation in the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations (the Trade Expansion Act of 1962), Congress had established the position of the
Special Trade Representative, with ambassadorial rank, reporting
directly to the President, for the purpose of taldng charge of those
negotiations on behalf of the United States. The 1962 Act represented certain compromises, because prior to that time the Department of State and the Department of Commerce had competed for
the principal authority to conduct international trade negotiations.
After the Special Trade Representative (STR) was established, a
staff was assembled by him (including two deputies at the ambassador rank), and a structure of interagency committees was set up to
advise the President about trade policy matters. The most important
of these committees was the Cabinet-level Trade Expansion Act Advisory Committee, established by the Trade Expansion Act of
1962.206 Under this were other inter-agency committees, including
the Trade Staff Committee, which carried on most of the day-to-day
work. Represented on these committees were officials from the Departments of State, Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, and the Treasury. The committees were usually chaired by an official from STR.
In later years, they sometimes included representatives from the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division, the Department of Defense,
204. See Trade Act of 1974, § 12l(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2131 (1976); S. REP. No. 1298, supra
note 192, at 86, 87.
205. See, e.g., Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1202, general headnote 11 (1976); S. REP.
No. 249 (1979), supra note 202, at 257-58.
206. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, §242. This section calls for a cabinet level advisory
committee. Such a committee was established by regulation in 1963. This committee was
called the Trade Expansion Act Advisory Committee and the regulations were codified at 48
C.F.R. ch. I (1968). Regulations also established committees below the cabinet level. These
other committees were (in descending order) the Trade Executive Committee, the Trade Staff
Committee, apd the Trade Information Committee. The regulations establishing these committees were codified at 48 C.F.R. ch. II (1968). Title 48 of the United States Code was vacated at the end of 1968. Chapter II of the regulations was transferred to 15 C.F.R. ch. XI
(1969), but chapter I was discontinued. The order vacating title 48 does not disclose the fate of
the Cabinet-level committee.

352

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 81:267

the Council on International Economic Policy, the National Security
Council, and other agencies. When the various departmental representatives on this committee could agree on a position, it usually became the official United States position. However, if any department
disagreed, that department representative's superior could require
that the matter be brought to an inter-agency committee at a higher
level. Through this process an issue could ultimately be taken to the
President himself for a decision. 207
The Trade Act of 1974 did not fundamentally change this structure.208 However, the Act upgraded the STR to Cabinet rank,209 and
permanently established his office as an agency within the Executive
Office of the President.210 Nevertheless, at this time, the expenses
required for STR conduct of United States representation at the
multilateral trade negotiation were controlled jointly by the STR
and the Department of State.211 In addition, matters relating to
GATT and international trade other than those of the MTN still fell
within the jurisdiction of the Department of State. Consequently,
there were two lines of authority to Geneva and to GATT: the normal mission to GATT, with a Minister responsible to the State Department charged with ongoing general GATT activities such as the
annual Contracting Parties' sessions, as well as the Special Mission
to the MTN.
In addition to the White House staff, congressional and private
groups desired input into the Tokyo Round negotiations. After the
Kennedy Round, the executive branch officials who had conducted
the negotiations were criticized for not adequately consulting with
Congress, or with the interested business sectors, in the formulation
of U.S. positions and negotiating strategy. Consequently, one of the
most important changes mandated by the Trade Act of 1974 was the
explicit expansion of congressional liaison, and the measures taken
for consultation with private business sectors concerning negotiating
207. See Malmgren, Managing Foreign Economic Policy, 6 FOREIGN POLY. 42, 48 (1972).
208. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 201-203, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1976); Trade Act of 1974,
§ 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. IV 1981).
209. The position of Executive Director ofCIEP, as established by the International Policy
Act of 1972, § 208, 22 U.S.C. § 2847 (1972), did not require Senate confirmation. However, in
1973, § 208 was amended to provide for Senate confirmation. 22 U.S.C. § 2847(a) (1976)
(amending 22 U.S.C. § 2847). The Special Trade Representative has always required Senate
confirmation. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 24l(a), 76 StaL 878, as amended.
210. Trade Act of 1974, § 141, 19 U.S.C. § 2171; S. REP. No. 1298 ,supra note 192, at 105,
See also Senate Finance Comm. Hearings (1979), supra note 196, at 442 for Senator Long's
statement on why he fought to upgrade the position of the Special Trade Representative,
211. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 14, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-131, 89 Stat. 611, 614 (1975).
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positions.212
With respect to congressional liaison, even in prior negotiating
rounds, it had been the practice to have a congressional delegation to
the negotiations consisting of two members of the Senate and two
members of the House, officially accredited by the President as advisors to the U.S. delegation. 213 Senate and House members cannot
devote a great deal of time to this activity, so it was felt that something more was needed. The Trade Act of 1974 specified214 that the
STR was obligated to keep congressional advisors informed of the
negotiation, and the Act explicitly provided that the Chairmen of the
House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Committee on
Finance could designate staff members of their committees to have
access to information as provided to official advisers. Likewise, the
Act required that reports be made regularly to the Congress. In carrying out these measures, both the Senate and House Committees
hired additional full-time staff members to follow the progress of the
MTN. These staff members were given access both to official documents of the MTN and to U.S. executive branch cables concerning
the MTN. When they traveled to Geneva these staff members were
sometimes permitted to be present during negotiating sessions.215
They also met with representatives from other countries from time to
time.
The Trade Act of 1974 also established an elaborate system of
private advisory committees for trade negotiations. 216 The Act required the President to establish an Advisory Committee for Trade
Negotiations for overall policy advice, chaired by the STR. In addition, the Act authorized the establishment of three general policy advisory committees, for industry, labor, and agriculture. Finally, the
President was also authorized to establish sector advisory committees consisting of representatives of the particular private sectors
within industry, labor, or agriculture. 217 Ultimately, twenty-seven
Industry Sector Advisory Committees (ISAC's) and several agricultural sector advisory committees were established. These commit212. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 161-163, 135, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2211-2213, 2155 (1976).
213. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 243, called for two members from each House of
Congress to be accredited. The Trade Act of 1974, § 161, supra note 212, calls for delegations
of five members from each House.
214. Trade Act of 1974, § 16l(b), 19 U.S.C. § 22ll(b) (1916);see H.R. REP. No. 571,supra
note 192; S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 192.
215. See S. REP. No. 249,supra note 202, at 6; H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 26
(1979).
216. Trade Act of 1974, § 135, 19 U.S.C. § 2155 (1976); see H.R. REP. No. 571 (1973),
supra note 192, at 38; S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 192, at 101.
217. Trade Act of 1974, supra note 216.
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tees would meet on the call of the STR during the trade negotiations,
to provide policy advice on the negotiations, technical advice, and
information.
The possibility of having private citizen members of advisory
committees present during actual negotiations was explored and rejected during the drafting of the Trade Act of 1974. It was stated,
however, that the Advisory Committee members "can go up to the
negotiating door." 218 This was intended to follow the lead of several
foreign countries in encouraging close ties between private industries
and the negotiating teams.
3. Negotiating Tar!lf Reductions, and the Role of the ITC
The Tariff Commission was an independent government agency
with significant statutory responsibilities relating to anti-dumping
and escape clause issues. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 required
the Tariff Commission to hold public hearings addressing possible
tariff reductions and their impact on United States industry. This
information was a prerequisite to the authority of the United States
negotiators and the President to conclude and implement an agreement on tariff reductions. The Trade Act of 1974 continued this
practice, but changed the name of the Tariff Commission to the International Trade Commission of the United States (ITC), to make
clear that the Agency's authority embraced non-tariff issues.219
Although the President's most extensive authority was in the field
of tariff reductions, there were a number of explicit statutory procedures with which the executive branch had to comply, before entering into international tariff agreements. In particular, with respect to
tariff negotiations, the President was required to submit a list of articles or products whose tariffs might be subject to negotiation.
Within six months after receipt of this list the ITC was required to
advise the President about the probable economic effects of modifications of duties for each article. During this time, the Commission
was charged with investigating and analyzing such information as it
could obtain, and holding public hearings. After the ITC issued its
recommendations, the STR was then required to hold its own public
hearings. Eventually, the ITC's recommendations influenced the
218. Hearings on H.R. 10710, the Trade Reform Act of 1973, Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 22S (1974) (statement of William Eberle, Special Representative
for Trade Negotiations, Mar. S, 1974); S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 192, at 104; H.R. REP. No.
S71, supra note 192, at 38-40.
219. Trade Act of 1974, § 171, 19 U.S.C. § 2231 (1976); see S. REP. No. 1298, supra note
192, at 11S.
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U.S. negotiating posture during the MTN. 220
4. The Countervailing Duty Problem
One of the most perplexing issues of international trade policy is
that of subsidies and their effect on international trade flows. The
first problem is to determine what is a "subsidy." In a broad sense, a
subsidy can include a wide range of government policies that have
some effect on international trade flows. For almost a century, it has
been established practice in international trade that an importing
country is entitled to impose "countervailing duties" on goods benefiting from foreign subsidies.221 The theory is that the countervailing
duty offsets the advantage the subsidy gives to the imported goods.
GATT Article VI continues this general approach, although it requires that the importing country establish that the subsidized goods
are "injuring" competing domestic industry before the importing
country is authorized to utilize countervailing duties. 222
The United States Countervailing Duty law originated with an
1897 statute which provided that the Secretary of the Treasury shall
apply countervailing duties to imported goods which benefit from a
"bounty or grant."223 This statute applied only to dutiable goods,
and contained no injury test. Thus, even though GATT Article VI
requires an injury test, under the so-called "grandfather rights" mentioned above, 224 the United States was technically in compliance
with GATT obligations when it applied countervailing duties to
goods even without an injury test, because the U.S. statute pre-dated
GATT.22s
As tariffs were reduced over the past several decades through international negotiation under the GATT, various non-tariff measures began to assume greater prominence in their effect on
international trade flows. Increasingly, the United States government found that domestic manufacturers were urging it to apply
countervailing duties to imported goods. For a variety of reasons,
220. Trade Act of 1974, § 131, 19 u.s.c. § 2151 (1976); U.S. INTL. TRADE COMMISSION,
ANNUAL REPORT 15-16 (1977); U.S. INTL. TRADE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 25-29
(1979).
221. See generally Barcelo, Subsidies and Countervailing .Duties -Analysis and a Proposal,
9 LAW & POLY. INTL. Bus. 779 (1977).
222. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfar signature Oct. 30, 1947, art. VI,
61 Stat A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194,214.
223. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1976).
224. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
225. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976); see Department of Treasury, Countervailing .Duties in Williams Commission Papers 409; S. REP. No. 1298 (1974), supra note 192, at 185.
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however, the Department of the Treasury, which administered these
duties, was slow to respond. Sometimes, petitions or complaints for
the application of countervailing duties were simply held by the
Treasury, for years, without any action. Treasury actions were often
the subject of congressional complaint on behalf of constituents who
desired countervailing duties. By the time of the drafting of the
Trade Act of 1974, a considerable amount of ill-will had built up
between Congress and the executive branch on the issue of countervailing duties. As a consequence, the Trade Act of 1974 included a
number of measures designed to circumscribe administrative discretion under the countervailing duty statute. In addition, the statute
required publication of the Secretary of Treasury's determination on
a countervailing duty petition. Finally the statute explicitly provided
for judicial review even of a negative determination by the Secretary
(that no "bounty or grant" existed).226 When judicial review had
been sought earlier, one court had decided that the Secretary's action
was not reviewable by the courts, but was a matter of "executive
discretion." 227
At the same time, upon request of the executive branch, the
Trade Act of 1974 extended, for the first time, the application of
countervailing duties to "nondutiable goods." The argument was
that both dutiable and nondutiable goods could harm competing
manufacturers if they were subsidized. On the other hand, since the
GATT grandfather rights did not extend to nondutiable goods, because the statute governing those goods did not precede GATT,
Congress included an injury test limiting the imposition of countervailing duties on non dutiable goods, but it continued the absence of
an injury test on dutiable goods, noting that this would be a subject
for agreement during the forthcoming trade negotiation.
To prevent the new U.S. countervailing duty regime with its
greatly restricted scope for executive discretion from damaging the
prospects for trade negotiations, Congress included a temporary
"waiver'' provision in the new countervailing duty law, which allowed the United States to suspend or waive countervailing duties
under certain conditions.228 The waiver authority, however, was to
226. Trade Act of 1974, § 32l(f)(l) (amending 19 U.S.C. l5l6);see S. REP. No. 1298,stpra
note 192, at 185.
227. United States v. Hammond Lead Prods., Inc., 440 F.2d 1024, 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1971),
This discretion could be analogous to "prosecutorial" discretion, especially if the practice triggering the importing government's reponse is viewed as a breach of law or of international
rules of"fair trade." In the House Ways and Means Committee report, Hammond Lead Products is cited as the decision necessitating the amendment mentioned in note 36. H.R. REP. No.
571, supra note 192, at 76.
228. These conditions included the following: (I) that there be a reasonable prospect for

December 1982)

Tokyo Round

357

expire January 2, 1979 (four years after the enactment of the 1974
Act). By mid-summer of 1978, the main lines of the multilateral
trade negotiation were declared "completed," but many details were
still left open.229 It was clear that the results of the MTN, including
a potential new agreement on countervailing duties and subsidies,
could not be completed before the January 2, 1979 deadline, and
that consequently after that date the United States government executive branch would be forced to apply countervailing duties on a
number of goods, including dairy products from the European Economic Community.230 Officials of the European Economic Community made a statement that the application of such duties could cause
them to refuse to conclude the MTN negotiations or approve the
MTN agreements. They stated that ''we can't negotiate with this gun
at our head." 231
In the fall of 1978, the executive branch therefore tried to persuade Congress to extend the deadline of the waiver authority. Unfortunately, this bill attracted amendments from various interest
groups, trying to further certain particular goals they sought. For
example, a textile group introduced an amendment to another bill
which would have withdrawn the whole textile sector from the negotiation, and there was talk of putting this amendment on the countervailing duty waiver bill. In addition, certain business groups
introduced legislation to broaden the potential of "adjustment assistance for firms" (loan and tax measures for manufacturing firms suffering from foreign competition). 232 The waiver extension was then
successful trade negotiations for reduction and elimination of barriers to international trade;
(2) that adequate steps had been taken to reduce substantially or eliminate the adverse effects
of a bounty or grant; and (3) that the imposition of such a countervailing duty would be likely
to "seriously jeopardize the satisfactory completion" of the negotiations. This authority was
explicitly provided to last for a four-year period from the enactment of the Act. The general
negotiating authority on tariffs and, indeed, on non-tariff barriers, had a duration of five years.
The shorter duration of the waiver provision for countervailing duties was understood by the
Congress to indicate its view of the importance of negotiating new international rules concerning subsidies and countervailing duties.
Indeed, after the Act was enacted, a number of new petitions were received by the Treasury
for the application of countervailing duties and, in nineteen cases, the Treasury felt it necessary to exercise the waiver to prevent jeopardizing the negotiations. See S. REP. No. 45, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1979); T.D. 75-114, 9 Cust. B. & Dec. 229 (1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 21720 (1975).
229. See 214 INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORTER: U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) C-2 (July
11, 1978) [hereinafter cited as ITEX (BNA)); 215 ITEX (BNA) AA-1 July 18, 1978; 4 GENEVA
Focus: A REPORT FROM THE INDUSTRY CENTER FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, 1 (No. 5, Oct.
13, 1978).
230. 4 GENEVA Focus: A REPORT FROM THE INDUSTRY CENTER FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, 3 (No. 5, Oct. 13, 1978). See also European Community News Press Release No.
19/1978 (Oct. 16, 1978); Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1978, at 22, col. 3.
231. See 226 ITEX (BNA) A-9 (Oct. 3, 1978); 227 ITEX (BNA) C-1 (Oct. 10, 1978), discussing the "Hollings Amendment" to the Eximbank extension.
232. See Hearings on R.R. 1147 Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on
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procedurally linked to this bill by an amendment. Despite a rather
intensive scramble to sort out the problems, the Congress adjourned
in the early hours of the morning of Sunday, October 15, 1978, without having extended the waiver authority. 233 Consequently, the U.S.
executive branch was faced with the unhappy prospect of trying to
mollify the European negotiators in the light of the potential application of countervailing duties, after January 2. Congress was not
due to reconvene until January 15, so at the very least there was a
two-week gap during which countervailing duties could apply.
Moreover, since 1978 was an election year, there would undoubtedly
be a substantial delay while the new Congress attempted to organize
itself in 1979.
Interestingly enough, the solution was simply to tolerate a messy
legal situation for several months until the matter could be rectified.
Even though the waiver provision expired on January 2, 1979, any
administrative agency would take time to react to the new legal conditions it faced. A "creative bureaucracy" can extend that time. In
the early months of 1979, the executive branch forcefully presented
its case to Congress for the extension of the waiver authority. In
March, Congress agreed to extend the authority until September 30
or until a bill to implement the negotiations was enacted or defeated,
whichever was earlier. 234 In the meantime, no countervailing duties
had in fact been applied, and the legislation extending the waiver
authority clearly absolved companies from any liability for the interim period.235
5. Sectoral Negotiations
Section 104 of the Trade Act of 1974 established "sector negotiating objectives" for the United States. 236 This provision encouraged
Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 10·11 (1979) (to extend temporarily the authority of the
Secretary of the Treasury to waive the imposition of countervailing duties).
233. See 228 ITEX (BNA) A-11 (Oct. 17, 1978).
234. Pub. L. No. 96-6, 93 Stat. 10 (1979); see H.R. REP. No. IS, 96th Cong., 1st Scss.
(1979); S. REP. No. 45, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao.
NEWS 30; Extension ofAuthority to Waive Countervailing .Duties: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Trade ofthe House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), For the notice
of administrative action to be taken by the U.S. Customs Service during the period between
the expiration of the waiver authority and the subsequent extension of the authority, see 44
Fed. Reg. 141 (1979) and the memorandum reprinted at page 12 of the House Ways and
Means Committee hearings.
235. The amendment was effective Jan. 3, 1979. Pub. L. No. 96-6, 93 Stat. 10 (1979). See
H.R. REP. No. 15, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. REP. No. 45, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); 125
CONG. REC. H. 3756 {daily ed. Mar. l, 1979); 125 CONG. REC. S3574 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1979),
236. Trade Act of 1974, § 104, 19 U.S.C. 2114 (1976). See H.R. REP, No. 571, supra note
192, at 20-23; S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 196, at 22-23, 78-79; Executive Hearing on Sector
Negotiations Befare the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); A. RIBICOFF, A
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the United States negotiators to pursue negotiating techniques in the
MTN which would try to establish within "appropriate product sectors" equivalent competitive opportunities in the markets of all
countries. Thus, a sectoral free trade agreement could be one result.
Another might be, within a particular sector (such as steel) to obtain
roughly the same level of protection in each of the major importing
countries, whether such protection was afforded by tariffs or nontariff barriers.237 Obviously, this is a difficult negotiating objective
and the groups proposing this objective were inspired by a variety of
motives.
Although some attempt was made to pursue a sectoral approach
for certain sectors (particularly steel, aircraft, dairy, meat, and
grains), generally, these attempts did not influence the final results of
the MTN. Perhaps the most significant sector result of the MTN was
for the aircraft sector, in which basically a free trade agreement was
reached for a limited number of participating countries. 238

E. Accepting the MTN Results: U.S. Law
1. Legal Authority to Accept MTN International Agreements
In the traditional academic terminology, the United States embraces a dualist philosophy in its reception of international legal obligations into its legal system. Thus it is possible for the United
States to be bound by an international legal obligation under international law, but fail to follow that obligation in its domestic law
(and then to be in noncompliance with its international obligation).239 This subpart focuses on the legal requirements and procedures which were necessary for the United States to accept the
international law obligations of the MTN results, leaving for the
next part the discussion of the implementation and compliance with
those obligations.
In some cases the President had explicit authority to accept a
MTN agreement. The most important illustration of this was the
MTN tariff agreement, known as the Geneva Protocol (1979). 240 Section 101 of the 1974 Trade Act authorized presidential acceptance
STRATEGY FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 9 (Comm. Print, Report to Senate
Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1973).
237. See H.R. REP. No. 571, supra note 192, at 22; S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 192, at 79.
238. See generally Piper, Unique Sectoral Agreement Establishes Free Trade Framework, 12
LAW & POLY. INTL. Bus. 221 (1980).
239. See L. HENKIN, supra note 166, at 151; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 145 (1965); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 610-11 (3d ed. 1979).
240. Trade Act of 1974, § 101, 19 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976).
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and implementation of certain tariff concessions under these Protocols. Pursuant to that authority, the President's ·representative to
GATT signed these Protocols in Geneva on July 11, 1979. Effectiveness was made contingent, however, on the passage of the Trade
Agreements Acts of 1979.241
This contingency was necessary becaµse some of the proposed
tariff concessions negotiated at the Tokyo Round went beyond the
authority of section 101, and consequently required acceptance
under section 102. Presidential Proclamation 4707 of December 11,
1979, implemented the tariff concessions in U.S. law relying both on
the authority of Section 101 of the 1974 Act and on various sections
of the 1979 Act. 242
The President probably had authority apart from the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 to accept certain other MTN agreements as
well. For example, the agreements on Bovine Meat and Dairy Products basically only set up an international consultation mechanism,
presumably a matter within inherent presidential authority. 243 The
Agreement on Licensing needed no legislation for implementation
since the President had authority to regulate licensing under existing
legislation.244 Consequently, it was also likely that the President had
authority to accept the Licensing Agreement on his own authority,
although analogous activity by the President has been challenged.245
With the exception of the principal tariff agreements mentioned
above, Section 2 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 provided explicit authority for the President to accept all the major MTN agreements, and all the bilateral MTN agreements to which the United
States was a party.246 This statutory acceptance authority, however,
241. 265 ITEX (BNA) C-4 (July 17, 1979) and Special Supplement at 29; GATT Doc,
1/4914/Rev. 2 (July 23, 1980).
242. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, §§ 2(b)(2)(A), 502, 503(a)(2)(A), 855(a), 93 Stat. 147,
251,295. Proclamation to Carry Out the Geneva (1979) Protocol to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade and for Other Purposes, Proclamation 4707 of Dec. 11, 1979, 44 Fed. Reg.
72348 (1979).
243. "Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat," GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 84 (26th Supp.
1980) and "International Diary Arrangement," GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 91 (26th Supp.
1980).
244. See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 202, at 257.
245. The challenge to the 1967 Anti-dumping Code included the idea that the President
did not have the authority to change long-standing administrative practices without congressional approval. See S. REP. No. 1385, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. Part 2 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 4529, 4551.
246. Section 2(c) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2503(c) (Supp. Ill
1979), lists the following Agreements:
(I) The Agreements on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (relating to customs valuation).
(2) The Agreement on Government Procurement.
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was qualified in three important ways.
First, because the MTN had not been completely finalized at the
time of enactment of the 1979 Act (certain corrections or later minor
changes were expected), the statutory draftsmen were faced with the
problem of how to authorize acceptance of nonfinalized agreements
and yet not give the Executive a blank check to enter into agreements which have not been approved by Congress. The uneasy solution was language authorizing the President to accept the "final legal
instruments or texts" of trade agreements approved by the Congress,
if the differences between the final text and the text earlier submitted
to Congress were only "rectifications of a formal character or minor
technical or clerical changes," or if the changes were only in "annexes" to the agreement and the President determines that the balance of rights and obligations for the United States had been
maintained.247 One particular exaihple of the use of this latter authority was the Government Procurements Agreement. The United
States and Japan continued to negotiate on the "entities" to be included in the Annex to that agreement until December 1980, at
which time agreement was reached and formalized through an exchange of letters. On December 23, 1980, the United States announced that it was accepting the Government Procurement Code
and the Code came into effect on Janaury 1, 1981.248
Second, the "acceptance" authority of section 2 of the Trade
(3) The Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.
(4) The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (relating to product standards).
(5) The Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (relating to subsidies and countervailing
measures).
(6) The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (relating to anti-dumping measures).
(7) The International Dairy Arrangement.
(8) Certain bilateral agreements on cheese, other dairy products, and meat.
(9) The Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat.
(10) The Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft.
(11) Texts Concerning a Framework for the Conduct of World Trade.
(12) Certain Bilateral Agreements to Eliminate the Wine-Gallon Method of Tax and
Duty Assessment.
(13) Certain other agreements to be reflected in Schedule XX of the United States to the
General Agreement on Watch Making Requirements, and to Modify United States Tariffs
and Trade, including Agreements (A) to Modify United States Tariff Nomenclature and Rates of Duty for Watches.
(B) to Provide Duty-Free Treatment for Agricultural and Horticultural Machinery,
Equipment, Implements, and Parts Thereof, and
(C) to Modify United States Tariff Nomenclature and Rates of Duty for Ceramic
Tableware.
(14) The Agreement with the Hungarian People's Republic.
Note the exceptional ambiguity of item number 13.
247. Trade Agreements Act of 1979 § 2(b)(l), 19 U.S.C. § 2503(b)(l) (Supp. III 1979).
248. Determination Regarding Acceptance and Application of the Agreement on Govern-
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Agreements Act of 1979 imposed the limitation that "No agreement
accepted by the President . . . shall apply between the United States
and any other country unless the President determines that such
country - (1) has accepted the obligations of the agreement with
respect to the U.S., and (2) should not be denied the benefits because
it has not accorded adequate reciprocity. to the commerce of the
.United States, required from other industrial countries by Section
126(c) of the 1974 Trade Act." 249 This condition is obviously troublesome. This problem must be distinguished, however, from MostFavored-Nation treatment. Even if the U.S. accepts an agreement
but does not apply that agreement to another country, it may still
apply its own law implementing the obligations of the agreement, in
a non-discriminatory way, to trade of all other nations whether parties to the particular agreement or not. 250 Thus, in revising its antidumping law to conform to the new Anti-Dumping Agreement of
the MTN, the United States did not distinguish between trade from
nations who are, or are not, parties to this MTN Agreement. In
other cases, however, this was not true.
The 1979 statute's reciprocity condition implies a legal mechanism under which the United States could accept a particular MTN
agreement without applying it to other countries, some of whom
were also parties to the same agreement. As to the obligation to apply a MTN agreement to nations which have not accepted the same
agreement, this is a question either of the language of the agreement
ment Procurement, 45 Fed. Reg. 252 (1980). See also Statement Concerning Executive Order
12260 on Agreement on Government Procurement, 46 Fed. Reg. 1657 (1981).
249. No agreement accepted by the President under paragraph (I) shall apply between the
United States and any other country unless the President determines that such country (A) has accepted the obligations of the agreement with repect to the United States, and
(B) should not otherwise be denied the benefits of the agreement with respect to the
United States because such country has not accorded adequate benefits, including substantially equal competitive opportunities for the co=erce of the United States to the
extent required under section 126(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2136(c)), to the
United States."
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 2(b)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2503(b)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
If the President determines under subsection (b) of this section that a major industrial
country has not made concessions under trade agreements entered into under this chapter
which provides substantially equivalent competitive opportunities for the commerce of
the United States, he shall, either generally, with respect to such country or by Article
produced by such country, in order to restore equivalence of competitive opportunities,
reco=end to the Congress (1) legislation providing for the termination or denial of the benefits of concessions of
trade agreements entered into under this chapter made with respect to rates of duty or
other import restrictions by the United States; and
(2) that any legislation necessary to carry out any trade agreement under section 2112 of
this title shall not apply to any such country.
Trade Act of 1974 § 126(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2136(c) (1976).
250. E.g., Trade Agreements Act of 1979, §§ 101 (adding title VII to the Tariff Act of
1930), 106 (repealing Anti-Dumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. § 160 & other amendments).
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itself, or of a MFN obligation in some other international agreement.
The principal other source of such obligation is, of course, the
GATT itself (MFN in Article I) which indeed may apply in a
number of such cases.251 Other agreements, such as bilateral Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation agreements, could also give rise to
a MFN obligation.252
In addition, however, some of the MTN agreements purport to
be "agreed interpretations" of provisions in the GATT itself253 and
as such could arguably be interpreted to imply an obligation to treat
all other GATT members in the manner required by that specific
MTN agreement. It is also theoretically possible (although not the
case) that a MTN agreement could explicitly provide that parties to
it would treat all GATT members, or all other nations (or some subset of them) in a manner required by that Agreement.254
, 251. The United States does not apply MFN treatment in its implementation of the results
of three of the Multilateral Trade Agreements - The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Code, the Government Procurement Code, and the Standards Code. See Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 56 (26th Supp. 1980), Agreement on Government
Procurement, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 33 (26th Supp. 1980) and Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 8 (26th Supp. 1980). See also Hufbauer, Erb
& Starr, The GA'IT Codes and the Unconditional Most-Favored-Nation Principle, 12 LAW &
POLY. INTL. Bus. 59 (1980).
252. Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation agreements such as Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of
Germany, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593, 273 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 14, 1956);
see Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805
(1958). See also Trade Agreements Act of 1979 § 101, 19 U.S.C. § 70l(b)(3) (Supp. III 1979),
in which the term "country under the Agreement" is defined to include a country with respect
to which the President determines that (A) there is an agreement in effect between the United States and that country which (i) was in force on June 19, 1979, and
(ii) requires unconditional most-favored-nation treatment with respect to Articles imported into the United States,
(B) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade does not apply between the United
States and that country, and
(C) the agreement described in subparagraph A does not expressly permit (i) actions required or permitted by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or
required by Congress, or
(ii) nondiscriminatory prohibitions or restrictions on importation which are designed to
prevent deceptive or unfair practices.
The Senate Report lists agreements with seven countries which could potentially meet these
requirements. These countries are Venezuela, Honduras, Nepal, North Yemen, El Salvador,
Paraguay, and Liberia. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 205, at 45.
253. E.g., Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (relating to customs valuation), GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 116 (26th Supp.
1980); Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (relating to subsidies and countervailing measures),
GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 56 (26th Supp. 1980); Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (relating to antidumping measures),
GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 171 (26th Supp. 1980).
254. A search of the MTN agreements revealed no such provision.
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As to the nonapplication of a particular agreement to another
party to that same agreement, this seeming anomaly (which "reservation" rules might in some cases legitimize under international
law) 255 stems from the strong precedent of GATT Article XXXV
which allows (under certain circumstances) ·a GATT contracting
party to give notice of the nonapplication of the GATT between it
and another GATT member. 256 An explicit clause in some of the
MTN agreements allows this same type of action. 257
Third, the final important qualification of the "acceptance" authority in the 1979 Act (section 2(b)(3)) prevents the President from
accepting certain agreements (all the major multilateral agreements
of the MTN except the tariff agreements) unless all "major industrial
country" MTN participants also accept. The statute defines "major
industrial country" as the European Communities (whose acceptance is deemed acceptance by the Member States for this purpose),
Canada, and Japan and other countries designated by the President.258 Despite the condition, however, the statute allows the President to accept the agreement if: (1) only one major industrial
country has not accepted and that country is not a major factor in
the trade in products covered by the agreement, (2) the President has
authority to deny the benefits of the agreement to that country and
takes steps to do so, or (3) U.S. trade would benefit anyway and the
President reports that it is in the national interest to accept the
agreement.
Under this clause, some difficult situations arose for the acceptance and implementation of the MTN agreements. The United
States, through the 1979 Act, was the first major industrial partici255. Most of the MTN agreements prohibit reservations without the consent of all parties,
see, e.g., Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Art. 23, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 116 (26th Supp. 1980); Agreement on Import
Licensing Procedures, Sec. 18, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 154 (26th Supp. 1980). See
Bishop, Reservations lo Treaties, 103 RECUEIL DES CouRS 245 (Hague Acad. of Intl. Law)
(1961).
256. See WORLD TRADE, supra note 3, at 100-02.
257. See, e.g., Agreement on Government Procurement, Part IX, ~9, GATT, BASIC IN•
STRUMENTS 33 (26th Supp. 1980); Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Sec. 24, GATT,
BASIC INSTRUMENTS 154 (26th Supp. 1980); Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, ~10,
GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 171 (26th Supp. 1980); Agreement on Interpretation and Appli•
cation of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII ofGATT, Art. 19, Sec. 9, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS
56 (26th Supp. 1980); Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Art. 9.7, GATT, BASIC INSTRU·
MENTS 162 (26th Supp. 1980).
258. Trade Act of 1974 § 126(d), 19 U.S.C. § 2136(d) (1976) defines the term "major industrial countries" as follows: "For purposes of this section, 'major industrial country' means Canada, the European Economic Community, the individual member countries of such
Community, Japan, and any other foreign country designated by the President for purposes of
this subsection."
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pant in the MTN to obtain executive authority to accept the results.
It then acted to accept "conditionally."259 The European Economic
Community delayed such action partly because of an internal constitutional dispute over which institutions or governments had the competence to authorize acceptance of the MTN agreements. The EEC,
however, accepted the agreements by the end of 1979.26 Canada,
also, first appeared to be delaying (partly because of an election) but
acted before the end of 1979.261 This left Japan, which found itself
totally unable to finish the acceptance procedure before 1980. A new
Parliament was elected in October 1979 in Japan, and this Parliament took time to organize.262 The cabinet officials took the necessary steps to recommend approval of the MTN results, and the
Parliament finally acted in April 1980.263 The uneasy solution utilized in United States law was for the President to determine that,

°

(ii) in accordance with Section 2(b)(3) of the Act (93 Stat. 147), the
acceptance of these agreements by Japan is not essential to the effective
operation of the agreements for that period of time during which Japan
is completing its Constitutional procedures to accept the agreements
and in light of the stated intention of the Government of Japan to act
in the interim in line with the agreements within its existing powers. 264

2. The Fast Track Procedure for NTB Agreements, and the
Drefting of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979
Congressional approval was required for the United States both
to accept and implement the major nontariff agreements of the
MTN. Under the Trade Act of 1979 this was to be accomplished by
normal legislation, considered by Congress under the fast track procedure described above.265 The procedures operated in an interesting manner, which are analyzed in this section.
Under the fast track procedure, the President was required to notify the Congress 90 days before he signed any NTB agreements, and
to consult with key congressional committees during those 90 days.
259. 287 ITEX (BNA), at A-3 (Dec. 18, 1979).
260. Council Decision of Dec. 10, 1979, concerning the conclusion of the Multilateral
Agreements resulting from the 1973 to 1979 trade negotiations, O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. L 71/1)
(1980); see also 288 ITEX (BNA), at A-5 (Jan. 1, 1980).
261. See 287 ITEX (BNA), at C-2 (Dec. 18, 1979); 288 ITEX (BNA), at A-6 (Jan. l, 1980).
262. See 287 ITEX (BNA), at A-3 (Dec. 18, 1979); 4 INTL. TRADE REPORTER: U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA), at A-11 (Nov. 28, 1979) [hereinafter cited as ITIM(BNA)].
263. See Part III supra.
264. Presidential Determination Regarding the Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Acceptance and Application of Certain International Trade Agreements, 44 Fed. Reg. 74,781, § l
(Dec. 14, 1979).
265. See Trade Act of 1974 §§ 102, 151, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2112, 2191 (1976).
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Congress had been kept informed generally throughout the course of
the Tokyo Round negotiations, and key congressional committees
had developed professional staff whose full time was devoted to following the course of the negotiations. When the President notified
Congress in early January 1979 about the tentative NTB agreements,
his officials sent Congress detailed information about the status of
the negotiations, including the tentative drafts of various NTB agreements. 266 Anticipating this, congressional staff, in consultation with
key Senators and Congressmen, had designed a procedure for the
consultation which closely paralleled the normal procedure followed
in work on bills except that, in this case, no bill was yet introduced in
the Congress.
When a Committee of Congress begins formally to consider a bill
that has been introduced, and to prepare that bill for report to the
floor of the whole House, its session is often called a "markup," indicating that the committee is "marking up" the bill with its proposed
changes. The "consultations" with the executive branch during the
90-day period prior to completion of the international agreements
were called "non-markup" sessions, and closely followed this type of
procedure. One important difference was that the sessions were not
open to the public.
The principal committees devoting time to the MTN were the
Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee. These committees met extensively with executive branch officials, including the trade negotiators, and occasionally entered into
detailed negotiations about the matters which should be included in
a U.S. statute implementing the international agreements. Particularly close attention was given to the anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws.267 Perhaps most surprising, the members of
Congress informed the executive branch that they wanted their own
staff (including the legal staff of the House and the Senate) to develop the actual text of the bill which the President would introduce.
Other procedures also paralleled the normal legislative processes.
On certain issues the House Ways and Means Committee and the
266. See COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTINO
NOTICE OF SEVERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, PURSUANT TO SECTION 102(E)(l) OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974, H.R.
Doc. No. 33, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), for a summary of the status of the negotiations at
that time.
267. See House Ways and Means Committee, Press Release No. 14 (Mar. 19, 1979); Senate
Finance Committee, Press Release No. 112 (Apr. 5, 1979); Senate Finance Committee, Press
Release No. 115 (May 3, 1979); Senate Finance Committee, Press Release No. 116 (May 8,
1979); Joint Press Release No. I (May 24, 1979).
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Senate Finance Committee did not agree, and so they held a "nonconference" joint session,268 at which they resolved their. differences,
to enable the two Houses to present a united front to the executive
branch. Throughout this process the executive branch officials participated, influenced the deliberations, and were in a position of
some bargaining power, since it was understood that it was the President's bill that would ultimately be introduced and which thereafter
could not be amended. 269
After the international agreements were initialed in Geneva, the
executive branch prepared the bill that the President introduced to
Congress. Understanding political realities, the President's officials
adopted almost in its entirety the draft bill which had been prepared
by the congressional committees and staff. The President then arranged to have this bill introduced in June 1979.270
Since the bill could not be amended, when the bill was introduced the basic substantive work was over. Thus, from the point of
view of Congress, the consultation period, including the "nonmarkup" and the "non-conference," that went on prior to the introduction of the bill, was crucial to shaping the bill in a manner that
would gain enough support in both Houses of Congress to permit
passage. Thus, after the bill was introduced, the normal procedures
for enacting legislation were a formality. To no one's surprise, the
bill passed.271 What was surprising was the overwhelming vote in
favor of the bill: 90 to 4 in the Senate, and 395 to 7 in the House. 272
One unusual development in these congressional proceedings
was the degree of foreign involvement they attracted. As the congressional Committees' "non-markup" sessions began their work, officials of the European Economic Community realized the
significance of these proceedings. They recognized that the statute
Congress was formulating would have a profound effect on the implementation of the MTN Agreements. Once the statute became
U.S. law, it would be hard to persuade the U.S. Congress to change
it. Thus, other nations might shape their own implementation of the
268. In normal bills, a conference committee session to resolve differences in the two
houses is typical.
269. This was probably the most important feature of the "fast track" procedure.
270. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1979).
271. July 23, 1979, signed July 26, 1979. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified at
19 U.S.C. § 2501) (Supp. III 1979).
272. See 125 CONG. REC. Sl0,340 (daily ed. July 23, 1979) and 125 CONG. REC. H5690
(daily ed. July 11, 1979). Destler notes that five of the eleven legislators voting against the Act
were from Wisconsin and that the dairy industry in that state objected to increases in cheese
imports allowed in U.S. concession. See DESTLER, MAKING FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY 202
(1980).
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MTN Agreements in accordance with the precedent in the United
States. The fact that the United States procedures were moving
faster than those of any other country would also be influential.
Consequently, the EEC took the logical step: they hired professional
(legal and economic) representation in Washington, D.C., to monitor
the congressional consultations with the executive branch officials.
These representatives reported quickly and frequently to the EEC
officials, permitting EEC negotiators to raise certain issues with their
American counterparts. If the Congressional-Executive Sessions began moving in an undesirable direction, the EEC could make it
known that certain statutory formulations would be deemed a
breach of the international obligations assumed by both the EEC
and the United States. One example of this was the phrasing of the
injury test for the anti-dumping and countervailing duty agreements.
U.S. law used the word "injury," rather than the phrase "material
injury," in its anti-dumping procedures. GATT Article VI required
the phrase "material injury." Since U.S. law preceded the GATT,
grandfather right exceptions could be argued. On the other hand, the
1967 Anti-Dumping Code using the term "material injury" had been
accepted by the United States. For more than a decade, foreign
countries argued that the United States was not living up to its 1967
anti-dumping code obligations. The United States argued, however,
that even though the U.S. statute omitted the adjective "material,"
material injury had existed in fact in all U.S. anti-dumping procedures. This is an exceedingly difficult proposition to refute since it
would require a de novo examination of the complicated facts.
The word "material" was included in the MTN Countervailing
Duty and Anti-Dumping Agreements. Initially, however, the executive branch officials seemed willing to accept statutory formulations
that did not include the word "material." Presumably they would
continue to argue that a material injury test would infact be utilized.
The EEC negotiators let the United States know that this was unacceptable, and that they would insist that the statute include the word
"material." As a result of these negotiations, and the presentation of
these views to the committees of Congress, the word "material" was
finally included in the U.S. statute. Interestingly enough, however,
the committee reports describing the meaning of the "material injury" test stated that the meaning (as to anti-dumping law) was to be
that which had been previously applied by the International Trade
Commission in recent years under the "injury'' test. Thus, Congress
expressed its view that "material injury" had long been the defacto
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criterion and that the word "material" added nothing to the word
"injury."
The new injury test phrase will have to be applied a number of
times before it will become evident if U.S. policy has actually
changed. However, the whole incident demonstrates the trend in
modem diplomacy for foreign representatives to participate in seemingly domestic governmental procedures.273
Participants suggest that, throughout this process, congressional
committees were responsive to executive branch objectives that nothing be included in the U.S. statute that would require the United
States to default in any of its international obligations under the
MTN results. Congressmen were careful to avoid such provisions in
the proposed statute. In fact, after the bill was forwarded to the Congress in final form, the Commission of the European Economic
Communities issued an official statement that, in the opinion of the
EEC officials, on the whole the bill reflected both the spirit and the
letter of the MTN Agreements.274
Several aspects of this procedure for enacting the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 are potentially significant. First, the Congress was
evidently pleased with the procedure. The involvement of the con273. About the involvement of the EEC, see 12 BULL. EuR. COMM. 5, 75 (1979), where it is
stated that, prompted by rumors that the future American legislation implementing the code
on subsidies would not interpret correctly the idea of "material injury," the Community has
approached the American authorities. See also 12 BULL. EuR. COMM. 4, 15 (1979); N.Y.
Times, Apr. 21, 1979, at 29, col. 6; European Community News Press Release No. 14/1979
(Apr. 25, 1979); European Community News Press Release No. 28/1979 (July 16, 1979). For
some comments on U.S. law and the material injury test see Ehrenhaft, What the Antidumping
and Countervailing JJuty Provisions /Can/ /Wil/j [Should/ Mean for U.S. Trade Policy, 11 L. &
PoLY. INTL. Bus. 1361, 1421 (1979); Marks, Recent Changes in U.S. Import Restrictions, in
AIDS AND SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (P. Demaret ed. 1980)
(XXXIId Conference, University of Liege, Liege, Belgium, Oct. 18-20, 1979); Alberger, The
concept ofinjury in United States trade law- the role ofthe U.S. International Trade Commission, in AIDS AND SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (P. Dermaret ed.
1980) (XXXIId Conference, University of Liege, Liege, Belgium, Oct. 18-20, 1979).
274. "The European Commission notes that the texts agreed on in Geneva have not been
transferred literally into this Act with all the accuracy that is required, but on the whole, the
American Act reflects the spirit and the letter ofthe agreements. The Act alone does not provide
a full guarantee that the United States will meet all its commitments. Some texts lend themselves to several interpretations and some procedural provisions still have to be stipulated.
The Commission therefore intends to follow very closely the way in which the legislation is put
into practice, in compliance with the Geneva commitments." Europe (Agence Internationale
d'Information pour la Presse) Press Release No. 2763 (n.s.) at 7 (Oct. 6, 1979). See also Final
Report by the Commission on the MTN where the Commission notes: "With the United States
major agreements have been arrived at, both in the industrial and agricultural sectors. The
United States customs tariffs will have fewer peaks and in the nontariff field the United States
will come into line with the GAIT, particularly in relation to the criterion of "material injury," for the application of countervailing duties, abolition of the American Selling Price and
Final List systems of valuation, elimination of the discriminatory fiscal system of wine gallon
assessment on alcoholic beverages, and significant changes in the application of the Buy American Act." IO BULL. EUR. COMM. 7, 8 (1979).

370

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 81:267

gressional committees in the drafting process gave Congress confidence that the executive branch was not trying to enter agreements
without congressional input. For example, at one point in the consultative period prior to finalizing the international agreements, a
particular criticism was voiced by members of Congress on behalf of
small business constituents. They complained that the proposed
agreement on Government Procurement would reduce their "small
business preference" under existing U.S. law. Executive branch
negotiators sensed both the importance of this issue to Congress and
the relative unimportance of the issue to the policies underlying the
MTN. Consequently, the U.S. negotiators immediately approached
other countries and obtained approval from them to alter the proposed agreement in such a way as to take care of the problem.275
The incident illustrated the value of the consultation period before
the international agreement was completed.
Congress's satisfaction with the procedure is evidenced not only
by statements in the committee reports and other legislative history, 276 but more concretely by the fact that the Congress extended
the time period for this procedure by eight years beyond the period
contained in the 1974 Act. 277 In addition, Section 3(c) of the 1979
Act adopted virtually the same procedure for amending U.S. law
implementing the MTN Agreements, when such amendments are
necessary to fulfill a "requirement of, amendment to, or recommendation under such an agreement." 278 Thus, if an international disputes panel rules against the United States on a question of
interpretation of an MTN agreement, and U.S. law prevents the
executive from implementing the international interpretation, this
275. A front-page story in the Washington Post of March 14, 1979, led to criticism of the
U.S. position in the negotiations on a government procurement code. The story stated that the
United States would agree to a relaxation of preferences for small and minority businesses in
its government procurement practices. Members of the Subcommittee on General Oversight
and Minority Enterprise of the House Co=ittee on Small Business expressed concern that
small businesses would pay a price for benefits which would flow largely to multinational
corporations. They criticized the STR for the lack of prior consultation with those in the executive and legislative branches involved with small and minority business concerns. Special
Trade Represenatative Robert Strauss defended the administration's position in testimouy
before the subco=ittee on March 20, 1979. On March 22, the administration announced that
Japan and the European Co=unity had approved a change that would exclude United States
set-aside programs for small and minority businesses from the coverage of the agreement. It
appears that the inclusion of NASA in the U.S. entity list was part of the deal. See Washington Post, Mar. 14, 1979 at A-1, col. I; id., Mar. 21, 1979 at D-6, col. I; id., Mar. 23, 1979 at F-1,
col. I. See generally Multinational Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Gen•
era/ Oversight and Minority Enterprises ofthe House Comm. on Small Business, 96th Cong. 1st
Sess. (1979).
276. See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 202, at 5.
277. See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § I 101 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 2112(b) (1976)).
278. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 3(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2504(c) (Supp. III 1979).
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procedure could be followed to change U.S. law. 279
The fast track procedure thus holds considerable potential as a
means of providing both executive flexibility in international dealings, and congressional responsiveness to constituents. The fast
track procedure may also soften the recurrent disagreements between these two branches of government over the issues of international trade.
Second, there is an unusual problem with the interpretation of
the 1979 Act. Normally, United States courts take note of a statute's
legislative history when interpreting a statute. This history consists,
inter a!ia, of the committee hearings, debates, and reports, and statements on the floor of both houses while considering the bill. The
theory is that the intent of Congress, when ambiguous in the statutory language itself, can sometimes be ascertained by congressional
statements made during the drafting process. Under the fast track
procedure, however, a bill, which could not be amended, was introduced by the executive. Thus, the executive was the draftsman, and
the executive's intent was arguably the "intent of the draftsman."
The executive sent to Congress, along with the final draft of the bill,
"Statements of Administrative Action" indicating its intentions in
administering the new legislation.280 Thus these statements are an
important part of the legislative history, and may be the definitive
source oflegislative intent. However, the actual history of the executive-congressional consultative process suggests a somewhat different
approach, and the House and Senate Committee reports reflect that
difference. Although these reports were formulated by the key congressional committees in reporting on the actual bill introduced, and
thus came at a time when no amendments were permitted to the bill,
the reports state:28 1
The committee emphasizes that virtually all of the provisions of H.R.
4357 [which became the TAA of 1979] reflect the decisions of the
House and Senate committees, as coordinated in the joint meetings
noted above. The implementing bill was drafted in the offices of the
House and Senate Legislative Counsel with the participation of staff
members of the committees of jurisdiction in both Houses and representatives from the Administration. The bill reflects the understandings achieved on all issues, as explained in this report.

Thus, the report claims to be a prime source of legislative history,
219. See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 202, at 36.
280. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979: STATEMENTS
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, H.R. Doc. No. 153 pt. 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
281. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 202, at 6; see also H.R. REP. No. 317, supra note 270, at
28.
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just as it would be in the case of other legislation. Moreover, it also
presents a view of the role of the Statements of Administrative Action, and notes that those Statements "are not part of the bill and
will not become part of U.S. statutes . . . . They will not provide
any new, independent legal authority for executive action." 282
Finally, the role of the MTN Agreements themselves in the legislative history must be considered. As will be seen below, it is clear
that the Agreements do not themselves become U.S. law, but the
Committee Reports state that "[t]his bill is drafted with the intent to
permit U.S. practice to be consistent with the obligations of the
agreements, as the United States understands those obligations."283
It seems fair to conclude that the trade agreements (and presumably
their preparatory work) are a secondary source for legislative history
of the 1979 Act.
One additional aspect of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979
should be noted. This Act clearly covers a number of matters which
are not explicitly required by any of the MTN Agreements or other
negotiation results. Indeed, some of the matters contained in the
Trade Agreements Act seem only remotely relevant to the MTN.
For example, Section 111 of the Act makes some changes in Title V
of the Trade Act of 1974 relating to the Generalized System of Preferences. Among other changes, the President is authorized to designate members of OPEC, meeting certain requirements, as
beneficiaries of the Generalized System of Preferences. N evertheless, although the fast track procedure purports to be a procedure for
implementing and approving the trade negotiation results, since the
form of the congressional action is that of a typical statute, adopted
through the normal constitutional procedures (and not through a
procedure such as legislative veto or delegated regulations), the statute provides its own authority for even those matters that go beyond
implementation of the MTN results. Thus, it seems impossible to
challenge measures of the statute on the ground that they are ultra
vires the authority of the fast track procedure, as embodied in the
Trade Act of 1974, and particularly Sections 102 and 151 of that Act.
This is an important bar to constitutional challenges to the fast track
procedure.284
282. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 202, at 33.
283. S. REP. No. 249,supra note 202, at 36;seea/so H.R. REP. No. 317,supra note 270, at
41.
284. Title X and Title XI contain measures not necessary to implement the MTN results.
Title X amends sections of U.S. law dealing with judicial review of administrative decisions.
Title XI is entitled Miscellaneous Provisions and includes the following sections:
§ 1101 Extension ofnontariffbarrier negotiating authority
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United States Acceptance of the MTN Agreements

Once the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 became law (on July 26,
1979) the President had the authority he needed to accept the MTN
Agreements as international obligations of the United States.285
The President made most of the required determinations on December 14, 1979. His document authorized the signing and acceptance of seven of the agreements. Six of these agreements were
signed and accepted by Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Michael
B. Smith in Geneva on December 17, 1979, the opening day of the
three-year signing period.286 The Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft was accepted on December 20, 1979. Two agreements, scheduled to enter into force January I, 1981, were signed, but not
accepted at this time. The Agreement on Government Procurement
was not accepted at this time because negotiations on "entity coverage" had not been completed. The Customs Valuation agreement
was not accepted because the conditions in Section 2 of the Trade
Agreements Act had not been met. 287
The United States implemented the Customs Valuation Code in
U.S. law effective July I, 1980. The President's proclamation of the
early implementation of the Code was authorized by Section
204(a)(2) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 which required a determination that the European Economic Community had accepted
the obligations of the Code.288 A protocol to the Customs Valuation
Code, designed to encourage developing countries to adhere to the
Code, came into effect January I, 1981. This agreement was implemented in United States law by a statute that amended one section
of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.289
The Government Procurement Agreement was accepted by the
United States in December 1980290 and came into force January I,
1981.
§ 1103

Advice from private sector
§ I 104 Study of possible agreements with North American countries
§ 11 IO Study of export trade policy
§ 1111 Generalized system of preferences
285. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 2(b)(3), 19 U.S.C. § 2503(b)(3).
286. See 288 ITEX (BNA), at A-5 (Jan. I, 1980).
287. Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations - Determination Regarding the Application of Certain International Trade Agreements, 45 Fed. Reg. I 181 (1980).
288. Proclamation to Carry Out the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the Customs Valuation Code) and for Other Purposes, 45 Fed. Reg. 45,135 (1980).
289. Pub. L. No. 96-490, 94 Stat. 2556 (1980) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2503 (Supp. IV
1980)) (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1976)).
290. 287 ITEX (BNA), at A-3 (Dec. 18, 1979).
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F. Implementing the MTN Results in U.S. Law
1.

Source of U.S. Domestic Law

Since international agreements do not always become part of the
U.S. domestic law, the United States must be classified as a dualist
country.291 This section discusses the form of implementation of accepted MTN results into U.S. domestic law.
An international agreement (or part thereof) which is found by
the courts to be "self-executing" directly becomes a part of the domestic laws, which U.S. courts must apply in specific cases.292 To
avoid extensive analysis of this concept her~, suffice it to say that the
U.S. courts ,determine whether an international agreement is self-executing by ascertaining whether the draftsmen intended it to be so,
as manifested primarily by the language of the agreement itself, and
secondarily by the preparatory work. Since the concept of "self-executing" is itself a domestic U.S. constitutional question (often of little or no interest to other national parties to the agreement), it is not
surprising that the courts tend to look at the intent of the U.S. draftsmen. For U.S. agreements requiring congressional approval, congressional intent in granting approval becomes very important and
perhaps determinative.293 Often it is difficult to tell either from the
language of the agreement or its legislative history whether a particu1ar international agreement is self-executing. If it is not self-executing, whenever the agreement obligates the U.S. to change its
domestic law, such change must be implemented by other regular
constitutional means, such as enactment of a statute, or, if the executive branch has authority, the promulgation of a regulation.
Sections 3(a) and 3(f) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 address the self-execution and implementation of the MTN results. The
clauses are clarified by the relevant committee reports and the Statement of Administrative Action. Section 3(a) of the 1979 Act states:
No provision of any trade agreement approved by the Congress under
section 2(a), nor the application of any such provision to any person or
circumstances, which is in conflict with any statute of the United States
shall be given effect under the laws of the United States.
291. See note 239 supra; I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 33.59
(1973).
292. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 156-61 (1972); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 154 (1965); W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 144-49 (1962).
293. In Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the court noted that in
interpreting treaties courts must "look to the intent of the signatory parties as manifested by
the language of the instrument, and, if the instrument is uncertain, recourse must be had to the
circumstances surrounding its execution."
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Section 3 (f) states:
Neither the entry into force with respect to the United States of any
agreement approved under section 2(a), nor the enactment of this Act,
shall be construed as creating any private right of action or remedy for
which provision is not explicitly made under this Act or under the laws
of the United States.

The Statement of Administrative Action on the MTN Agreements states unequivocally that "[t]he Trade Agreements negotiated
are not self-executing and accordingly do not have independent effect under U.S. law." 294 The Senate and House reports follow suit,
saying that "the trade agreements are not self-executing." 295 The
Senate Report goes on to say that "[i]mplementation of obligations
for the United States under the agreements can only be achieved as
is provided in the Trade Act of 1974."296 This last statement, however, probably cannot be taken at face value. 297
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 is itself the source of several
U.S. domestic laws to implement the major nontariff MTN Agreements. This is true for the agreements on subsidies and countervailing measures, anti-dumping measures, customs valuation,
government procurement standards, and civil aircraft. Certain other
MTN agreements are implemented through other legal actions. For
example, most of the Tariff Agreements could be implemented under
the authority of Section 101 of the 1974 Trade Act. This Act (following the forty-year pattern of U.S. trade acts) explicitly authorized the
President to enter into tariff change agreements (within specified limits). In a separate clause, it then authorized him to "proclaim such
modification ... of any existing duty, ... [etc.] as he determines to
be required or appropriate to carry out any such trade agreement."298 This statute thus embraces a dualist philosophy. To the
extent that the tariff obligations agreed to in the MTN exceeded the
authority of section 101 of the 1974 act, however, legislation of approval was necessary. This is found in Title V of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.299 Pursuant to both of these sources of authority,
the President has proclaimed300 the staged reductions and other
294. U.S. House OF REPRESENTATIVES, TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979: STATEMENTS
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, H.R. Doc. No. 153 pt. 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
295. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 202, at 36; H.R. REP. No. 317, supra note 281, at 41.
296. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 202, at 36.
297. As discussed above, the President has some authority not solely derived from that Act;
see notes 240-42 supra and accompanying text.
298. Trade Act of 1974, § 10l(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 21 l l(a)(2) (1976).
299. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 503, 93 Stat. 144, 251-52 (codified
in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1980)).
300. Proclamation No. 4707, 44 Fed. Reg. 72,348 (1979).
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changes in U.S. tariffs, and this proclamation is the direct source of
domestic law applied by U.S. courts and customs officials.
In addition to tariffs, there were several MTN agreements (Dairy,
Bovine Meat, Import Licensing) 301 which the executive claimed, and
the Congress agreed, 302 did not need legislation to implement. In
these cases no U.S. statutes needed changing. The Dairy and Meat
agreements merely established international consultative arrangements, and normal U.S. diplomatic activities would embrace these
functions. Similarly, the President already had statutory delegations
which authorized him or his officials to issue or change regulations
to accommodate the procedural obligations of the Agreement on Import Licensing.303
Some MTN agreements required no direct implementation in
U.S. law because they did not require any particular U.S. action.
The so-called Framework Agreements, which were approved as decisions of the GATT Contracting Parties304 rather than independent
international agreements, contained matters which, although potentially very important, did not require specific actions by the United
States except, perhaps, conducting its diplomacy in GAIT fora in
the future. For example, one Framework Agreement permanently
authorizes GATT members to deviate from MFN so as to grant preferences to developing countries. No country is required to act that
way, but this text, now a "decision" of the GAIT Contracting Parties,305 will, in some instances, deny a GAIT member the right to
complain about other member nations' actions.
While the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 thus enacted the necessary measures for the United States to carry out its obligations under
some agreements, three of its measures exclude some GATT nations
from their coverage.306 Thus:
301. International Dairy Arrangement, GATI, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 91 (26th Supp. 1980);
Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat, GATI, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 84 (26th Supp. 1980);
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, GATI, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 154 (26th Supp.
1980).
302. See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979: STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, H.R. Doc. No. 153 pt. 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 526, 527
(1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. News 665, 774-76; s. REP. No. 249, supra
note 202, at 257-58; H.R. REP. No. 317, supra note 270, at 148, 186.
303. See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 202, at 257-58.
304. See Texts Concerning a Framework for the Conduct of World Trade, GATI, BASIC
INSTRUMENTS 201 (26th Supp. 1980).
305. The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Report by the Director-General ofGATI (GATI/1979-3); The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol. II:
Report by the Director-General ofGATI (GATI/1980-1); BASIC INSTRUMENTS (26th Supp.
1980).
306. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 101, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (Supp. IV 1980) (adding Title
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§ 101

(introducing §701) applies the new U.S. countervailing
duty law with its new injury test, only to countries that
also accept the MTN Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Duties (with exceptions for a few other
countries).
§ 301
regarding Government Procurement, likewise limits
U.S. implementation of the MTN Agreement on this
subject mainly to those countries that also accept that
Agreement, or provide appropriate reciprocal actions.
Section 441 limits certain procedural rights under the
Technical Barriers (Standards) Agreement only to certain countries that reciprocate.
Whether or not the U.S. law in these sections fully complies with
MTN obligations, the domestic law of the U.S. is that stated in the
1979 Act even ff inconsistent with United States international obligations. In implementing all other MTN agreements, whether required
by international obligations or not, the United States has extended
its law to all GATT or MFN countries.
2. Executive Branch Reorganization

For many decades, Congress has criticized the way the executive
branch carries out United States foreign international economic policy. Congress was distressed after the Kennedy Round that the
United States had given up too much in those negotiations.307 Likewise, Congress had been increasingly critical of the lack of effective
organization of the executive branch with respect to international
economic matters. The multiplicity of agencies and inter-agency
conflicts had caused delays and mistakes of policy, and made it difficult for members of Congress or their constituents to know where to
file their complaints. The extraordinary vote in favor of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979308 suggests that some of these congressional
concerns had been lessened by the particular procedures (including
the extensive consultation with Congress) that occurred prior to the
introduction of the bill. Some Senators, however, desired to go further. They urged reorganization of those parts of the executive
branch that govern international economic affairs. Various ideas
had been suggested, including unifying the splintered agencies in a
new single department devoted entirely to international trade matVII to Tariff Act of 1930); Trade Agreements Act of 1979, §§ 301,441, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2561
(Supp. IV 1980).
307. See J. EVANS, THE KENNEDY ROUND IN AMERICAN TRADE POLICY 305 (1971).
308. See text at note 272 supra.
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ters,309 which would gather together the various executive branch
agencies and activities relating to international trade.
For a variety ofreasons, the idea of a new department devoted to
trade was deemed unacceptable, both by Congress and the executive,
but some reorganization of trade functions seemed necessary. Indeed, some Congressmen spoke to this effect during the proceedings
on the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. They threatened to hold up
that procedure unless some commitments were made about an executive branch reorganization.3 10
Consequently, after the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 was enacted, the President was committed to provide some reorganization.
He did so with his reorganization Order Number 3 of September 25,
1979. Under a statute previously enacted by the Congress, the President has the authority to reorganize agencies of the United States by
issuing a reorganization order which he then lays before Congress
for sixty days. If the Congress "vetos" that order, the President is
not allowed to proceed with his reorganization. In this case, there
was no congressional veto, so on November 29, 1979 the order became law, authorizing the President to carry out the reorganization
pursuant to its terms. He did so by Executive Order No. 12188 of
January 2, 1980.311
The most important provisions of the reorganization were those
that shifted the administration of the countervailing duty and antidumping laws from the Treasury Department to the Department of
Commerce.312 In the Department of Commerce, a new International
Trade Administration (ITA) was set up with three principal divisions: one to handle anti-dumping and countervailing duty matters
and to take over the Commerce Department function of export control administration; a second to be concerned with international economic policy; and a third to continue a now embellished function for
the Department of Commerce, of exportpromotion. 313
309. See, e.g., Ribicoff-Ruth Bill, S. 377, [Feb. 13, 1979] 244 ITEX (BNA) M-1; Byrd Bill,
S 891, [Apr. IO, 1979] 252 ITEX (BNA) P-1; (June 19, 1979] 262 ITEX (BNA) 0-1.
310. See Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International
Trade ofthe Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 390-91, 435 (1979) (statements of
Senators Ribicoff and Roth).
311. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979); Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45
Fed. Reg. 989 (1980). The reorganization statute can be found at 5 U.S.C. § 901 (Supp. IV
1980).
312. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, § 2, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979).
313. See Undersecretary for the International Trade Administration, Authority and Functions, 45 Fed. Reg. 6141 (1980); International Trade Administration, Organization and Function Order, 45 Fed. Reg. 36,427 (1980). See also ITIM (BNA) Reference File 92: 0103-0104; 5
ITIM (BNA) at A-2 (Dec. 5, 1979); 9 ITIM (BNA) at A-2 (Jan 9, 1980); 289 ITEX (BNA) at A8 (Jan. 8, 1980); 298 ITEX (BNA) at A-3 (Mar. 4, 1980).
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In addition, the Reorganization Order took a number of international economic functions away from the Department of State, and
gave these to the office of the Special Trade Representative, renamed
the Office of the United States Trade Representative ("USTR").
The reorganization also provided that the USTR would have primary international negotiating responsibilities on a number of economic matters, including matters relating to anti-dumping and
countervailing duty law.3 14
3. MTN Implementation and the U.S. Regulatory Process

United States law heavily emphasizes individual rights and fair
and open procedures. A significant part of the 1979 implementing
statute set forth detailed procedures regarding administration of subjects of the MTN agreements. This was particularly true of the
countervailing duty and anti-dumping duty law. Elaborate provisions were included to govern the handling of private citizen complaints about imports. A series of time limits was imposed, and the
opportunity for public hearings clarified and broadened.315 Attempts were made to insulate administration of these subjects from
"political" influences. Finally, disappointed parties were granted
right to appeal the results of administrative rulings to the courts.
4. Private Citizen Complaints and Section 301 Procedures: U.S.
Export Access to Markets Abroad

Section 252 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act provided a framework for United States citizens to bring unfair foreign trade practices
to the attention of the U.S. government. This section then authorized the President to take certain retaliatory countermeasures if he
could not obtain satisfaction for the U.S. citizens through
negotiations.316
This procedure was revised in Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974. Section 301 sets up an explicit set of procedures designed to
give a private United States citizen a channel for bringing international trade complaints to the attention of the United States Government. Section 301 provides that the Office of the USTR shall receive
the complaints and shall, on demand, hold public hearings about the
314. See Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979); Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45
Fed. Reg. 989 (1980). See also 5 ITIM (BNA) at A-2 (Dec. 5, 1979); 9 ITIM (BNA) at A-2
(Jan. 9, 1980).
315. E.g., Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 101, adding§§ 702-706 (19 U.S.C. § 1671), and
§ 751 (19 u.s.c. § 1675).
316. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 202, at 36.
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validity of the complaint. 31 7
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 amended section 301, but the
basic structure of the complaint procedure was retained. If, after
consideration by the USTR, the complaint is considered justified, the
President is required tQ redress the matter, and he is authorized to
take a variety of countermeasures - including trade restriction
measures - against the foreign government, if negotiations prove
unsuccessful.318
This procedure may be unique. It stems from a general feeling in
the United States that individual citizens should have some right to
redress when foreign governments violate their international obligations. 319 It also stems from congressional distrust of the executive
branch's handling of these types of complaints. Various proposals in
the 1979 legislative process would have gone yet further in forcing
executive branch action against foreign governments. Nothing in the
statute requires the President to take retaliatory actions, but the requirement of public hearings320 coupled with the requirement to
state publicly the reasons for not acting, make it politically difficult
to ignore a reasonable complaint brought through this process.
G. Summary and Conclusions

The single most significant constitutional restraint on the ability
of United States officials to negotiate international economic agreements is, not surprisingly, the interaction of the executive and legislative branches in the United States Government. This relationship
colors every aspect of United States foreign relations, and particularly foreign economic relations, where the Congress has a special
claim to jurisdiction due to its enumerated power over foreign commerce. In spite of this constraint, however, the Tokyo Round experience demonstrates that the executive-congressional relationship,
managed correctly, can allow effective participation in international
negotiations and agreements. The overwhelming vote in favor of the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 may, as some have alleged, be evi317. Trade Act of 1974, § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1976); Procedures for Complaints Re•
ceived Pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 15 C.F.R. pt. 2006 (1982) (as
amended).
318. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, Title IX, 93 Stat. 144, 295-300
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (Supp. IV 1980)); Procedures for Complaints Received
Pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 15 C.F.R. pt. 2006 (1982) (as amended).
319. See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 202, at 232; H.R. REP. No. 317, supra note 270, at
173-74.
320. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 901, 93 Stat. 144, 295-99 (amending §§ 301-302 of the Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041-43) (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2412(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
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dence of too many concessions by the executive branch to Congress.
Nevertheless, the close consultation between the executive branch
and the Congress, in certain circumstances resulting in changes in
the international negotiation, in other circumstances resulting in
congressional changes in attitude, show the effectiveness of the
process. This process, however, can lead to certain nontraditional
diplomatic activities. For example, foreign nations may closely follow the executive-congressional activities. At appropriate times,
they may raise their concerns with potential congressional actions.
Although such activity is obvious to persons experienced in government or business, it seems to have been overlooked by those more
involved in the theory of international law.
The U.S. system now seems to rely fairly extensively on the section 301 procedures. The notion that a private citizen should have
the right almost to compel his government to take action in international fora on his behalf seems to be very attractive to a Congress
suspicious of the executive branch.
The technique of resolving legal dilemmas by ignoring them was
used during the implementation of the MTN Agreements. For example, the President's authority to waive countervailing duties in
certain circumstances ran out before the negotiation was :finished,
and the application of such duties had the potential to derail the
negotiation. Yet, in the end; the messiness was simply tolerated, and
the legal constraint did not override important policy goals. Likewise, the inability of Japan to ratify formally the results of the Tokyo
Round posed certain legal problems for the U.S. administration.
The lawyers for the administration, however, were able to wiggle
their way around the problem, albeit uneasily, with verbal formulae
in the Presidential findings document.
One might conclude, therefore, that to a certain extent the lawyers were irrelevant - that whenever legal technicalities threatened
to obstruct the negotiations, the law was simply ignored. One cannot, however, conclude that this approach would always work, particularly on a matter about which constituent groups in the United
States differed strongly.
One of the problems inherent in the congressional-executive
tensions is the problem of "oversell" that arises when the executive
branch tries to persuade Congress to accept and implement international agreements. There is a risk in this situation that executive
branch officials will make unfulfillable promises to Congress. Perhaps the prime example of this was the Subsidies-Countervailing
Duty Code. There, executive branch officials made optimistic state-
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ments to the Congress, including statements about pressure that the
United States would bring on developing countries to abide by the
basic principles of the code. It has proved very difficult, if not impossible, to fulfill these promises.
For a number of reasons, United States policies tend to a high
degree of "legalization." The limits of congressional power, coupled
with suspicions of the executive branch, have led Congress to pursue
its goals through detailed legislation that limits executive branch discretion. To help reinforce these limitations, Congress has also
designed procedures to make the decisions open and to allow public
participation at almost every stage. In addition, the Congress, particularly in the 1979 Act, has provided elaborate Court supervision
of the administrative process through the many possibilities for judicial review.
All this "legalization," of course, creates complexity and expense.
These costs have, in tum, been challenged by foreign critics as trade
barriers by themselves. To a certain extent this may be true, although this author has estimated the public and private annual costs
of the U.S. regulatory system for imports (excluding the normal customs processes) to be less than ½o of I% of the total value of annual
imports to the U.S.321 Yet it must be realized that there are also benefits derived from this system. Its openness, comparative objectivity,
comparative insulatioi:i from undue political influence, and comparative reliance on relatively detailed published criteria, give foreign
parties interested in exporting to the United States a degree of predictable access to the U.S. market that may not be available in any
other system. It is hard in the U.S. system for representatives of a
domestic industry to boast privately that they will see to it that the
government will exclude competing imports, unless certain specified
criteria are met. Lawyers can give· a measure of guidance both to
domestic industry representatives desiring to exclude competing
goods, and to importing interests, often eliminating the necessity of
seeking any formal (or informal) government proceeding. It is at
least possible to hypothesize that because of the public access to,
transparency of, and stipulated criteria for, the regulation of U.S.
imports, more and better access to the U.S. market is available to
321. This figure is based on approximately $68 million of annual U.S. Government costs
for trade agencies such as USTR, ITA (Commerce), etc., plus very rough estimates of private
lawyers fees and in-house corporate costs for the procedures occurring under U.S. law. A total
of $101 million annual costs estimated in this manner can be compared with the 1981 total
value of imports into the U.S. of $264 billion, and the resulting fraction is 4/100 of 1%. Al•
lowing leeway for various estimating errors, it would seem almost certain that this ratio is less
than 1/10 of 1%.
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foreign producers than is the case in most other markets. If liberal
trade is the desired goal of the system, such "legalization" may more
efficiently promote that goal than systems that rely more heavily on
government discretion, or nonpublic decision making.
In addition, the "legalization" (as aggravating as it is sometimes)
tends to reduce the "power-orientation" of the system and nudge it
more in the direction of a "rule-oriented" system, as this author has
elsewhere described. 322
But there are other costs to be paid by such a system. Clearly it is
less flexible (indeed that is its objective, for flexibility generally
means less predictability, and possibly, more subject to influence by
extraneous or unpredictable goals). One of the questions that has
been appropriately raised in connection with the system is whether it
can cope with the truly large cases, such as trade problems of the
steel or automobile sector, which often are a result of important and
painful trends of structural adjustment. If the rules are not adequately tuned to massive problems of this type, they could, when
inflexibly administered, create problems rather than solve them.
One answer to this criticism would be to improve and change the
rules. But when the world's procedures for such change are as difficult, lengthy, and inflexible as they are, rule changes do not occur
easily. Thus, rules sometimes become out-dated, or are ambiguous
or misdirected, because they result from difficult and elaborate negotiation processes. In such circumstances the rules tend to break
down.
These reflections do not seem to be encouraging for the future of
international economic relations. Yet improvisation by intelligent
officials, coupled with the discernible trend of not only greater rule
detail and complexity, but also greater openness and predictability of
the trade rules in the United States, offers the long-run prospect of
greater stability of trade and economic relationships. If the rules can
be steadily improved, and the experience with them utilized to enhance such improvements, then, in the opinion of this author, one is
entitled to be modestly optimistic about the long-run prospects of
international trade relations.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In the preceding Parts, we have examined the relationship of
322. See Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 93, 98-99 (1978); Jackson, The Birth of the GAIT-MTN System: A Constitutional
Appraisal, 12 J. LAW & POLY. INTL. Bus. 21, 27-28 (1980).
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three national constitutional systems to the processes of negotiating
and implementing international agreements. We have focused on
the Tokyo Round Negotiations in the context of GATT, as a case
study, so as to add precision to our inquiries. However, we had no
intention of simply chronicling the history of the Tokyo Round. Instead, it has been our purpose to examine the constitutional systems
of the three major trading partners in the world today, with a view to
understanding the effect of those national constitutions on potential
future international negotiations. As this is written, it is not clear
what the next major international economic negotiation will be.
Preparations have begun in the GATT, however, for some further
multilateral activity which could possibly lead to some negotiations
on certain subjects, such as international trade in services, or negotiation concerning certain international rules relating to merchandise
trade such as safeguards.323
In three different Parts, we have each explored the constitutional
and legal constraints on international economic negotiations, within
each of three systems. The reader will realize by now that there are
some substantial and interesting differences between those systems.
In addition, the reader may by now realize that there are some potential problems for any international economic negotiation, lurking
in the disparities between those systems. In this final Part, we propose to draw some comparisons and formulate some tentative hypotheses as to the significance of the differences between the national
constitutional systems. As indicated at the outset of this Article, we
. view our study as only part of the total story. Clearly, there are a
number of other countries for which a similar examination of the
national constitutional structures would be interesting and valuable
for a better understanding of the potential for international economic negotiations. It is our hope that other scholars will now utilize some of the same techniques we have utilized and address some
of the same questions that we have explored. We would hope to see
articles published in various scholarly legal journals, about other national constitutional systems and their relationship to international
economic negotiations.
We have divided the remainder of this final Part into five sections. In section A, we will draw some conclusions and make some
general comparisons about the three systems examined. In section
B, we will discuss some of the implications of our findings for future
negotiations. In section C, we raise a question which seems to be
323. See, e.g., GATT Press Release No. 1310 (Feb. 12, 1982).

Tokyo Round

December 1982]

385

more frequently on the minds of statesmen and politicians, namely,
whether the international economic structure for trade and other
economic affairs is workable and fair. In section D, we make one
proposal which could add to the workability and significance of international economic systems, although we do not have any illusions
that this proposal is likely to be adopted in the near future. Finally,
in section E we bring the Article to a close.
A.

The Three Constitutions Compared

The three constitutions are very different, and these differences
obviously have implications. Japan's constitutional system is one of
a highly centralized governmental structure, with a parliamentary
system. In some respects, the Japanese constitutional system is
rather new (dating technically from the post-World War II'period).
The European system is even newer. In this Article we have treated
the system of the European Economic Community as a sort of "national system" for the purposes of our analysis. The Constitution of
the EEC is in a process of rapid change. Starting with the Treaty of
Rome of 1957, that Constitution includes the longest written constitutional document of any of the three systems examined. A number
of changes have occurred in that written document, particularly
changes due to the addition of new Members. In addition, a number
of changes have been and continue to be occurring in the way that
document gets applied. In all three systems, power struggles among
the various branches of the system occur and 'have considerable
influence.
In the United States, we have the oldest continuous government
of the three, based on a written Constitution two hundred years old
and a large supply of Supreme Court opinions interpreting that Constitution. With respect to international economic relations under
that Constitution, however, the Supreme Court has spoken relatively
infrequently. Despite the length of its history, the United States
Constitution still leaves a number of issues open with respect to multinational relations.
Some brief comparisons (others have been made in the various
preceding chapters) can be grouped under two headings: (1) the distribution of power; and, (2) the legal process of implementing the
Tokyo Round Agreements.
1. The .Distribution of Power

A prime attribute of any constitutional system is the way that it
distributes power. Power can be distributed within a national gov-
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ernment among various branches of that government; and it can also
be distributed in a federal system between the central government
and the subordinate units of government (such as the states).
a. Subordinate units ofgovernment. With respect to questions of
power distribution between the central government and the
subordinate units of government, these questions are the least significant in Japan, and the most significant in the EEC. The Japanese
government is highly centralized, and these authors could not find
that problems of power distribution to local units, or power held by
local units, have any significant implications for international economic negotiations.
In the United States, ql!esiions of distribution of powers between
the states and the federal government in Washington, D.C., still have
some potency, although not nearly so much as was the case a century
ago. Basically, today, the U.S. federal government can negotiate and
fulfill almost any international agreement which it feels it can obtain, and which is approved by the governmental processes of the
federal government. However, there are some political limitations
on the processes of negotiating and approving international agreements that stem from the federal system. For example, with respect
to the Tokyo Round Government Procurement Code, it seems reasonably clear that if the nations which are parties to that Code had
provided in the Code that it would apply also to the governmental
purchases of government subdivisions such as states in the United
States, in that circumstance the United States federal government
would have had the power to require the states to follow the international agreement. However, there were at least some perceptions
during the negotiation that there could have been some opposition
among members of Congress to the approval of an international
government procurement code, if such a code were designed to apply
to state government purchases. We do not know the degree or extent
of that potential opposition, since the issue was never put to Congress. Indeed, the United States negotiators were at one point probably willing to try to have the international agreement embrace state
government purchases, but negotiators from other nations did not
desire such a move.
The EEC poses the most serious problems with respect to the distribution of powers between central governmental institutions and
member government states or subordinate government units. There
continues to be a considerable power struggle between the central
institutions of the EEC and the Member State governments (such as
England or France). Extra-constitutional mechanisms, such as the

December 1982]

Tokyo Round

387

"European Council," ~ave been set up for participation of national
government officials at the highest level, and this has tended to
strengthen the retention of power by the Member States, as opposed
to the EEC institutions.
Within some of the Member States of the EEC, there are also
important federalism questions. For example, in West Germany, the
Lander retain certain significant rights and powers, and these have
had and will continue to have some influence on the potentiality of
international economic negotiations.
More specifically, within the EEC the degree of centralization
varies with the subject matter. The general subject "commercial policy," which is deemed to include tariffs and trade, and most GATT
matters, is delegated to the central institutions of the EEC (Article
113 of the Treaty of Rome). However, a number of other subjects
are not, at least not explicitly, so delegated. For example, monetary
policy tends to remain with the Member States. Some have argued
that the codes concerning government procurement, or standards,
touched on matters peculiarly remaining within the power and jurisdiction of the Member States. This may have clouded certain phases
of the Tokyo Round Negotiation, but in the end, the actions of the
EEC and its Member State governments tend to confirm the proposition that these activities as negotiated in the Tokyo Round are embraced within the "commercial policy" delegation of authority to the
EEC institutions. In future international economic negotiations,
however, it will be necessary to examine fairly closely the question of
whether a subject matter to be taken up is within the jurisdiction of
the EEC institutions or not. For example, it has often been stated
that the next phase of multilateral discussions and potential negotiations within GATT, will embrace trade in "services" (insurance,
shipping, tourism, etc~). It has been argued that power to regulate
and to enter into international negotiations with respect to trade in
certain types of services remains with the Member States, or at least
is not under the authority of article 113. If true, this could necessitate a negotiation of a different type than that which occurred in the
Tokyo Round.
b. Central government institutions. Power is also distributed
among institutions at the central or federal government level. In the
United States, these problems are the most significant. The relationship of the executive branch (the President) and the Congress is the
single most important factor of U.S. participation in international
economic negotiations. This relationship has a number of difficulties. Although it is usually argued that the President has authority to
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negotiate on anything in an international context, it is clear under

the United States Constitution that the President does not have the
sole authority to approve or finally commit the United States to an
international agreement on many subjects. In commercial matters,
Congress feels that it has the preeminent reserved power, and that
the President only has those powers which have been delegated to
him by the Congress. This imposes effective restraints on the ability
of the President to negotiate in the international context, since the
negotiators from other countries are not likely to be willing to negotiate with him with respect to matters for which they feel he cannot
obtain approval. There is thus a tendency on the part of the executive branch officials to be more willing to enter into international
negotiations on subject matters which they feel are within the powers
already delegated to the President. Alternatively, it would be necessary for the President to obtain additional statutory delegations from
the Congress before the negotiation, or to take results of a negotiation back to the Congress under one procedure or another for approval. In connection with a major international economic
negotiation, a great deal of time, effort, and thought will be utilized
in managing these relationships between the executive branch and
the Congress.
In the EEC, the power distribution within the various central institutions is also highly significant. To a certain extent, these power
relationships mirror the problems encountered in the relationship
between the EEC institutions and the Member States. The EEC has
a Commission on the one hand, and a Council on the other hand.
The Council is composed of representatives of the Member States.
This institution is reluctant to yield power to the Commission which
is considered to reflect a more general EEC perspective. There is a
European Parliament, now selected by popular suffrage, but its powers are extremely limited, at least at this juncture of history. There is
also another very important central institution, namely the Court of
Justice (sitting at Luxembourg). This court has the final say about
legal matters interpreting the Treaty of Rome, and therefore is the
arbitrator of the disputes about power distribution within the EEC,
both disputes involving the central institutions and those involving
the relationship of those institutions to the Member States.
In the Japanese Government, the problem of distribution of
power among the national institutions is not so great. In a parliamentary system, the Executive is headed by a cabinet which is
largely drawn from the Parliament itself, so at least in theory, there
is not a significant tension between the Parliament and the Execu-
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tive. In Japan, the power distribution questions at the central government level are of a rather different nature than those in the
United States or the EEC. This makes comparison somewhat cliffi.cult. Many of the problems of power distribution in the Japanese
Government have to do with rivalry between ministries such as the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as compared to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. More specifically, the relationships between powerful Ministries and between Ministries and the Liberal
Democratic Party, and the pressures of some powerful interest
groups (for example, agricultural groups) may affect future negotiations. When looking at the different "constitutional systems" of the
three trading partners, to make effective comparison, and to analyze
the power distribution questions, one has to look at different information in Japan. The information is often not easily available, because it is rarely embodied in such things as Supreme Court cases, or
statutes and explicit regulations which are available to the public.
Nevertheless, there are some significant power distribution questions
in Japan which could affect future negotiations, and have affected
past negotiations.
Finally, in this comparison of power distribution, one must look
at the role of the courts. In the United States, the Supreme Court
has an extraordinarily powerful role in arbitrating the allocation of
power among units of government. It also has an important role in
the enforcement of statutes and regulations, and of the Constitution
itself. Consequently, many issues in the United States tend to become 'judicial issues" and this gives the court a more significant role
in the total process of international economic negotiations than is
probably the case in the other two constitutional systems explored.
In the EEC, the Court of Justice also proves to be very prominent.
Indeed, the analogies between the Court of Justice for the EEC and
the Supreme Court of the United States are strong and many people
have commented upon them. Even though governments within
Member States in Europe have not in many cases traditionally had a
constitutional system that placed considerable power in a judicial
body, in the EEC this is the case.
In Japan, courts including the Supreme Court have the power of
judicial review, and, at least in theory, they could play a role as an
arbitrator of the allocation of actions enforced by the Ministries in
light of the Constitution or laws. However, in reality, the Japanese
Supreme Court and lower courts have rarely exercised this power in
foreign trade areas. This is probably due to the paucity of court ac-
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tions which are raised by government agencies and private individuals, which reflects the nonlitigiousness in the national character.
2. Implementation of the Tokyo Round Agreements in National
Legal Systems
There is virtually no uniformity between the three constitutional
systems as to the way that the results of the Tokyo Round became
implemented. In the United States, as we have seen, the Congress
generally reserved the power to approve most of the final Tokyo
Round Agreements before the United States became committed to
them. The statute adopted by Congress to provide this approval and
to implement the Agreements clearly provides that the Agreements
themselves will not be "self-executing" in the United States law.
This means that the Agreements do not become part of the domestic
law of the United States. Therefore, a citizen must look to the statute adopted by Congress, which implements the international agreement, for the source of his rights and for judicial and administrative
application within the United States. On the other hand, the statute
adopted is quite long, and quite detailed. It takes much of the language of the international agreements and applies that language verbatim as part of the United States law. In addition, administrative
agencies charged with implementing various parts of that statute
have issued regulations that are even more detailed. Thus, there is a
vast, elaborate, explicit body of written rules that is part of the
United States jurisprudence and designed to implement the Tokyo
Round Agreements. Individual citizens have the right to invoke
those rules, and to utilize the court system to assist them in such
invocation.
In the EEC, the situation is considerably more confused. It is not
entirely clear whether the international agreements negotiated in the
Tokyo Round will always be considered to have "direct effect" as
part of the jurisprudence of national government institutions, including the courts, in the EEC. A recent case, however, leaves open the
possibility of such "direct effect." In some cases, the EEC has issued
a "regulation" on the subject matter concerned; such a regulation
becomes part of the domestic jurisprudence in the Member States of
the EEC. In other cases, the EEC has issued a "directive" which
directs Member States to take implementing action. Although there
have been cases which have held a directive to have certain types of
direct e.ffects in Member State law, the general theory is that the
thrust of the directive would not normally lend itself to be treated as
part of the domestic jurisprudence. Finally, in some situations, the
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implementation of the Tokyo Round agreement has simply been left
to the Member States. Entering into the agreement by the EEC institutions imposes a legal requirement on the Member States to follow
and implement the international agreement.
In Japan, as long as the international agreements negotiated in
the Tokyo Round have been approved by the National Diet, they are
regarded as "treaties" in the sense of the constitutional provision
and, as such, are given not only the power of law but also overriding
effect upon the domestic law which comes into conflict with them.
As touched upon earlier, such approval has been given to most of the
agreements negotiated in the Tokyo Round. Whenever there are
differences between the approved international agreements and domestic laws, it has been the practice of the Japanese Government
that the Cabinet proposes legislative bills and the National Diet enacts them into laws in order to make the language of domestic laws
conform to the language contained in the international agreements.
This has been done with regard to some of the international agreements negotiated in the Tokyo Round. With certain limitations, individuals have the right to invoke the rules contained in the
agreements and to seek cancellation of administrative actions, regulations or laws which are contrary to these rules, and also to seek
recovery for damage sustained by them due to actions or inactions of
the government officials contrary to the rules enunciated in the
agreements. Here again, however, the likelihood of such court actions by Japanese citizens is rather slim due to the reluctance of the
Japanese people to resort to court actions.
One of the striking things that emerges from a study of this type,
therefore, is that the processes and degree of implementation of the
international agreements, in the three different constitutional systems, differs greatly. This could conceivably lead to some significant
disparities with respect to effective implementation of the international obligations. In a society where citizens have direct access to
judicial institutions to enforce their rights, and in those procedures
such citizens have the right to rely directly on the international
agreements, or on statutory implementation of these agreements
which embraces the language of the international agreements, it
would seem plausible that the international agreements would be
treated seriously. On the other hand, where such institutional mechanisms are not available to the ordinary citizen, or where whatever
does exist contains considerable leeway for the play of governmental
discretion, it is possible that government officials involved will find
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themselves at some point tempted to apply the international obligations less rigorously.

B. Implications for Future Negotiations
There are at least two important categories of implications with
respect to future negotiation on international economic matters
which stem from the analysis in this Article. First, there is the question as to in which of the types of subject matter that are likely to be
subjects of potential negotiations are constraints resulting from the
three constitutional systems most serious? And second, how should
negotiators be i;i.ffected by the fact that the processes of implementation in the three different constitutional systems vary so greatly?
With respect to the first question, one can examine the potential
constraints of the national legal constitutional systems on negotiations of a number of subjects, including trade in services, investment
and capital flows, and subjects that have or have not been previously
negotiated and relate to the more traditional merchandise trade matters. For example, with respect to the negotiation of services, there is
likely to be a major jurisdictional question within the EEC as to the
methodology of negotiating, approving and implementing international agreements on that subject. The same is likely to be the case
with respect to investment and capital flows. On the other hand,
with respect to negotiations that might continue on some of the leftover matters from the Tokyo Round negotiation, it is more likely
that the jurisdictional question will be considered clear, and that the
central EEC institutions will be deemed to have greater control.
In the United States, it is likely that the Congress will have to
give either advance authority to the executive branch to enter into
international negotiations and agreements on subject matters such as
services, or will retain for itself the ultimate right of approval of
whatever emerges from the international negotiation. This will have
a profound effect on the structure and procedures of the negotiation.
In Japan, there will be little jurisdictional problem in negotiating
and entering into international agreements on services and investment, since most of the powers in these areas are vested in some
Ministries of the National Government whose Ministers compose
the Cabinet. Problems may lie in the reluctance on the part of Ministries in charge of promoting and controlling these matters to adopt
international agreements which may adversely affect the interest of
industries under their jurisdiction.
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C. The Structure of the International Economic System
The basic thesis of this Article is that the international economic
system is a complex structure involving the intertwining of national
constitutional systems, and the international "constitutional system."
The international constitutional system is primarily that of GATT,
and the other international economic organizations such as OECD,
IMF, etc. For purposes of illustration here, we can focus on the
GAIT. Thus, we see the GAIT (which has, as indicated in the introduction, a very frail constitution, not designed to fill the role that
it has been forced to fill) as an international institution that strongly
depends on certain national governmental structures. Vice versa,
some of the national governmental structures concerned (particularly the United States) depend heavily on the existence of the
GAIT and its "system." United States law makes use ofGATT in a
number of ways. The Trade Act of 1974 and the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979 would make little sense without the existence of GAIT.
Conversely, at the time the GAIT was originally formulated, and at
the time the Tokyo Round agreements were being negotiated, the
United States constitutional and other law relating to international
trade had considerable influence on the shape of GATT and on the
various supplementary "codes" negotiated in the context of GAIT.
This Article has not been an examination of the GAIT itself; that
task has been taken up elsewhere. It is not our purpose here, therefore, to review some of the statements of concern about whether the
GATT can cope with contemporary international economic
problems and trends, and whether the GAIT needs some substantial
revision for that purpose. Our purpose here, however, is to comment
upon the total GATT system in the context of the relationship of the
GAIT to the national constitutional systems of GAIT members. In
this context, one can see strengths and weaknesses. The GATT has
managed to survive despite the disparity of constitutional systems,
and indeed, despite the disparity of economic systems. On the other
hand, it is clear that the GATT applies in a way that is uneven as
between economic systems, and may also be uneven as between constitutional systems. For example, there are practical effects of direct
citizen access to national judicial or administrative procedures
designed to enforce the international economic obligations. Is an international agreement really fair, when it is in fact implemented in
such varying manners in various countries?
In addition, national constitutional structures may influence the
ability of national representatives to negotiate effectively on behalf
of their national interests. The United States, for example, with its
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constant power struggle between the executive branch and the Congress, may in sonie circumstances find its ability to conduct international negotiations to be constrained, either because Congress has
not adequately delegated power to the executive branch which conducts the negotiations, or because in such a delegation the Congress
has laid out in too explicit detail the scope or range of maneuver of
the negotiators, thereby giving opposing negotiators some important
intelligence about those positions.
D. A Proposalfor the Future: .Direct Citizen Access to the
International System of Economic Obligations
Much has been written in recent decades about the tendency of
international law to accept as subjects of international law, individuals as well as national states. Without trying to get into the somewhat theoretical questions involved in those writings, we would like
simply to point out that it has now become established that it is possible to design procedures under which private citizens or firms have
some sort of access (usually limited) directly to international bodies
for the purpose of asserting their rights. 324 The two prime examples
of these types of procedures which come to mind are the European
Convention on Human Rights325 and the International Convention
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes.326 Under the former, an
individual citizen can go to an international body with a complaint
against his own government, on the grounds that his government has
violated its obligations under the international convention, namely
the European Convention on Human Rights, in a manner which has
directly affected that citizen. The international procedures then call
for a commission to look into the complaint and possibly to help
mediate a solution between the citizen and his government. Where
the commission feels it is justified, it may bring the complaint to a
court - the European Court on Human Rights. That court then has
the authority to rule whether or not the state concerned has violated
its obligations under the European Convention. Only states which
have explicitly accepted this fairly far-reaching procedure under the
324. W. FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 225-49 (1964),
325. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. See generally R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNA·
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 560 (1979),
326. Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, openedfar signature March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575
U.N.T.S. 159. See generally Broches, The Convention on the Settlement ofInvestment Disputes
Between States, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS 331 (Hague Acad. of Intl. Law) (1972).
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appropriate convention can be brought into these procedures by
their own citizens.
Likewise, the ICSID - International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes - set up under the auspices of the
World Bank, provides a mechanism by which those governments
who have accepted the ICSID in advance can subsequently provide
in any contract with a foreign private firm or citizen that disputes
about such a contract will be referred to an arbitration process set up
by ICSID.
There are some interesting potentials in these precedents for the
GATT and the international economic system. Although probably
not soon acceptable to governments which participate in the GATT,
one can envisage that at some point in the future, the policies that
call for greater predictability of national government economic actions in an increasingly interdependent world, and the policies which
move governments to desire a greater balance and equality of actual
de facto implementation of the negotiated international rules on economic matters, could lead governments to be willing to accept some
sort of a mechanism by which individual citizens or firms could appeal directly to an international body such as the GATT for a determination about whether a government, obligated under the GATT
or one of the GATT codes, has taken action inconsistent with its
international obligations.
Several particulars are likely to be necessary in any such procedure. First, a requirement that national internal administrative and
judicial remedies be exhausted seems appropriate. Second, some
sort of a "filter'' would probably be needed, much as is the case currently with the European procedure for human rights. Thus, some
international body, such as a GATT unit, could be charged with initially receiving the complaints from private citizens or firms, and
making a preliminary investigation to see whether there was any
merit in such complaints. This would be desired as a way to prevent
spurious complaints from getting very far. Third, it is likely that at
the outset, any procedure of this type would have to accommodate
itself to the lack of effective sanctions. It is doubtful that states
would at this stage be willing to accept such an international procedure if there were truly effective sanctions which could be applied.
This does not, however, make such a procedure useless. The mere
fact that there could be a reliable third-party determination with respect to the facts and the application of the law (the international
obligation) would itself be salutary. To a certain extent, the mere
fact of findings by an international arbitration panel, when such
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findings are made public, is itself a sort of "sanction," which many
governments try to avoid.
Clearly, the typical governmental reaction against relinquishing
any power, or against constraining its field of discretion, would discourage a move in the direction of the procedures described. On the
other hand, it should be recognized that there are some advantages
for governments in such a procedure. For one thing, if the procedure were carefully designed, and became reliable, governments
might well find that the procedure would tend to de-emphasize and
de-politicize many relatively minor trade or economic complaints
that now exist between nations. For example, let us assume that a
citizen in country A (we will call the citizen Mr. A ) finds that his
exports to country B are being restrained improperly by country B,
inconsistent with country B's international obligations. Under the
current procedure, Mr. A must go to his own national government
and get it to take up his matter with the foreign government. Thus,
his case has immediately been raised to a diplomatic level, and it
quite often means, by the nature of things, that it has been raised to a
fairly high level of official attention and consequently of public perception. On the other hand, if an appropriate international procedure existed, when Mr. A came to his government to complain about
country B, country A officials could refer Mr. A to that procedure
and encourage him to utilize it, without, however, the government of
country A itself taking any stand on the matter. There is then some
possibility that the issue could be handled more expeditiously and
routinely. The case would continue to be Mr. A 's case, and not become country A's case. The issue would be Mr. A versus country B,
instead of Mr. A and country A versus country B. Country A could
even make noises that it did not approve of Mr. A 's position, without, however, undercutting Mr. A 's rights in the international
procedure.
It is the view of at least one of the authors of this Article that, in
all probability, early versions of such a procedure would require
some kind of governmental "right of veto" on its own citizens' attempts to invoke the process. However, if this right were accorded to
national governments as a way to make them more comfortable with
experimenting with this procedure, such "veto" could be designed so
that during the course of time it would gradually die out (at least for
all but the most exceptional cases).
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E. Interdependence and Legal Systems:
Some Concluding Remarks
The stresses currently imposed on the international economic
system are formidable indeed. Phrases such as the "demise of
GATT," or the "failure of the exchange rate mechanism" are being
heard, as political leaders scramble for ideas and policies with which
to alleviate the economic pain of their constituents. Many of the
traditional assumptions of the Bretton Woods system are being questioned. People are asking if comparative advantage has the same
meaning today as in previous years, and whether "industrial policy"
as executed by some nations is a fair way to "play'' in today's world.
Political forces for protectionism loom large, and the traditional
rules often seem to be bent more than they are applied.
Arthur Dunkle, the current Director-General of GATT, has said
[I]ntemational economic policy commitments, in the form of agreed
rules, have far-reaching domestic effects, . . . . They are the element
which secures the ultimate co-ordination and mutual compatibility of
the purely domestic economic policies. They form the basis from
which the government can arbitrate and secure an equitable and efficient balance between the diverse domestic interests: producers vs.
consumers, export industries vs. import-competing industries . . . .
[O]nly a firm commitment to international rules makes possible the allimportant reconciliation, which I have already alluded to, of the
necesssary balance on the production side and on the financial side of
the national economy . . . .321

But if the rules are so important, they must be kept abreast of the
fast changing conditions of the world. This implies an orderly and
intelligent system by which the rules themselves can be changed.
The complex mix of national legal institutions and constitutions, and
the various international institutions are not now structured in a way
that gives one confidence that the international economic system can
evolve in an orderly fashion. What we have tried to do in this. Article
is to shed some light on the legal aspects of this international economic system, and particularly on the little-studied interrelationship
of the national legal.systems to this international system. In doing so
we hope we have contributed both to a modestly better understanding of that system and its strengths and weaknesses, and to stimulating further study of this perplexing subject.

327. GATI Press Release No. 1312 (Mar. 5, 1982).

